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Faith and religion have long been recognised as a dynamic force in the international system. 
Within the scope of Diplomacy Studies, however, the positive integration of faith into the 
theory and practices of diplomacy is only a recent endeavour. Faith-based diplomacy, which 
emerged in the 1990s, is a framework for achieving this effective integration. This thesis 
evaluates the theoretical constructs of faith-based diplomacy to assess if these frameworks are 
appropriate when addressing the challenges of the 21st Century. Given the changing nature of 
conflict, the implications of globalisation, and the impacts of global terrorism and religious 
violence, this thesis finds that the current theoretical frames are insufficient. As such, this 
thesis aims to reconceptualise the framework of faith-based diplomacy considering the 
theoretical advancements in Diplomacy Studies, and the changes in the international system 
since the faith-based diplomacy’s introduction into scholarship. A comprehensive review of 
the literature in Diplomacy Studies reveals that faith-based diplomacy can benefit from the 
expanded scopes of analysis, including areas such as public diplomacy and cultural 
diplomacy. This, along with the development of concepts such as reconciliation, mediation 
and the tracks of diplomacy all suggest that the theoretical framework of faith-based 
diplomacy can be improved. To expound on this improvement, this thesis evaluates the 
development of theory in Diplomacy Studies more broadly, recognising the presence of faith 
and religion in diplomatic theory through history. This thesis, however, will also assess the 
actors who engage with diplomacy, highlighting ways in which faith-based diplomacy can be 
utilised by both state and nonstate actors. In doing so, this thesis provides an evaluation of 
faith-based diplomacy in theory, and also in terms of how actors in the contemporary 
international landscape may be able to engage in practice. From this evaluation, this thesis 
concludes with key recommendations on how faith-based diplomacy’s framework can be 
reconceptualised to integrate more effectively the assets of religion into the practice of 
diplomacy. This reconceptualisation contributes to the growing body of scholarship within 
Diplomacy Studies by providing a theory that better reflects the nature of diplomatic theory 
and practice in the current international system.  
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The resurgence of religious feeling will continue to influence world events. [Policymakers] 
cannot afford to ignore this; on balance they should welcome it. Religion at its best can 
reinforce the core values necessary for people from different cultures to live in some degree of 
harmony; we should make the most of that possibility - Madelaine Albright.1  
 
 In 2015 the Pew Research Center released a report titled The Future of World Religions: 
Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050. The report revealed that the percentage of the 
world’s population unaffiliated to any religion will decrease from 16% in 2010 to 13% in 
2050.2 This statistic indicates that the presence of religion is not declining, but rather will 
remain or grow as a force in society in the future. The report also indicates that the percentage 
of the population adhering to the Islamic faith will grow to 29.7% of the world’s population in 
2050, with Christianity remaining the world’s largest religion at 31.4% of the population.3 
Likewise, ‘imported’ religions such as Islam and Buddhism have an increased presence in 
Western societies, based on migration and changing demographics.4 Traditional conceptions 
of religion and its place in the community are being tested by the reality of an increasingly 
pluralistic and globalised world.  Indeed, observers of international relations will have to 
contend with religion as a factor in decision making well into the century. Today, the 
importance of religion is not only indicated by its increased prevalence throughout the world, 
but also its centrality to much of the conflict that has unfolded within the prevailing 
international system.5 
 Religion’s presence in conflict is not a new phenomenon, with past conflicts ravaging 
modern Europe across Islamic-Christian and Protestant-Catholic lines. Religious conflict 
                                                          
1 Madelaine Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy," Review of Faith & International Affairs 4, no. 2 (2006). 9 
2 Pew Research Center, "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050," (2015). 
3 Ibid.  
4 For more see Peter L. Berger, "Religions and Globalisation," European Judaism 36, no. 1 (2003). For more 
from the Islamic perspective, see René Otayek, "Religion and Globalisation: Sub-Saharan Islam to Conquer 
New Territories," South African Historical Journal 61, no. 1 (2009). 
5 Douglas M. Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded," in Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping 
Realpolitik, ed. Douglas M. Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 4 
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began to increase again in global distribution from 1977.6 However, due to the deeper social 
and political roots that religion has within society, religious conflicts have been fought for 
longer periods than other types of conflict.7 Not only are religious conflicts often more 
entrenched and intractable, but studies suggest that they are fought more savagely.8 Fox notes 
that this has been evident by the wave of religious terror and militant movements, highlighting 
that this wave of religious conflict may outlast previous waves.9 The emergence of extremist 
religions, namely militant Islam through groups such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, has 
dramatically reshaped the Middle East.10 The ideology underpinning the expansion of such 
groups is radical and dogmatic, and has informed the contemporary understanding of terrorism 
as a globalised movement. The strong religious narrative presented has proven difficult for 
policymakers to curb as recruitment, the spread of ideology, and the threat of attacks have 
posed an increasingly global challenge. Followers are bound by religious symbolism and 
collective identity which is difficult to respond to effectively.11 The West in particular exhibits 
a longstanding inability to respond to the challenges of religion, and it is these challenges that 
will only intensify over time.12 Not only is religion often present in violent extremism, but in 
much of today’s identity and communal based conflict, religion plays a vital role.13 Therefore, 
there is a need for the development of frameworks to understand and implement the positive 
assets of religion, particularly in combatting violence and building peace. However, as Hehir 
notes, “there’s no place where a sophisticated understanding of religion as a public force in the 
world is dealt with”.14  As such, this thesis aims to construct a clear frame of analysis by which 
the place of faith, particularly in diplomacy, can be better understood.  
 Such an undertaking comes in the context of a renaissance in Diplomacy Studies – in 
the way that diplomatic theories are being explored, expanded and constructed15 – and one of 
these innovations has been faith-based diplomacy, first proposed as a scholarly perspective in 
                                                          
6 Jonathan Fox, "The Religious Wave: Religion and Domestic Conflict from 1960 to 2009," Civil Wars 14, no. 2 
(2012). 155 
7 Ibid. 155 
8 Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 3 
9 Fox, "The Religious Wave: Religion and Domestic Conflict from 1960 to 2009." 155 
10 Nicos Panayiotides, "The Islamic State and the Redistribution of Power in the Middle East," International 
Journal on World Peace 32, no. 3 (2015). Islamic State is also known by other names, these being Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Daesh. 
11 Stephan Rosiny, "The Rise and Demise of the IS Caliphate," Middle East Policy 22, no. 2 (2015). 95 
12 Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 5 
13 Douglas Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics," in Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, 
ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 3 
14 Hehir as cited by, Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 3 




1994. Douglas Johnston is recognised as a principle proponent of the theory of faith-based 
diplomacy, and notes that this form of diplomacy is typically conducted by nonstate actors who 
integrate the dynamics of religious faith in the processes of international peacemaking.16 As a 
conceptually new addition to the area of international relations more broadly, faith-based 
diplomacy can benefit from this renaissance in Diplomacy Studies, quite apart from being one 
of its strands. In further developing the theoretical understanding of faith-based diplomacy, it 
can be reconceptualised to address more effectively the religious challenges presented in the 
21st Century.  
 
Aims of the Thesis  
 The primary aim of this thesis is to contribute to the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies 
by reconceptualising the theoretical framework of faith-based diplomacy. To achieve this 
reconceptualised framework, this thesis has identified the research gaps by reviewing the 
pertinent literature. Fundamentally, religion needs to be better understood as a driver in the 
international system. Leonard highlights that religion has become a decisive trend in 
international politics and thus the operation of diplomacy needs to be rethought.17 Former 
United States (US) Secretary of State John Kerry called for foreign policy to construct a 
sophisticated approach to religion.18 When considering operationalisation, what is required is 
a form of diplomacy that seeks to understand the sources of conflict while actively also 
rebuilding relationships.19 Johnston has warned that government officials are often ill-equipped 
to engage in faith-based diplomacy, but there is potential for unofficial diplomatic agents to 
metaphorically pass the baton on to official government agents of diplomacy.20 Understanding 
the different tracks of diplomacy and where faith-based diplomacy would be best positioned is 
a topic that scholars have started to address. However, this remains underdeveloped.21 These 
gaps suggest a need for a frame of analysis that recognises the role of religion as a driver in the 
                                                          
16 Douglas M. Johnston and Brian Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement," in Faith-Based 
Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, ed. Douglas M. Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 15 
17 Mark Leonard, Andrew Small, and Martin Rose, "British Public Diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'," 
(London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005). 
18 John Kerry, "Religion and Diplomacy. (Cover Story)," America 213, no. 6 (2015). 
19 Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 
20 Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 




international system, that can better inform foreign policy, and that can place more effectively 
the different agents and actors of diplomacy.  
 When looking to diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution, primarily in situations 
where faith-based diplomacy can be a positive force for mitigating religious violence, several 
gaps are present in the literature. Finding commonalities between different religious traditions 
and values as a platform for resolution needs attention.22 Research on the dissimilarities 
between religions is well known; however, the focused understanding of the assets shared 
between religions to achieve peace23 is yet to be clearly articulated.24 The literature and 
practical expertise in conflict resolution need to adapt to the changing nature of conflict, 
including the impact of religion, before strategies are employed to resolve conflict situations.25 
Thus, reconceptualising faith-based diplomacy to understand its position as a tool for conflict 
resolution can satisfy these gaps.  
 Burnett has called for the scholarly literature of International Relations to attend to the 
intellectual framework of faith-based diplomacy because a well-constructed theory can exert a 
positive influence on the effectiveness of practice.26 More specifically, the field of Diplomacy 
Studies would benefit from a new, encompassing lens that analyses and engages the 
contemporary challenges of religious conflict and religious extremism.27 In 1994, the 
theoretical considerations of faith-based diplomacy were first published following discourse 
from diplomatic and academic contributors. One principal contributor to the scholarly lens, 
Douglas Johnston noted that, “today’s model leans heavily on the recycling of old approaches 
and adapting them to fit new problems, problems which they are ill-designed to 
                                                          
22 R. Scott Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of 
Peacebuilding," in Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, ed. Douglas M. Johnston (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  Catholic theologian Hans Küng’s Declaration of a Global Ethic, presented at the 1993 
Parliament of the World's Religions, was an effort to address this. So, too, in a broad fashion, were the United 
Nations Dialogue of Civilisations and later the Alliance of Civilisations that included dialogue among religions 
and sought conflict resolution. They were in contrast to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis of post-Cold 
War conflict. 
23 Early phases of exploration on this topic have taken place, namely Hans Küng, A Global Ethic for Global 
Politics and Economics (Oxford University Press, 1997). Attempts to run interfaith initiatives have also been 
conducted but scholars note that the theoretical frameworks for application have not been fully developed.  
24 Pauletta Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century," in Religion and Security: The New Nexus in 
International Relations, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 
25 William Vendley and David Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, 
and Christianity," in Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 313 
26 Stanton Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community," ibid. 
27 Douglas M. Johnston, Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual 
Engagement (California, United States: Praeger, 2011).  
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accommodate”.28 While there has been some movement to explore faith-based diplomacy’s 
application in conflict resolution, the theoretical, intellectual, and analytical framework for 
faith-based diplomacy still lacks cohesion.  
 Since faith-based diplomacy’s emergence as a scholarly construct in Diplomacy Studies 
in the 1990s, several scholars and practitioners have engaged with it to varying degrees. While 
some suggested that the theoretical framework for faith-based diplomacy already exists,29 this 
thesis seeks to demonstrate that theoretical advancements in faith-based diplomacy are 
necessary to address the changing nature of conflict and diplomacy in the current international 
system. As such, this thesis aims to review the literature of faith-based diplomacy and 
consolidate the theory’s advancements. This will result in a redesigned definition for faith-
based diplomacy, a revised construction of the theory’s central tenets, and a frame of 
understanding by which different actors can engage in faith-based diplomacy. By doing this, 
the absence of a sophisticated theoretical conceptualisation of faith-based diplomacy will be 
addressed in order to fill this gap in the literature.  
 
Methodological Considerations  
 As one of the central aims of this thesis is to consolidate the different streams of 
research surrounding faith-based diplomacy, this thesis will begin with an extended literature 
review. This approach to research is required since a detailed theoretical framework for faith-
based diplomacy does not exist, and both historical and methodological approaches need to be 
explored. Short case studies will be used as part of its analysis, with reference to examples 
throughout the thesis to demonstrate the practical application of the theories. Before providing 
a structure for the thesis, however, some comments will be made about the methodologies that 
have been employed previously on studies of faith-based diplomacy. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing analytical approaches will be highlighted to inform a systematic 
approach to new approaches to diplomacy presented in this thesis. These considerations will 
provide some insight into the scope of analysis applied to this study. Due to the nature of the 
field itself, data collection is limited regarding research on faith-based diplomacy. Most of the 
literature has utilised case studies and interviews as their primary methodology to gather data. 
Considering that the topic lends itself to qualitative research, this is to be anticipated. The 
                                                          
28 Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 333 
29 See Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community." 296 
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author responsible for most of the research on faith-based diplomacy is Douglas Johnston, and 
his edited texts form the bedrock for this thesis.30 A variety of scholars have contributed to 
these texts, and their larger bodies of work have also been considered in this thesis. However, 
their approach to studying faith-based diplomacy also relies heavily on the case analysis and 
interview approaches. Within the case studies, scholars rely on interviews and written 
documentation from primary sources such as media releases and government policies. Albright, 
who has also written from a diplomat’s perspective on the topic of faith-based diplomacy, 
interviews diplomats and government officials as her source of data collection. While these 
sources of information are helpful in building a qualitative data set, they are not without their 
limitations.  
 Johnston offers his critique of this methodology.31 He states that when selecting case 
studies, the bulk of the literature focuses on Christian religious traditions, and religions beyond 
Christianity are relatively underexplored in scholarship. As a result of this, there are areas 
within this thesis where there may seem to be a Christian bias in the analysis presented. This 
is not the intention of the author. However, as this thesis is reviewing the available literature, 
it is inevitable that this is reflected through analysis. Yet, in light of this critique, the scope of 
religions studied in Johnston’s second text, Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, 
does make a concerted effort to address this. While studies on faith-based diplomacy from 
various perspectives have begun, those perspectives remain underdeveloped. Johnston also 
notes that analysis developed from case studies is inherently subjective. The opinions and 
personal beliefs of different groups will ultimately impact the analysis of faith-based 
diplomacy. This is a concession that analysts must be mindful of when examining cases on 
something as inherently personal and identity-based as faith. Furthermore, Johnston recognises 
that the application of faith-based diplomacy to conflict resolution can be troublesome when 
measuring effectiveness as each conflict is unique and therefore can promote dissimilar 
conclusions.32 To balance this concern, this thesis looks to the work of Babb who discusses the 
methodological value of equivalences.33 When applying equivalences to literature, the 
researcher recognises that comparative cases will have areas of disagreement. While this is 
                                                          
30 These texts include his seminal text, edited with Cynthia Sampson: Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, 
Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Douglas Johnston, 
Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and, Johnston, 
Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement. 
31 See Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics."  
32 See "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm."  
33 J. Babb, A World History of Political Thought (Edward Elgar, 2018). 
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certainly the case between different religions, different conflicts, and different diplomatic 
approaches, equivalences in a methodological approach suggest that these disagreements aside, 
research will highlight areas of similarity. These similarities are valid, even with the 
fundamental differences between cases found in the literature. As this thesis aims to consolidate 
research and provide an overarching theoretical framework for faith-based diplomacy, these 
equivalences will be presented through the thesis. Regarding data collection, the role of faith-
based diplomats in peacemaking is limited in the analysis. Documentation on the topic is often 
fragmented, and coupled with the subjectivity of the interview process, data used to assert 
claims can be misguided. The result of this is that any conclusion drawn on in the issue of faith-
based diplomacy, or even on the role of religion in conflict resolution, can be either 
oversimplified into general terms or overcomplicated by existing cross-cultural differences. 
These limitations have been taken into consideration when undertaking the review of literature 
in this thesis and drawing inferences from available data.    
  
Scope and Structure of the Thesis   
 The central purpose of this thesis is to consolidate the research on faith-based 
diplomacy to provide a theoretical framework for future application and study. As such, this 
thesis is firmly scoped in Diplomacy Studies as a school of analysis within International 
Relations. The structure of this thesis has been designed to evaluate the literature of Diplomacy 
Studies to establish a firm foundation of scholarly analysis. This forms the theoretical 
background that grounds the analytical discussions of faith-based diplomacy for the rest of the 
thesis. Chapter 1 introduces the context for studying faith-based diplomacy, the aims of the 
research to fill the gaps in the literature, methodological considerations in studying faith-based 
diplomacy, and the structure for the thesis.  
 Chapter 2 begins the analysis of theory in Diplomacy Studies by discussing traditional 
diplomacy and the foundations of Diplomacy Studies. This focuses on what constituted 
diplomacy through history and how the traditional agent of diplomacy, the diplomat, engaged 
in diplomatic practice. The central functions of traditional diplomacy follow, with 
consideration as to where faith intersects with traditional diplomacy. The scholarship of 
diplomacy did evolve from this point, however, and Chapter 2 concludes by providing a 
contextual springboard for this theoretical transition.  
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 Chapter 3 is designed to expand on the theoretical base for analysis in Diplomacy 
Studies by examining the evolution of diplomatic theory from traditional diplomacy. The 
chapter begins by discussing the broader expansions in International Relations theory, from a 
positivist to a post-positivist lens, and how this shift impacted the study of diplomacy. Scholars 
have labeled this significant shift in the theories of Diplomacy Studies as the ‘new school’ and 
the ‘innovative school’. The central tenets, characteristics, and implications to the study of 
diplomacy for both schools are discussed in this chapter.   
 Chapter 4 takes the theoretical considerations of Chapter 3 and applies them to the 
actors that practise diplomacy. Where Chapter 2 looks at how the state engages in diplomacy, 
Chapter 4 considers how nonstate actors are involved in diplomacy. Intergovernmental 
organisations, nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations and individuals 
constitute the actors examined. This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the modes, channels and 
actors of diplomacy have expanded in line with the growth of theory in diplomacy studies. 
Thus, a comprehensive analysis of both diplomacy’s theory and practice is sought before 
assessing these constructs through the lens of faith-based diplomacy.   
 Chapter 5 establishes the context and framing of faith-based diplomacy. The 
importance of this chapter is to set the analytical parameters for the framework constructed in 
the latter stages of the thesis. To achieve this objective, the changing nature of conflict in the 
contemporary system is addressed, as is the changing character of conflict resolution. An 
important consideration in a thesis of this nature is defining the concepts of religion, spirituality 
and faith. The terms used in the thesis will be those that have been chosen by the authors 
referenced. Expanding on the definitions, Chapter 5 identifies the central characteristics of 
religion and faith. A necessary discussion in the foundation of a theory involving faith and 
international relations is that of secularisation. The separation of church and state, and the 
implications of that separation are also addressed in Chapter 5. The debate that many parts of 
the world are shifting into a post-secular society merits discussion in this chapter too. Also, the 
way that religion has re-emerged in the current international climate will be contended with to 
form the contextual requirements of the theory.  
 Chapter 6 turns to the theory of faith-based diplomacy. An overview of the term and its 
emergence in scholarship is conducted. Scholars have also provided several definitions for 
faith-based diplomacy. This chapter distils the similar elements of those definitions and, 
importantly, offers a revised definition for faith-based diplomacy. This chapter also identifies 
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the imperative characteristics of a faith-based diplomat, according to current theories. Finally, 
the chapter proposes the differences between faith-based diplomacy and another emergent 
theory for consideration in the field, that of interfaith diplomacy.  
 Chapter 7 presents the various scholarly perspectives that can support faith-based 
diplomacy as it has been defined in Chapter 6. The scholarship and theories of International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies are interrogated to highlight areas of complementarity with 
faith-based diplomacy. In particular, this chapter looks at new areas of scholarship, soft power, 
cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, to suggest a nexus for theoretical support. Chapter 7 
also presents the frameworks of analysis that are already available in faith-based diplomacy. 
This chapter seeks to establish the essential requirements to address the gap in Diplomacy 
Studies and provide a more sophisticated analysis of faith-based diplomacy’s theoretical 
underpinnings.  
 A consolidated conceptual lens of faith-based diplomacy isdeveloped in Chapter 8. 
Here, the central tenets of faith-based diplomacy and how actors engage in it are discussed. 
The central tenets of faith-based diplomacy identified through this thesis are a values-based 
approach to diplomacy, the role of reconciliation, religious freedom, how faith-based 
diplomacy can inform foreign policy, the place of religious leaders in the diplomatic process, 
the capacity for faith-based diplomacy to engage as a third-party mediator, and the way in 
which faith-based diplomacy can be utilised in multiple tracks of diplomacy. Chapter 8 also 
offers frames by which various international actors can incorporate faith-based diplomacy. The 
actors highlighted in this chapter include the state and diplomats, and nonstate actors including 
nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, places of worship, and individuals. 
When considering individuals, this primarily focuses on the role of religious leaders. Thus, this 
chapter offers the field of Diplomacy Studies a comprehensive presentation of faith-based 
diplomacy’s central tenets and the actors suited to engage in such diplomacy.  
 The final part of this thesis, Chapter 9, evaluates faith-based diplomacy in light of the 
framework provided. Here, the strengths of faith-based diplomacy are proposed, while 
recognising a number of limitations of faith-based approaches. Being aware of these limitations 
is integral to building more effective faith-based theories and strategies for the future. Finally, 
the chapter discusses the opportunities available for the future of faith-based diplomacy. This 
includes careful consideration of how this thesis can be of assistance in supporting future 
research in the field.  
10 
 
 At the conclusion of this thesis, a comprehensive analysis of faith-based diplomacy 
would have been performed. Not only will the idea of employing a faith-based diplomacy be 
conceptualised, but the examinations conducted in the theories of Diplomacy Studies will allow 
for it to be reconceptualised to serve more effectively the contemporary international system. 
This reconceptualisation will be evident by the revised definition of faith-based diplomacy, the 
comprehensive theoretical analysis, the presentation of central tenets for faith-based 
diplomacy, and a framework by which different actors can engage in faith-based diplomacy. 
With this reconceptualisation, practitioners and theorists of diplomacy will have an accessible 
theoretical lens of faith-based diplomacy to apply to the international system, expanding the 





















The purpose of this chapter is to establish the foundation of theory within Diplomacy 
Studies by examining traditional diplomacy. An understanding of the theory and practice of 
traditional diplomacy affords the basis for evaluating the evolution of Diplomacy Studies, 
ultimately resulting in an expanding scope featuring faith-based diplomacy. This chapter will 
outline the core definitions and theoretical tenets of traditional diplomacy, primarily through 
the scholarly contributions of practitioners historically. Hedley Bull’s conception of the 
functions of diplomacy will form the basis of the investigation into the central operations of 
diplomacy. Following this, the chapter will highlight intersections between faith and diplomacy 
based on historical evidence. The chapter will conclude with a brief outline of the limitations 
of traditional diplomacy and how those limitations prompted an evolution in diplomacy’s 
theory. As a result, this will provide the historical context for concepts discussed in this thesis.  
 
The Foundations of Traditional Diplomacy: Definitions, Thinkers, and Theory 
Diplomacy through History  
Diplomacy, as it is presently understood, is the product of a long period of historical 
development. The practice of diplomacy is informed by a rich historical tradition that places 
the state at the centre of diplomatic affairs. Typically, the origins of diplomacy are associated 
with the system of states emerging from the Westphalian Treaty in 1648 – and yet evidence of 
diplomacy and its institutions are recognisable in earlier human societies.34 Across the ancient 
world, from ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Rome and China, diplomatic institutions comprised 
a systematised process of communication, procedures and conventions to govern intergroup 
relations and to mediate between cultures.35 With the evolution of traditional diplomacy 
progressing from Roman to European diplomacy,36 notable features of Greek, Byzantine, 
                                                          
34 Donna Lee and Brian Hocking, "Diplomacy," in International Encyclopedie of Political Science, ed. Bertrand; 
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Venetian and French expressions of diplomacy have endured.37 This section will now outline 
some of the defining historical features of traditional diplomacy evident from these eras.  
The early foundations of the practice of Western diplomacy stem from the Hellenistic 
period. During this time envoys, embassies, heralds and emissaries would carry messages and 
negotiate in response to conflict.38 The Hellenistic era (323-31 BC) was renowned for its 
“ordered and predictable” diplomatic system, which was tested by the challenge of Roman 
conquest.39 The extended Roman period (64-1453) of diplomacy then reinterpreted basic 
mechanisms of exchange including diplomatic procedure, rituals and vocabulary.40 As the 
stability of Rome directly impacted its broader region, Roman allies, Greek states and 
extensions of the Roman Republic were all engaged in maintaining relations, of which the 
Roman state set the tone.41 This meant that once Rome came to dominate the Mediterranean, 
it had the controlling power of the diplomatic mechanisms. The Greek influence on the 
practices of diplomacy showed that the diplomatic institutions reflected the dynamic political 
life of Athens, where embassies and proxenoi (local citizens selected by foreign states to 
represent them)42 became an integral feature of political outlook and representation.43 The 
Byzantine (330-1453) style of diplomacy reflected the need for foreign cultures to be 
understood, whereby “the practical development of patterns of protocol and diplomacy” 
allowed for the development of communication mechanisms between great empires.44 Another 
key feature of Byzantine diplomacy was the control of information, secrecy and displays of 
military might.45 Notably, religious elements were bound in the construction of Byzantine 
diplomacy, which enabled dialogue between the East and Europe as a way of managing great 
powers.46 Characteristics of these different historical diplomatic traditions are evident in the 
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modern European context, highlighting the value of understanding the foundations of 
traditional diplomacy and its contribution to Diplomacy Studies.   
The European style of diplomacy draws on this historical context. Several units of 
power governed the relations between groups in this time. The relations between kingdoms in 
the medieval era, the mobilisation of the Holy Roman Empire and the authority of the Catholic 
Church as political entities dominated different diplomatic channels.47 Indeed, the Vatican 
developed an extensive corps of diplomats (nuncios), alongside the active collection of 
intelligence, designed to retain influence across Europe. The collapse of universal Christendom 
tested these systems. In response, a gradual increase of city-states, coupled with the acceptance 
of the idea of sovereignty, emerged on the international stage.48 This was most apparent with 
the advent of the Italian city-states system, wherein actors would facilitate communication and 
other diplomatic functions to ensure a balance of power between the city-states.49  This system 
was a precursor for the state system introduced by the Westphalian treaty. The shift to the city-
state system was bolstered by the rise of resident ambassadors in Renaissance Italy which 
reinforced diplomatic culture.50 It was in the late 15th Century that diplomatic theory began to 
appear as a scholarly consideration – albeit weak and stunted from growth.51 The 17th Century 
required a more practical diplomacy to manage the newly emerged state system.52 Later, the 
French style of diplomacy established a clear ordering to the diplomatic process, achieved 
through the intentional training of diplomats to create the French consular service – an 
institution which would promote trade and the French influence.53 This need for practical 
diplomacy to govern state relations in the post-Westphalian system mirrored the theoretical 
formulations of diplomacy that remained at the forefront of affairs between states well into the 
20th Century.54 As evident through history, traditional diplomacy is predicated on the conduct 
of formal relations between states.55 The mechanisms and features of formal relations between 
groups, city-states, and sovereign states, has been formed and reformed by the influence of 
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great powers throughout history. Not only did the historical trends heavily influence the 
formation of traditional diplomacy, but the practitioners of diplomacy – the diplomats – played 
an integral role in the construction diplomacy’s foundational theory.   
 
Traditional Diplomacy through the Lens of the Practitioner 
Observers conclude that the study of traditional diplomacy has been influenced more 
heavily by practitioners than academics.56 Accordingly, this section will examine prominent 
practitioners of diplomacy to understand how they contributed to traditional diplomacy’s 
theorisation. Berridge highlights that up to the end of the 17th Century, diplomacy was thought 
to concern the perfectibility of the ambassador and “his complex legal standing at a foreign 
court”, supporting the notion that the functions of the diplomat formed the basis of diplomatic 
theory.57 Sending, Pouliot and Neumann provide an overview of the diplomat’s role in 
constructing theory, stating that:  
Key texts have been written by diplomats like Sir Ernest Satow and Harold Nicolson 
and by statesmen like Henry Kissinger. This helps explain why diplomacy has often 
been defined by its purpose and ideal functions, or by the particular skills that the 
diplomat should have, either to excel in the “art” of resolving negotiations peacefully 
or more generally to define the national interest beyond the constraints and lack of 
vision expressed by elected politicians, as in the example of Talleyrand’s tenure at Quai 
d’Orsay, or in Kissinger’s idea that diplomats should balance the dual goals of 
advancing the state’s interests and maintain the state system.58 
Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte studied how ‘diplomatists’ (the old term for diplomat often 
used when referring to the traditional forms of diplomacy) informed theory in their text titled 
Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger. The following section will interrogate this 
text as the foundational source for examining the selected practitioners as the authors have 
consolidated the broader literature in this text. This will elucidate practitioners’ contributions 
to defining diplomacy while presenting traditional diplomacy’s central role. The key 
contributors featured in this section are Machiavelli, Richelieu, Callières, Satow, Nicolson and 
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Kissinger. These diplomats best represent diplomacy as a reflection of their respective 
international contexts. This section does not intend to give a comprehensive outline of the 
effectiveness of each of these diplomats, but rather it will highlight their respective 
contributions to traditional diplomacy. While it is recognised that there are a variety of 
theoretical perspectives that are evident in traditional diplomacy, the realist strands most 
prominently feature throughout this section as the central tenets of realist theory most closely 
align with the paradigm of traditional diplomacy.  
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) is widely recognised for his evaluation of power from 
a classical realist perspective formed through a career as a diplomat for the Republic of 
Florence.59 In simple terms, he focused on the state, how to bring stability to the state, the 
relations between states, and what might impact those relations.60 The essence of diplomacy 
for Machiavelli was that it was a key machinery of the state, particularly when gaining control 
of regimes.61 As Berridge notes, Machiavelli examined the genuine nature of raison d’état and 
wrote about themes which have implications for the methods and role of the ambassador.62 In 
evaluating the role of diplomacy, “Machiavelli’s fundamental assumption was actually that 
skill in the art of war was more important to the state than anything, including skill in 
diplomacy, because of his belief that ‘sound laws’ follow ‘sound arms’”.63 Even so, 
Machiavelli did acknowledge that diplomacy is important to great powers, even with 
significant military capacity, because prudent strategy values the avoidance of military 
overstretch.64 Machiavelli’s discussion of strategy, fear, deceit and human character all inform 
his conceptualisation of diplomacy’s purpose and place in society, as revealed through his own 
writings.65 Machiavelli assumed that good faith between states existed as fertile ground for 
negotiation.66 Diplomacy functions in this sphere of good faith; however, when that good faith 
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is tested, diplomacy becomes even more crucial.67 It is upon these assumptions that Machiavelli 
explored the roles and functions that diplomats had the responsibility to fulfil.   
Machiavelli commonly explored the general rules of human conduct, particularly in his 
early diplomatic reports.68 When considering the role of the ambassador, Machiavelli outlined 
the following tasks:  
1. The ambassador must encourage the prince to whom he is accredited to pursue 
policies congenial to the interests of his own prince, and refuse to consider 
policies to them;  
2. The diplomat must also submit advice on policy to his own prince, and at all 
costs defend his own prince’s reputation; 
3. He must, if instructed, engage in formal negotiations, and obtain information to 
report home; and, 
4. If possible, the ambassador must be aware of potential future developments.69  
Diplomatic reporting is an integral element to the foundation of key texts in Diplomacy Studies. 
As reflected in Machiavelli’s time, “the growing importance of diplomacy in Renaissance Italy 
as a whole also necessitated similar archival procedures and practices, especially for the 
preservation and [organisation] of diplomatic letters alongside the wider body of public 
records”.70 For Machiavelli, the diplomat had a civic duty to fulfil, and reporting advice, even 
if that advice may be deemed negative, fell within that duty.71 Machiavelli’s career as a 
diplomat reveals central features of traditional diplomacy beyond the importance of reporting. 
The two most important features are outlined by Russell. “Firstly, his public service 
exemplifies how professional diplomacy, by the end of the [15th Century], became one of the 
branches of statesmanship” and, “secondly, while the diplomatic arts might serve as an 
auxiliary component of statesmanship broadly conceived, the diplomat had to observe certain 
rules of negotiation and communication in his capacity as a reliable liaison.”72 In line with the 
developments in the international system made through the Italian Renaissance period, as a 
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practitioner of diplomacy, Machiavelli made significant contributions to the formation of 
theory in traditional diplomacy.   
Along with Machiavelli, another practitioner who made contributions to the field was 
Cardinal Richelieu. Armand Jean du Plessis was a Cardinal and Duke of Richelieu in France. 
In this role, he developed considerable political and administrative skills which allowed him to 
engage with the growing understanding of diplomacy at the time.73 Harold Nicolson wrote that 
the very origins of modern diplomacy could be traced to the impact of Cardinal Richelieu, as 
it was Richelieu who developed a new class of diplomatists who were active in promoting the 
state’s interests through ceaseless negotiation.74 His religious affiliation notwithstanding, 
Richelieu could express tolerance to people of different religious dispositions and would 
incline to reason over force.75 Richelieu’s political career spanned over many years with several 
significant posts, but the height of his career was being appointed as Chief Minister to King 
Louis XIII from 1624 till his death in 1642.76 At a time of religiously fuelled conflict, notably 
during the Thirty Years War, Richelieu worked to achieve two chief objectives: 1) “to forge 
unity within France and increase the authority of the crown” and 2) “to create a peace of 
Christendom”.77 This peace Richelieu pursued was intended to promote coexistence and liberty 
within Christendom.78 His methods to achieve this peace exemplify the hallmarks of traditional 
diplomacy in practice. He invested in the military and naval strength of France to extend the 
French national influence and worked to construct a balance of power within Christendom.79 
Even when declaring war on other states, Richelieu was known for seeking peaceful resolutions 
surreptitiously.80  
One principle that Richelieu famously contributed to Diplomacy Studies was that of 
continuous negotiation. This notion meant having diplomatic agents available anywhere there 
was a French interest, being active always.81 This network of agents would not only fulfil their 
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symbolic functions but also pursue negotiation and agreements where possible.82 This principle 
suggests that Richelieu’s priority in diplomacy was negotiation. For Richelieu, negotiations are 
most effective when they are directed by a single mind, acknowledging that different 
circumstances in negotiations required different responses, where secrecy in negotiation is 
essential, and where negotiators are keenly trained.83 Historians have examined the writings of 
Richelieu and have noted that Richelieu placed significant importance on clear and explicit 
diplomatic instruction.84 As a result, his writings and processes heavily influenced the early 
modern European practice of diplomacy as demonstrated in Richelieu’s publication Lettres, 
instructions diplomatiques et papiers d’état85.86 Richelieu is a significant figure to consider in 
the lens of this thesis. His writing and experience demonstrate an undeniable link between 
religious prominence and diplomatic activity. Most pertinent to this section, however, 
Richelieu markedly influenced the development of traditional diplomacy in theory and 
practice. 
Another notable diplomat from within the French diplomatic system was Francois de 
Callières, an author and diplomatic envoy. He was vitally important in bringing about the 
“elaboration of a diplomatic system of states articulated and mediated by the activities of 
resident envoys”.87 Hedley Bull wrote with great esteem of Callières’ work, calling it “the most 
important general analysis of diplomacy and its place in international society”.88 Scholars 
observe that Callières represented a uniquely French expression of diplomacy by reformulating 
the work of Richelieu. He also contributed to the body of literature in Diplomatic Studies 
through his key text The Art of Diplomacy.89 This text promotes diplomacy as a moderating 
influence, where:  
The pursuit of interests in relation to other states is taken to be compatible with 
[civilised] behaviour. Intelligence with respect to one’s own interests and that 
of others must however inform the conduct of foreign policy. Without 
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intelligence prudence is impossible, and in the absence of prudence men 
habitually come to rely on force.90 
 Callières’ observations highlight the need for order, where power politics and civilised 
behaviour are complementary.91 His work espouses the transition from a temporary, ad hoc 
approach of representation, to a system of regular representation.92 He identified that 
diplomacy was most active when the balancing and counterbalancing of great powers was 
apparent in the region.93 Keens-Soper quotes Callières as saying,  
In order to know truly the usefulness of negotiations, we ought to consider that 
all the States of Europe have necessary ties and commerces one with another, 
which makes them to be looked upon as members of one and the same 
Commonwealth. And that there can hardly happen any considerable change in 
some of its members, but what is capable of disturbing the quiet of all the 
others.94  
This quote demonstrates Callières’ appreciation of the balance of power approach to the 
international system. It also alludes to the role of negotiation that is not only continuous but 
also universal.95 By way of definition, Callières states that “the task of the negotiator is, by 
means of reason and persuasion, to bring princes to act on a true appreciation of their interests, 
rather than a mistaken one, and to recognise common interests, where these exist.”96 As a result, 
effective diplomacy needs to come from its own independent profession, where the art of the 
negotiator is the primary concern.97 By extension, Callières saw a role for the diplomat to 
engage in conflict resolution, actively negotiating in peace politics.98 Callières wrote during a 
time between great conflicts, and his writing provides an understanding of diplomacy in this 
environment, focusing on political interest.99 His approach consolidates the foundation of 
diplomatic theory set before the Thirty Year War, and provides form to diplomacy in the 
Westphalian state system, giving political direction to the discussion of diplomacy in a time of 
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transition.100 With the establishment of the Westphalian state system, diplomacy’s theory and 
practice became a more recognisably European institution. 
Modern European diplomacy emerged from the era of distinct French influence. 
European diplomacy was also heavily influenced by British diplomats, where the diplomatic 
character was rich with literary tradition, making the British development of diplomacy 
pertinent to the discussion of diplomatic theory. 101 As Otte states, “perhaps one of the most 
exceptional representatives of the literary tradition of British diplomacy was Sir Ernest 
Satow”.102 His early career placed Satow as a valuable bridge between East and West as he 
became one of the best-informed diplomats in the East due to his diplomatic roles in Japan.103 
Satow’s active career saw him engage with diplomatic questions arising from Western 
imperialism in the East, the Anglo-Japanese alliance and China’s territorial unity; however, 
when his career ended, the policy direction on these issues changed.104 He remained keenly 
interested in scholarship as evidenced by his most famous work, The Guide to Diplomatic 
Practice.105 This text earned Satow the reputation as a leading authority on the practice and 
theory of diplomacy, and The Guide to Diplomatic Practice is still regarded today as a classic 
exposition of diplomacy.106 His work outlines the practical application of diplomacy. The text 
intended to propose a form of diplomacy that might be a more effective tool for conduct in 
international relations, avoiding the need to resort to military violence.107 To the student of 
diplomacy, Satow’s text is seminal as it elaborates on three valuable insights, being the changes 
of the European diplomatic tradition, the international political environment of the time, and 
the position of diplomacy as an integral tool of statecraft.108 As is common in traditional 
diplomacy, Satow identified precedents for diplomatic rules and processes from history and 
used history to highlight the problems of statecraft to best improve diplomatic practice.109 By 
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examining history, Satow was able to prescribe the practice of diplomacy and inform 
diplomacy’s theoretical base.  
Diplomacy, in Satow’s often quoted definition, “is the application of intelligence and 
tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states”.110 
Satow’s definition highlights the context of the international system and how ingrained the 
institution of diplomacy had become in the Westphalian state system. This system is one where 
independent states work to maintain mutual relations to develop a “society of [civilised] 
nations” where diplomacy is the pursuit of state interest but also works as a moderating 
influence.111 This process of moderating and maintaining relations was a dynamic and complex 
process for Satow, with the diplomatist being required to distinguish threats to a government’s 
interests within changing circumstances.112 Satow outlines specific tasks that are imbedded in 
the role of the diplomat. These include: to watch over the maintenance of good relations, to 
protect the interest of their government, to actively report to their government.113 Further, in a 
similar vein to Callières, the diplomatist is to watch over the execution of treaties, to make 
representations, minimise tension and manage disputes arising between the governments to 
which they are accredited and the government they represent.114 These characteristics are still 
repeated by scholars in the contemporary context, thus demonstrating the impressive 
contribution Satow has made in theorising the practice of diplomacy. Satow was able to anchor 
diplomacy in international affairs within the great power state system of the early 20th 
Century.115 When examining Satow’s influence on the theory and practice of diplomacy, the 
observer should note that 
Satow’s work is a clear and precise exposition of the essence of diplomacy, and 
as such it has become by no means archaic. On a more practical level, the 
illustrations of diplomacy in action and the advice to practitioners offered by 
Satow deserve to be given due attention.116 
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His text remains a hallmark of scholarship in Diplomacy Studies, and his prescriptive writing 
informs the frameworks of diplomacy in the modern context. The form of diplomacy Satow 
represents typifies the character and practical nature of traditional diplomacy.  
Like Satow, Harold Nicolson expanded the British literature on diplomacy and wrote widely 
on various aspects of diplomatic history, theory, and practice.117 In contrast to Satow, though, 
he wrote with more ease and fluency which changed the tone of his writing on diplomacy.118 
Nicolson maintained the hallmark of traditional diplomacy in that he viewed the world ‘through 
the embassy window’, meaning his preference was for state-qua-state relations on the 
international stage.119 Hailing from a political pedigree, Nicolson turned easily to diplomacy 
for his career.120  The key texts that influenced the theory and practice of diplomacy written by 
Nicolson included Diplomacy and The Evolution of Diplomatic Method. Both sought to explain 
“the transformation of diplomatic practice in the aftermath of and in response to the Great 
War”;121 and his writing showed what diplomacy is and what it is not. 122 Nicolson’s texts also 
explore the changes to the international system from the inter-war period’s Wilsonian Idealism, 
to a post-war realist pragmatism.123 This underpinning shift is supported by Nicolson’s 
preference of the balance of power as being the best method to preserve peace and security in 
the post-war era.124 His approach to international politics embraced realist assumptions about 
the prevalence of power. However, he also acknowledged the moral dimensions of politics, 
drawn from the Graeco-Roman-Christian tradition which forms the foundation of modern 
Western civilisation.125   
When defining diplomacy, Nicolson would often quote Satow’s definition, approving 
of its central ideas. However, in his writing, he would expand on certain concepts. Some of 
these additions to Satow’s definition include: ‘Diplomacy essentially is the organised system 
of negotiation between sovereign states’; ‘…diplomacy is neither the invention [n]or the 
pastime of some particular political system, but is an essential element in any reasonable 
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relation between man and man and between nation and nation’; ‘Diplomacy is… ordered 
conduct of relations between one group of human beings and another group alien to 
themselves’; ‘Diplomacy…designates… the art of negotiation’; and ‘the aim of sound 
diplomacy… is the maintenance of amicable relations between sovereign states. Once 
diplomacy is employed to provoke international animosity, it ceases to be diplomacy and 
becomes its opposite, namely war by another name’.126 Otte asserts that the central thinking in 
Nicolson’s definitions is that there is a distinct element of alienation and separation between 
group identities, that diplomacy is an inevitable outcome of relations between groups and there 
should be some conduct and order to these relations, and finally that this system is essentially 
one of negotiation.127 One key feature that Nicolson would purport is that students of diplomacy 
must avoid empirical generalisations, because in his view “diplomacy is the most protean” of 
human activities. 128 Protean diplomacy means that diplomats and their governments will need 
to adapt to political, military, and economic changes which would influence diplomatic 
initiatives. 129 Nicolson’s key texts and definitions of diplomacy cement the value of traditional 
diplomacy following World War 1.   
When considering the evolution of diplomatic theory, Nicolson was a key theoretician 
at the time of the proclamation of ‘New Diplomacy’. The theory of new diplomacy is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3. However, for the sake of understanding the context of Nicolson’s 
writing, some considerations must be made. Wilsonian ideals exemplified new diplomacy as 
“open covenants openly arrived at” as opposed to the traditional secrecy of old diplomacy.130 
Hedley Bull noted that Nicolson saw the push toward open covenants “as an advance upon the 
Old Diplomacy, in so far as it makes possible parliamentary control of foreign policy and 
provides a safeguard against secret treaties of the sort that were concluded before and during 
the First World War.”131 This concerned Nicolson as it challenged the diplomat’s role in 
international negotiations.132 Even in this climate of change, Nicolson saw the core element of 
diplomacy in the traditional way – essentially that negotiation was an ordered framework based 
on representation between sovereign states.133 Thus, for Nicolson, ‘new diplomacy’ was merely 
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a mirage. The changes which occurred reflected a shift in the centre of power, but not the 
essential principles of diplomacy.134  Regarding the understanding of diplomacy in the modern 
environment, Nicolson stressed the impact of policy-making on diplomacy.135 The construction 
of policy based on popular opinion in democratic channels could challenge the way 
diplomatists function, and their resultant effectiveness, an observation upon which Henry 
Kissinger would develop in his later works. 136 Nicolson, like other practitioners examined in 
this section, did proffer his formulation of ideal diplomacy. This diplomat must work within 
four principles. First, no government should give secret pledges or conclude secret treaties – 
diplomacy and foreign policy should not be confused.137 The second principle is that 
governments should not make promises they cannot fulfil. 138 Third, the country’s response has 
to be proportionate with its strength. Thus, the government needs to know its relative 
strength.139 Fourth, self-preservation is the most permanent of human desires, and therefore the 
maintenance of national security is the most compelling ideal of foreign policy.140 The diplomat 
should communicate these underpinning principles through what Nicolson characterised as the 
qualities that constituted the ideal diplomat:  “truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, 
modesty and loyalty.” 141 Many of these characteristics are displayed in his lectures, diplomatic 
writings and demonstrate Nicolson’s commitment to clear diplomatic practice even in a 
changing environment.142 At the end of his career, Nicolson was credited with rendering an 
objective account of the nature of diplomacy and establishing its immutable, essential elements 
in a time of great international change.143  
The final key figure examined in this section of the thesis is Henry Kissinger. The 
international system of his time was remarkably different from that of the practitioners 
discussed previously. Kissinger represents an American expression of diplomacy in the Cold 
War era, where he brought a realist, practical sense of conduct to the American brand of 
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diplomacy, while still representing the central characteristics of traditional diplomacy.144 
Kissinger is well regarded for his extensive list of writing achievements. Most notable for this 
study is his text Diplomacy, which outlines the history of post-Westphalian international 
politics to the end of the Cold War. Kissinger states in his text that “examining how statesmen 
have dealt with the problem of world order – what worked or failed and why – is not the end 
of understanding contemporary diplomacy, though it may be its beginning” which suggests 
that, like previous diplomatic scholars, Kissinger is interested in building upon the historical 
accounts of diplomacy to suggest ideal diplomatic behaviour in the international system.145 
Diplomacy demonstrated “a virtual transplant from the world of thought into the world of 
power… a unique experiment in the application of scholarship to statesmanship, of history to 
statecraft”.146 His writing maintained the state-centric lens, with his approach to academic work 
being rooted in the classical tradition of historically saturated political theory, which is 
consistent with the core tenets of traditional diplomacy.  
Otte discusses the two main assumptions of Kissinger’s writings. The first is that the 
present is historically grown, and second, there is a key role of philosophy.147 Instead of using 
‘diplomat’ as the term for a practitioner, Kissinger preferred the title of ‘statesman’, which 
reflected his classical leanings to the outworking of diplomacy as a form of statecraft.148 When 
outlining his version of the ideal statesman (a term, one notes, is gendered in line with the 
understanding of traditional diplomacy as male-oriented), Kissinger supported the idea that the 
statesman must be prepared to grapple with the circumstances, to wrench politics from the tight 
fist of the past in order to reshape reality, being endowed with extraordinary gifts of charisma, 
perseverance, sober analysis, and the intuitive understanding of any given situation and the 
forces within.149 To be fully effective, these must translate into a proper understanding of 
policy.150 The statesman, according to Kissinger, would operate within a specific international 
environment which maintains the hallmarks of classical realist thought.151 In fact, Kissinger 
was known to speak “of realist theory to provide academic justifications for policies tailored 
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to political needs”. 152 Kissinger approached international relations through geopolitical and 
strategic perspectives – a reflection of traditional European power politics.153 In this approach, 
states are the primary actors, concerns for national security motivate their actions, and the 
international system requires order and stability.154 This demonstrates how firmly Kissinger 
applied the realist perspective to the international system, and how principles of traditional 
diplomacy were embedded in his policy approach even in a relatively recent era.   
For Kissinger, the diplomat must understand how to operate within the international 
system and be a contributing agent to global order. Through the time of his writing, the Cold 
War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a determining factor of instability. As a result 
of the significant weight nuclear weapons applied to international relations, diplomacy’s ability 
to exert pressure, while still present, weakened.155 Yet, diplomacy was still involved in the 
many international disputes around the globe during the Cold War.156 In this context, 
“diplomacy, therefore had become the complement to war rather than remaining an alternative 
to it.”157 To highlight the value and influence of diplomacy, Kissinger understood the 
international system as a complex balance of powers and found that “it is within a functioning 
equilibrium that diplomacy operates at its best”.158  
Diplomacy, like statecraft, requires a degree of intuition to reach its full potential, which 
is why Kissinger refers to it as an art.159 Kissinger’s definition of diplomacy is “the art of 
relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force.”160 However, 
this does not mean that diplomacy is void of a role in military affairs. For Kissinger, 
negotiations are the main instrument of diplomacy. This was evident in his favouring of 
negotiations in his approach to politics in his role as the US Secretary of State. Some observers 
expressed concern at this involvement in the political office, which may tarnish a legitimate 
contribution to diplomatic theory. Otte offers a counter to this point, arguing that: 
By highlighting the link between diplomacy and politics he very effectively 
circumscribed the potential of diplomacy as the main tool of international 
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politics as well as its limits. His conception of this tool is firmly rooted in 
traditional European diplomacy, as, for instance his emphasis on the need for 
reliability and honesty demonstrates. Similarly, however much he was in the 
political limelight, in practice he relied on the classic usages of secrecy and 
patience in negotiations. His insistence on the need for thorough preparation of 
conferences and summit meetings also harks back to the precepts of classical 
diplomatic writers.161  
The evaluation of Kissinger highlights the relationship among foreign policy, politics, and 
diplomacy in the modern era. Furthermore, Kissinger’s approach to international relations 
demonstrates the enduring features of the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy over 
time.   
Traditional diplomacy is understood best through the eyes of a practitioner and sets the 
foundation of what constitutes diplomacy. Before evaluating the specific functions of 
traditional diplomacy, this chapter will now examine the core characteristics of traditional 
diplomacy as outlined by practitioners and scholars in the field of Diplomacy Studies. This will 
provide a summary of key ideas in the scope of traditional diplomacy before understanding 
how traditional diplomacy functions in the international system.  
 
The Characteristics of Traditional Diplomacy   
  This section will briefly present the central tenets of traditional diplomacy drawn from 
the analysis of key thinkers and practitioners. Traditional diplomacy is predicated on the 
conduct of formal relations between states, reflecting the realist perspective of International 
Relations.162 This interaction occurs through foreign ministries or organisations that represent 
independent states. Within traditional diplomacy, the business of diplomacy is conducted only 
to achieve the state’s interests in meeting foreign policy objectives.163 In this context, diplomats 
work to achieve the aims of the state they represent, and until units other than the state can 
assume a state’s power, this trend will remain.164 The definitions of diplomacy put forward by 
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scholars reflect these notions. Satow’s definition of diplomacy, being “the application of 
intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of 
independent states”, is still maintained by several scholars as the benchmark of traditional 
diplomacy.165 Even in the modern context, Kissinger did not depart too far from this definition 
when he stated that diplomacy is “the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather 
than by the exercise of force.”166 Hedley Bull synthesises the different definitions of diplomacy 
to find that when defining diplomacy, three consistent features emerge. They are:  
1. The conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics 
by official agents and by peaceful means.  
2. Such conduct of relations by professional diplomatists.   
3. Such conduct of relations between states that is carried out in a manner which is, in the 
everyday sense of the term, ‘diplomatic’.167 
These are broad categorisations of the core features of diplomacy, and Bull concedes to the 
potential limitations of these definitions. However, they are helpful to understand traditional 
diplomacy. A simplified definition of diplomacy offered by Kerr and Wiseman is “the process 
and institutions by which a country represents itself and its interests to the rest of the world”.168 
In this definition, diplomacy is a tool of statecraft utilised as an instrument of governing 
relations between states.169 Scholars such as Berridge maintain that the chief purpose of 
diplomacy is for states to achieve their goals, meaning that states are the primary actor to 
engage in the diplomatic process.170 After surveying the scholarship of diplomacy studies, 
Murray posits that there are five key features of traditional diplomacy, being:  
1. Diplomacy is a state function;  
2. Diplomacy is a study of sovereign states overcoming the anarchical nature of the state 
system;  
3. Highlighting the importance of the high political agenda, typical in terms of security 
architecture;  
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4. Diplomatic and political history is central to the school of thought, and  
5. Theorists within the traditional school write prescriptive guides to the practice of 
diplomacy.171  
These characteristics are consistent with the analysis of the historical trends of diplomacy.  
 
The Functions of Traditional Diplomacy  
Traditional diplomacy is best understood both in terms of its theoretical construction 
and how it operates in practice. That is why the theory of traditional diplomacy generally 
focuses on prescribed manuals of diplomatic behaviour. Hedley Bull is regarded as a prominent 
thinker in the study of diplomacy and has outlined specific functions of diplomacy as derived 
from theory and practice. This section will examine those five functions. Bull discusses the 
definition of diplomacy but does contend that the traditional conceptions of diplomacy required 
expansion in the contemporary international environment. He begins to extrapolate on the 
potential areas of concern with the traditional constructs of diplomacy, for example when he 
states, “we must apply the term diplomacy to the official relations not only of states but also of 
other political entities with standing in world politics.”172 However, Bull does note that the core 
elements of traditional diplomacy remain as the official relationships between sovereign states. 
This is reflected in the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities which 
codified diplomatic practice. This Conference confined the diplomatic practice to the 
traditional scope of diplomacy.173 When considering traditional diplomacy in a modern 
environment, Bull suggests observers bear in mind the following distinctions:  
1. Diplomacy includes both the formulation of a state’s external policy and its 
execution.  
2. Diplomatic relations are either bilateral or multilateral [relations].  
3. Diplomacy may be either ad hoc or institutionalised. 
4. Distinction should be made between the ‘diplomatic’ and the consular branches 
of the conduct of international relations.174  
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To understand the way that diplomacy interacts and informs international order, Bull outlines 
five functions of diplomacy. These are communication, negotiation, intelligence, the 
minimisation of friction and the symbolic function of diplomacy. Bull selected these functions 
as they are “the functions which diplomacy has fulfilled in relation to order within the modern 
states system.”175 These five functions will be used to structure analysis within the remainder 
of this section.  
The first function proposed by Bull is communication. Bull expresses the importance 
of communication within diplomacy by stating that “diplomacy facilitates communication 
between the political leaders of states and other entities in world politics. Without 
communication there could be no international society, nor any system at all. Thus, the most 
elementary function of diplomatists is to be messengers...”176 Beyond simply exchanging 
messages, however, messages need to be understood and interpreted.177 That is where the 
diplomat is crucial to successful communication. The way that the diplomatist interprets a 
message depends on several contextual elements. This includes the person who sent the 
message, the person who received it, the circumstances of the message being sent, the previous 
history of exchanges, the content of the message, and what may be omitted in the message. 178 
Bull summarises the function of communication within diplomacy as follows:  
Diplomatists are specialists in precise and accurate communication. They are 
more than mere couriers or heralds; they are experts in detecting and conveying 
nuances of international dialogue, and are equipped not merely to deliver a 
message but to judge the language in which it should be couched, the audience 
to whom and the occasion at which it should be presented.179 
Other scholars support the importance of communication within the theory of 
diplomacy. Jönsson and Hall illuminated the recurring feature of communication in diplomacy 
in their study titled Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy. They quote Tran who 
states that “whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of 
diplomacy, is dead…”180 Stearns labels communication as the essence of diplomacy.181 
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Constantinou and James even define diplomacy as a process of communication.182 These 
scholars explicitly present communication as being essential to the diplomatic process, 
establishing the importance of communication to the theorisation of diplomacy within the 
traditional school. 
Jönsson and Hall outline that the basic aspects of diplomatic communication are the 
gathering and transmission of information.183 This communication between diplomatists, the 
government they represent, and the government to which they are assigned, can be performed 
verbally, nonverbally, privately and publicly – amongst other categorisations.184 The processes 
by which diplomats communicate have been ritualised within the institution of diplomacy, and 
although the institution of diplomacy has adapted and evolved, communication remains the 
essential aspect of the diplomatic process.185 The following paragraph will examine changes to 
the methods and theory surrounding communication in diplomacy, but Jönsson and Hall 
caution against a preoccupation of the revolution in communication technology at the expense 
of understanding the enduring features of diplomatic communication.186 
A point of consideration in communication concerns the forms and channels in 
diplomats utilise to communicate in the current international system. Pamment examines the 
impact of ‘mediatization’ on diplomacy. This term refers to the ways that communication 
technologies are integrated into activities, even in the diplomatic context.187 This means that 
diplomatic actors are communicating in new ways. However, the fundamental need for 
communication as a part of diplomacy remains. Pamment elaborates in his study on the 
connection between communication, diplomacy, and public diplomacy. What is important in 
this analysis is that, even in changing diplomatic contexts, the role of communication is still 
being considered, evaluated and re-evaluated as a central feature of diplomacy.188 Beyond the 
technological impact on the methods of communication, the media more broadly is being 
utilised by states as an instrument of communication.189 During the process of negotiations, the 
media constantly communicate messages that can assist or hinder the overall diplomatic 
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outcome, meaning that communication must be considered on several fronts.190 The methods 
of communication in diplomacy have expanded, but communication remains a key 
consideration in the practice of diplomacy.   
Not only has communication been examined through the lens of the practice of 
diplomacy, but also in the theorisation of diplomacy. This is evident in the expansion made to 
the field of public diplomacy. A prominent scholar in the field, Joseph S. Nye, suggests three 
dimensions of public diplomacy being “daily communication, explaining policy decisions; 
political campaigns built on a few strategic themes; and long-term relations with key 
individuals”.191 Each of these features relies on the application of communication at multiple 
levels. Even as it translates to the international policy level, multiple modes of communication 
can be integrated, such as the mass communication approach often taken by the United 
States.192 Strategic communication, a concept featured in the theorisation of public diplomacy, 
looks at the role of communication in policy construction. Paul quotes Bruce Gregory, stating, 
“we know that exponential growth in mobile phone, social media, and viral communication is 
changing diplomacy and armed conflict” and the institutions of diplomacy are still contending 
with how to manage these modes of communication best.193 Communication is having a 
significant impact, not only in policy but in the construction of the message to communicate 
policy. Importantly, the function of communication in diplomacy remains as integral in the 
modern environment as it was when Bull assessed it during the Cold War period. When 
considering the success of public diplomacy strategies, the strategy must align with political 
and communication dynamics evident in that strategic landscape.194 This strategic level of 
communication is evident in areas of connectivity, interactivity and cultural exchange.195 
Although these issues are still examined in their respective fields, the central role of 
communication is primary in the theory, practice and future of diplomacy. Communication is 
an essential feature of traditional diplomacy, but also to Diplomacy Studies more broadly.  
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The second function of diplomacy highlighted by Bull is negotiation. Bull explains the 
importance of negotiation by stating that, “without the negotiation of agreements, international 
relations would be possible but they would consist only of fleeting, hostile encounters between 
one political community and another.”196 Although interests between parties are different, the 
skilled diplomat can determine where interests overlap, knowing that this space is the fertile 
ground for productive negotiations.197 An underpinning assumption of the international system 
is that states are rationally pursuing their self-interest. Within this process, state representatives 
can understand their interests, and other parties’ interests and negotiate within the rational 
decision-making process.198 The significance of negotiation as a function of diplomacy is of 
particular importance to the practitioner. This was shown earlier in the chapter when assessing 
the contributions of Callierés, Satow, and Nicolson. Bull notes that within the traditional scope 
of diplomacy, professional diplomats are skilled at formulating and promoting proposals. 199 
These proposals are then put forward in negotiations, generally conducted in private, with 
members of the negotiating profession who have built confidence and mutual respect with one 
another over time.200 The function of negotiation is an essential element to consider when 
outlining the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy. 
Within diplomacy, negotiation is the fundamental means of reaching the potential 
settlement of conflicts and crises.201 Some scholars see negotiation as the institutional 
framework for diplomacy between states. Therefore, diplomatic negotiation is evidence of a 
functioning state system.202 This exemplifies how central negotiation is in understanding the 
theories of traditional diplomacy. The negotiator is a key channel to project and represent the 
state and the state’s interests. The diplomat must understand and relay varying styles, cultures, 
rules, traditions, and symbols – all becoming integrated in negotiations.203 This notion of 
representation is central to successful negotiations. An individual negotiator needs the support 
of the body they represent, which is why the networks between the diplomat and the state are 
well established.204 This is clear in both theory and practice. Historical accounts of negotiations 
between nations are documented through the Greek and Roman era, particularly when 
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mitigating conflict between warring parties, such as with Attila in 425 AD.205 The conduct of 
negotiations between parties during the Middle Ages is also clear in classical texts, where 
dignitaries and members of religious organisations would represent and negotiate agreements 
with other groups.206 In the same way that diplomatic theory is developed by evaluating history, 
examining the methods of negotiation in conflicts through history has influenced the theories 
of negotiation.207  Negotiation, being an interactive and communicative process, shows the 
interlinked nature of the functions of diplomacy – successful negotiations requires effective 
communication.  
Negotiation is an important facet of the diplomatic peace process. Scholars within the 
conflict resolution field have reinforced the importance of timing in negotiations. The diplomat 
needs to understand when to begin negotiations and the appropriateness of conducting 
negotiations with certain parties.208 Scholars such as Zartman suggest that diplomats look for 
a stage at which both parties see no advantage in continuing in conflict – that is, a stalemate – 
to determine the ripeness of negotiation.209 This demonstrates the importance of negotiation in 
diplomacy, but also the skill required for a diplomat to enter negotiations effectively. As the 
study of negotiation is expanding in the conflict resolution field, the versatility and importance 
of diplomacy across many disciplines are apparent. Beyond negotiating to resolve conflict, 
negotiation is also a method of rule-making in the international system, and is important in 
both treaty formation and multilateral diplomacy.210 This makes effective negotiations essential 
as a force that can contribute to conflict prevention.   
Due to the changing nature of conflicts in the 21st Century, some scholars are concerned 
with the diplomat’s ability to negotiate within identity-based conflicts. Here, the diplomat 
needs to understand how to de-escalate tension while developing a problem-solving approach 
which can change the framework for future negotiations.211  Within the scope of traditional 
diplomacy, state-to-state negotiations are well understood. However, diplomats that represent 
states are confronted by the challenge of negotiation with religious and/or ethno-nationalist 
groups to reach peaceful settlements.212 This is evident in the proliferation of terrorist and 
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insurgent groups in recent history. Thus, the need for the diplomat to engage in negotiations 
successfully is more complex but perhaps more vital.  
The next function proposed by Bull is the function of information or intelligence 
gathering. This function of diplomacy refers to “the gathering of intelligence or information 
about foreign countries” as a state’s external policies need to be based on reliable intelligence 
concerning other states.213 When considering it as a function for diplomats to perform, “the 
professional diplomatist is uniquely skilled in gathering a particular kind of information that is 
essential to the conduct of international relations”.214 An interesting consideration about this 
function is that it is not just about finding information about another party. Rather, the 
diplomatic agent is also tasked with denying their counterparts sensitive information, while 
supplying information that is more favourable.215 This is where the notion of secrecy in 
diplomacy is important to understand and is perhaps where the duplicitous reputation of the 
diplomatic institution has originated. Bull outlines the historical development of the function 
of information gathering in diplomacy. In the 17th and 18th centuries, as the balance of power 
was the key concern of international politics, diplomats would be gatekeepers of a constant 
flow of information that maintains a favourable balance.216 In the 17th Century, the sultans of 
the Ottoman Empire established networks of diplomats - a rudimentary form of the diplomatic 
corps - as it was an indispensable source of intelligence.217 In the early part of the 19th Century, 
the gathering of intelligence and the selective access of information from institutions became 
formalised, primarily through military attaches.218 The diplomat needs to evaluate and 
understand how intelligence influences the government’s political leadership, how intelligence 
will influence policies over the long term, and how intelligence might influence the day-to-day 
business between parties.219 Considering the complex nature of intelligence and the diplomat’s 
role in disseminating and interpreting intelligence, a nuanced understanding of this function is 
required.  
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An important consideration of the function of information gathering is how the 
diplomat engages in intelligence systems. The channels of intelligence in the international 
community have been formalised through the 20th and 21st centuries. An example of this is the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Within this institution, diplomatic agents can engage in 
everyday diplomacies that govern the relationships between the member states of the 
institution.220 This has given a formal structure to the sharing of information. The contemporary 
preference to build networks of information gathering with prestigious, powerful partners is a 
mirror of the trends in traditional diplomatic practice.221  States utilise the network of embassies 
to provide information about another state’s economies, policies, and military movements.222 
From the network of embassies, the frequent diplomatic reporting aims to strengthen the 
reliability and credibility of intelligence.223 In this space, the diplomat’s fundamental role is 
that of an information gatherer.224 In an international climate where multiple channels of 
communication exist, in particular through information communication technologies and social 
media, “diplomatic channels offer one of the more credible sources of strategic information.”225 
In the contemporary environment, the diplomat must be skilled at engaging in the established 
intelligence networks. At the same time, they must gather information while also disseminating 
intelligence that aligns with their state’s interests. This function of diplomacy demonstrates the 
skills that are necessary for successful diplomatic relations. Although the methods of 
intelligence gathering have evolved, as with communication and negotiation, this function 
remains an integral skill in the diplomat’s repertoire.  
The next function refers to the minimisation of the effects of friction between actors on 
the international stage. Bull accepts that within the international system, tension is ever-present. 
This is due to the competing interests, prejudices, preoccupations and divergent histories 
among states.226 Bull maintains that even between close and amicable states, friction can still 
exist on points of interest; this a diplomat is tasked to minimise and manage.227 By influencing 
the policy of their own state, and by observing conventions governing relations between foreign 
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officials, the diplomat can de-escalate potential tension.228 As noted earlier in this chapter, 
practitioners in contemplating the ideal ambassador have stressed that they must be skilled in 
minimising tension between parties. Remarkably, the characteristics promoted for an effective 
diplomat in minimising friction have changed very little.229  
As with other functions of the diplomat, such as negotiation, this function of minimising 
friction has cross-sector relevance – namely conflict resolution. The diplomat in this instance 
seeks to minimise friction to reach an agreement supporting the diplomatic process.230 This 
process can take place within several different phases of the conflict resolution process. The 
underlying assumption from conflict resolution practitioners is that conflict is too costly. Thus 
the resolution of conflict peacefully is a priority.231 The use of force is considered by many 
observers as an illegitimate tool of statecraft, even though it may seem necessary in the short 
term.232 As conflict continues, this goal may be harder to achieve. For diplomats to minimise 
friction, it is imperative that the diplomat ‘gets the parties to the table’ to allow the effective 
minimisation of friction to take place.233 When the conflict resolution process has begun, the 
interests and conditions of the parties may change. The diplomat must be able to identify a shift 
in these priorities. At this time of the resolution process, there are significant consequences to 
abandoning the diplomatic process. These consequences include, “the loss of valuable 
intelligence, a diminished public diplomacy capability, and the potential [radicalisation] of 
moderates in target regimes”.234 These challenges are particularly evident with the presence of 
non-traditional security threats in the current system.235 Understanding that diplomatic agents 
are skilled at lessening tension between actors in the international system signifies the 
importance of this function in diplomacy.  
The final function of diplomacy that Bull outlines is the symbolic element. This 
function has multiple levels of interpretation. Bull proposes that “diplomacy fulfils the function 
of symbolising the existence of the society of states.”236 Within multiple areas of the institution 
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of diplomacy, diplomats are an expression of the rules and norms of state relations in action.237 
Bull presents an example of the presence of a diplomatic corps in every capital city as evidence 
of the notion of an international society at work.238 Not only does the diplomat symbolically 
express the working of a society of states, but they also are tasked with preserving and 
strengthening that system of states.239 Bull critiques the modern international system, observing 
that “states are more numerous, more deeply divided and less unambiguously participants in a 
common culture”, but he recognises that in this environment, the symbolic role of the 
diplomatic institution is all the more important.240 Indeed, the willingness of states to still 
embrace diplomatic procedures demonstrates an acceptance of the idea of international 
society.241 When Bull refers to the symbolic function of diplomacy, he refers to the underlining 
existence of the society of states which the diplomat tangibly reflects. Later in The Anarchical 
Society, Bull explores alternative paths of world order and the role of diplomatic culture. He 
recognises that the international system of the 18th and 19th centuries has changed dramatically. 
These centuries are important because the international system of the time strongly supported 
diplomatic culture. There is a risk, however, that with the current system’s marked difference, 
the diplomatic culture is not as well supported.242 This does not undermine the importance of 
this diplomatic function, but it may mean that the diplomat represents a different type of 
international society. As Sharp aptly states, “diplomats will represent whatever is there and in 
need of representation.”243 Where Bull sees the diplomat to be symbolically representing the 
international society of states, some scholars would also posit that the diplomat is a symbol of 
other elements of the international system.  
 Here, scholars would consider the close link between diplomacy and representation. 
Scholars such as Der Derian and Sharp consider that “much of diplomacy is about 
representation, the production and reproduction of identities, and the context within which they 
conduct their relations.”244 While the composition of the symbolic function of the diplomat is 
made up of more nuanced features than just the representation of broader international society, 
these features feed into the notion of an international society of states, where “by diplomacy, 
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the actors and their relations are ‘constituted’.”245 So long as something requires representation, 
the diplomat will have a function to play.246 This is evident in the relations between states, and 
the role diplomats have in representing those relations. For example, when a state wishes to 
express its strength and to have its power recognised by other states, the embassy becomes a 
way of symbolising power – and the diplomat works to ensure the symbol of state power is 
represented.247  
Diplomacy, as an institution, is recognised for making extensive use of symbols. 
Faizullaev, in studying the role of symbols within diplomacy, found numerous examples of 
how states and their intentions are objectified through symbols, symbolic actions, and 
interactions, and then how diplomatic agencies are symbolically representative of the state.248 
These examples include a national flag, an anthem, a map, monuments, songs, food, and many 
others.249 Not only are diplomats themselves a symbol, but the diplomat must expertly translate 
symbols to provide their interpretation. For these reasons, the function of symbolism and 
representation in the diplomatic institution is not likely to decline in importance. Neumayer 
outlines several reasons for this, including that “the substance and symbolism of diplomatic 
missions is crucial in defending the precarious role of the state in an era of globalisation.”250 
Foundationally, diplomatic representation maintains and reinforces the modern system of 
sovereign states.251 Understanding the role that the diplomat plays in representing symbols, but 
also interpreting symbols, is necessary for appreciating the importance of diplomacy as an 
institution in the international system. More specifically to this thesis, the role of symbols in 
diplomacy is also an important facet to understand when evaluating and constructing 
diplomatic theory. 
 This section has used Bull’s chapter on diplomacy in The Anarchical Society to provide 
an outline of the predominant functions of diplomacy and to expand on the concept of 
traditional diplomacy. By examining the functions of communication, negotiation, intelligence 
gathering, the minimisation of friction, and the symbolic function of diplomacy, this section 
has explored the traditional theory that underpins Diplomacy Studies. Before analysing how 
                                                          
245 Ibid. 50 
246 Ibid. 
247 Eric Neumayer, "Distance, Power and Ideology: Diplomatic Representation in a World of Nation-States," 
Area 40, no. 2 (2008). 
248 Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and Symbolism," The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 8, no. 2 (2013). 
249 Ibid. 




theory has changed, the review of the literature through this chapter will reveal several 
intersections between faith and traditional diplomacy. By highlighting this, a historical 
platform of faith in diplomacy will be provided.  
 
Traditional Diplomacy and Faith  
This section will examine where faith and religious orientations emerged as important 
factors in the study of traditional diplomacy. By assessing key thinkers that utilised principles 
of faith in their theorising of diplomatic theory, namely Butterfield and Wight, a foundation of 
faith in traditional diplomacy will become evident. This section will be relatively short as the 
bulk of analysis on this notion of faith in diplomacy will be reviewed in later chapters. 
However, considerations concerning the historical development of diplomatic theory will be 
presented. The reason for doing this is to make the intersection between faith and traditional 
diplomacy apparent to construct a comprehensive framework of faith-based diplomacy later in 
this thesis.  
 When discussing the historical turning points in international relations, of particular 
significance was the establishment of the authority of the state system following the 
Westphalian Treaty of 1648. This was a defining moment in the secularisation of politics, 
marking the separation of church and state, even though it took time to pervade wider European 
practices. History reveals that there is an influence of faith on politics and diplomacy. When 
examining the European context, “the medieval era witnessed the growth of diplomatic 
processes as international relationships became more complex and dense.”252 A pursuit of 
universalism underpinned the Christian philosophy of the Catholic Church, expressed through 
the dominance of the Holy Roman Empire.253 During this time, diplomacy was not firmly 
rooted as an activity conducted by states, but rather by emissaries and figures representing the 
Church or the Empire.254 The agents that would act as diplomats were typically papal envoys, 
representatives of rulers of the church, or representatives of rulers of kingdoms, fiefdoms, or 
powerful cities.255 Relations between these groups stemmed from the common ground of 
respublica Christiana, an ecclesiastical society of Christians, where inter-group relations were 
managed.256 Many historians note that the influence of this common grouping, underpinned by 
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faith and universal Christendom, gave strength to empires and imperial enterprises.257 Thus, 
religion had a place in sustaining the traditional constructions of power. History also shows 
that as the universal concepts of Christendom began to break down, the emergence of sovereign 
statehood became realised in the international system.258  
 The influence of faith, particularly Christianity, is clear in the writings of some 
practitioners in history, informing the scholarship of traditional diplomacy. Drawing from 
practitioners examined earlier in this chapter, the influence of faith is apparent through the 
writings of Cardinal Richelieu. Not only did he rise to prominence due to his role in the church, 
but his understanding of international relations was guided by his personal faith. For example, 
the notion of collective security was supported by Richelieu because collective security 
maintained the universalist notion of Christendom – that if states adhere to Christendom, then 
they should engage in negotiations due to their common ground.259 Here the principles of faith 
were used as a lens to understand the international system. Furthermore, Christian ethics would 
often be used to rationalise political activity. Machiavelli was known for criticising the way 
some Christian ethics were used to justify activities which served only political gain.260  Even 
though he would criticise the potential misuse of Christian ethics, Machiavelli did not discredit 
the role or value that Christian ethics could have in the international system.  
 Practitioners and scholars of diplomacy in modern history are also known for using 
principles of faith to underpin their constructions of diplomatic theory. Two prominent figures 
who did this were Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. Both Butterfield and Wight were 
influential in what is called the English School within International Relations. This school of 
thought comprised scholars, historians, philosophers, theologians, and diplomatic practitioners, 
who formed the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics created in 1959.261 
The goal of this committee was to investigate theory in International Politics and demonstrate 
the role of culture, sociology, and history on the state system. 262 The intersection with classic 
theory and faith often saw these scholars titled Christian Realists.263 As a result, these scholars 
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would offer valuable insights into the intersections of diplomacy, faith, and international 
relations.  
 One prominent practitioner from the English School involved in the inclusion of faith 
in diplomacy is Herbert Butterfield. He was a Christian and “one for whom his faith informed 
what he had to say about international relations and diplomacy”.264 Butterfield was a historian 
whose writing would apply a Christian perspective to the discussion of important historical 
events.265 Perhaps most famously, Butterfield published Christianity, Diplomacy and War, 
which explored the classical ideas of the balance of power, preponderance of power, hegemony 
in the international system, and great power politics.266 Butterfield’s writing conclusively 
described, “judgement, fear, righteousness, tragedy, and other foundational elements of 
traditional Christian teaching – including providence – as it applies to diplomacy, war, and 
other recurrent features of international affairs”.267 Butterfield justified this approach in 
combining ethical and pragmatic ideals as they were evident in Western political traditions.268 
The concepts that Butterfield focused on are the “timeless dilemmas of politics and power” 
which were presented as an innovation in scholarship due to Butterfield’s faith-based 
approach.269 Even when discussing classical realist concepts, Butterfield’s Christian lens is 
obvious. For example, when describing alliances between states, Butterfield contends that since 
humanity is made up of sinners, “statecraft and diplomacy ought to be conducted on the 
principle that today’s friends may be tomorrow’s enemies”.270 When examining the impact of 
virtues in international affairs, Butterfield seems to accept that there is a difference between 
what virtues are maintained internally within a state, and what virtues are evident in the state’s 
external conduct. However, his writing often blurs this separation. When considering the 
characteristics of an effective diplomat, Butterfield often presents the importance of virtue in 
effective diplomacy – such as the diplomat living a good life and avoiding temptation.271 
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Consistent with the scholars of the traditional school of diplomacy, Butterfield writes on how 
diplomats should conduct themselves, and the prescribed behaviour comes from Christian 
ethics.272 As a way of summary, Sharp consolidates Butterfield’s writings and highlights that 
there are three central implications for the diplomat, and for the theory of diplomacy more 
broadly. 
First, because the interests of those they represent are derived from understandings 
which are necessarily incomplete and partial, good diplomats will [realise], in a spirit 
of humility, that they ought to conduct themselves with restraint and urge a similar 
restraint upon those who send them. Second, because a full understanding of the 
imperatives which drive others is impossible, but a recognition of the equal moral worth 
of others, if not of their imperatives, is right, good diplomats will [realise], in a spirit of 
charity, that they ought to conduct themselves with generosity, and urge a similar 
generosity on the part of those who send them, in their judgements of the actions and 
arguments of those who receive them. Finally, [recognising] that a good system of 
diplomacy performs the role of civilizing international relations, in the sense of 
fostering the conditions within which human personalities are heightened and enriched, 
and that such a system has its own needs if it is to be maintained and function, its own 
‘raison de système’, good diplomats will [realise] that they ought to represent these 
needs to both those who send and those who receive them.273 
A challenge that Butterfield faced was that the faith-based approach he took to 
theorising was difficult for observers to accept if they did not share the same faith perspective 
as him.274 To counter this, Butterfield argued that not only did the faith-based perspective of 
international relations provide the foundations in one’s faith, but it also reflected the person’s 
general interpretation of life.275 Butterfield was intentional in ensuring that his theory had wide-
ranging application. It was this approach that made his writing important to the school to which 
he belonged. Butterfield was able to present the traditional Christian perspectives with 
empirical knowledge from his background as a historian. This enabled his contributions to 
remain both credible and influential in scholarly fields.276  
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From the same school of thought as Butterfield, Martin Wight also wrote on the 
influence of Christian theology in international relations. They often wrote together, but there 
were areas of divergence in their thinking. When considering Wight’s writing, “unless one gets 
hold of the religious dimension of Martin Wight’s thought on diplomacy and international 
relations more generally one will not understand it”.277 This demonstrates how Christian 
thought underpinned Wight’s approach to assessing international relations.278  Hedley Bull 
highlights this when analysing Wight’s work.279 Bull thought that two attitudes should be 
applied when considering the development of politics in history. First, one must reject secular 
optimism. That is the belief that humans are well-meaning and things will happen for the 
best.280 This does not, in Wight’s view, represent the true human condition and thus does not 
accurately represent the pessimistic tendencies of state relations. The other attitude important 
for Wight is the idea of theological hope. This is a more transcendent notion than simply hoping 
for the best to happen, but rather this hope is an intentional casting “upon God’s mercy” where 
humanity has the promise to be saved.281 For Wight, this approach gives intentionality to the 
activities of humans, and by extension, states. Although he supports a Christian approach to 
relations between states, Wight condemns a politics of faith and upholds a sceptical approach 
to diplomacy.282 The goal of diplomacy is mutual accommodation of independent states, and if 
the diplomat does not have some level of scepticism of the human condition, the goals of 
diplomacy will not eventuate.283 Reflected from the personal level to the international level, 
Wight believes that humanity should strive for the best, but that the root of humanity cannot be 
escaped.284 The response to this, from a Christian perspective, is that a Christian’s attitude 
toward politics should reflect “pessimism about what might be achieved and gratitude for what 
is achieved but it is not one of hope or confidence that anything can be achieved if we only put 
our minds to it and keep an open heart”.285 This pessimistic view of politics correlates with the 
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realist paradigm of international relations and grounds this approach to politics within 
traditional diplomacy.286  
Wight’s work has specific implications for the development of diplomacy. Summarised 
below is his conception of traditional diplomacy as a set of fundamental moral principles:  
• Honesty and truthfulness: do not tell lies or break promises, it does not pay and brings 
its own retribution; establish a reputation for straight dealing.  
• Moderation and restraint: keeping a sense of proportion… requires the absence of 
assertiveness or national (and personal) egotism, and a readiness to make concessions, 
to give way on unessentials.  
• Courtesy: seeking not diplomatic “victories”, “triumphs” or “successes”, all of which 
imply a defeated antagonist, but “agreements”, which suggests common achievement; 
or perhaps seeking “victories” which come without being noticed. The art of diplomacy 
is to conceal the victory: “the best diplomacy is that which gets its own way, but leaves 
the other side reasonably satisfied”.  
• Respect for the other side: thinking the best of people… trying to share their point of 
view, understand their interests.287 
This list follows the pattern of theorists in traditional diplomacy in that theory prescribes 
diplomatic behaviour. Wight took religious ideas seriously and believed that they could 
genuinely contribute to diplomacy and other institutions of international affairs. This includes 
religious doctrines and how they shaped a state’s approach to war and peace, how religious 
doctrine impacted national churches and the resultant national consciousness, the influence of 
culture and religion on diplomatic practices and state systems across varying civilisations, and 
the role of common culture between states throughout history.288 However, in line with the 
pessimistic assumption of state relations, Wight recognises that any activity of statecraft, 
primarily diplomacy, is influenced by the moral quandary of the human condition.289 For 
Wight, patterns of culture influence international society and the society of states, and as there 
is no shared culture (compared to the universal Christendom of the past, for example), the base 
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of international relations is unstable.290 This means that culture derived from faith-based values 
must be properly understood so their incorporation into policy can play a role in stabilising the 
balance of power in international affairs. In Wight’s opinion, the cultural and moral community 
that enables fruitful relations between parties was degraded by the development of the Western 
state-system.291 With this critique in mind, diplomatic systems must find a way to operate in 
that state-based paradigm effectively.   
 Both Butterfield and Wight show the strong influence that Christian thought has had on 
the development of diplomatic theory. These ideas will be expanded upon later in this thesis 
when considering a framework for faith-based diplomacy. The important factor to recognise at 
this point is that there is evidence of the influence of faith and religious systems in traditional 
diplomacy, which gives a platform for theory construction.  
 
Moving from Traditional Diplomacy  
Traditional diplomacy is deeply rooted in historical tradition. As a result, it has been 
challenged by the changing nature of the international system in the modern period. Although 
there are some enduring features of traditional diplomacy, there are limitations to the traditional 
approach to diplomacy. In the traditional form of diplomacy, bilateral relations are the basis 
for diplomatic engagement.292 With the onset of non-traditional security threats, the advent of 
new technologies, the growth of multilateral organizations, the impact of globalisation, and 
with the extended cast of actors on the international stage, diplomacy’s scope has expanded.293 
Indeed, eminent thinker Hans Morgenthau predicted that “consequently, traditional diplomacy, 
too, must give way to a new conception of diplomatic intercourse appropriate to the new 
relations established between nations”.294 However, the intensity of the evolution of the 
international system brought about this change sooner than some scholars anticipated. These 
contemporary forces saw a decline in the traditional approach of professional diplomacy.295 
Some argue that the functions of diplomacy, even those mentioned earlier in this chapter, can 
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be performed by other actors.296 Even though other actors may be able to communicate, engage 
in negotiations, or gather intelligence, the traditional mechanisms within the state are still well-
adapted to fulfil the necessary functions of diplomacy.297 The actors may be expanding, but the 
state still has a degree of authority when it comes to diplomacy. This challenge to the primacy 
of the state and state-centric diplomacy has seen an expansion in the theory of diplomacy. What 
emerged in scholarship is the distinction between what some scholars call the old and new 
diplomacy. Old diplomacy began to decline in the World War I era, where other systems, such 
as the Washington system, began to emerge. 298 The influence of the Foreign Office was 
impacted in the wake of World War I, which brought about the construction of other channels 
of diplomacy.299 The nuanced balancing of powers in Europe in the post-World War era saw 
the typical state of affairs change.300 The impacts of the diminishing power of the state in this 
period saw changes to the processes of international law. The Hague Conferences are evidence 
of a forum where the traditional goals and methods of diplomacy were challenged and modified 
in the early 20th Century.301 In several ways the basic assumptions of traditional diplomacy 
were challenged, leading scholars, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, to believe that 
the old had to make way for the new.  
The term new diplomacy encompasses the changing international order in response to 
the First World War. While these concepts will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, here 
it is important to note that institutions of diplomacy were established to move away from 
bilateral deals to a multilateral approach, such as in the League of Nations, supported by 
advancements in diplomacy, conflict resolution and international law.302 The notion of new 
diplomacy emerged out of the deficiencies of the old diplomacy. This was primarily the public 
desire for openness, lessening the control of the state, and the development of international 
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forums to facilitate peaceful resolutions of dispute.303 The state still does have a role to play in 
the ‘new’ international environment. The responsibility of scholars is to ensure that theory is 
present to facilitate understanding of these changes. This includes the role of the state, the role 
of new actors in the international system, the influence of faith and religion in international 
politics, and the advancements of Diplomacy Studies more generally. This chapter has outlined 
the theory of traditional diplomacy to present the foundation of Diplomacy Studies. The next 
chapter will examine how the theory of diplomacy expanded from traditional diplomacy to new 
diplomacy and then innovative diplomacy. Where traditional diplomacy gives a historical 
sketch of Diplomacy Studies, investigating new and innovative diplomacy in Chapter 3 will 















                                                          




Evolutions in Diplomacy Theory: From Traditional to New and Innovative 
Diplomacy 
  
Having established the foundation of theory within Diplomacy Studies by examining 
traditional diplomacy, this chapter turns to the diplomatic schools of thought that proceeded 
from traditional diplomacy. First, the shift from positivism to post-positivism in International 
Relations will be considered. This is a crucial area of analysis as it marked an expansion in the 
processes of theoretical construction in International Relations more broadly, with significant 
implications to the area of Diplomacy Studies emerging as a result. Following the consideration 
of the post-positivist approach, this chapter will summarise what scholars have called ‘new 
diplomacy’, how it emerged from traditional diplomacy, and how it impacted diplomacy’s 
theoretical landscape. From this point, the innovative school of thought in Diplomacy Studies 
will be examined. Once the theoretical schools of thought have been discussed, this chapter 
will then apply that analysis to the actors in the international system that utilise these non-
traditional approaches to diplomacy. Nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and individuals, will be examined to understand 
how these actors operate within the changing diplomatic institution.  
 
Expansions in International Relations Theory: From Positivism to Post-positivism  
To fully understand the shift from traditional diplomacy to new and innovative 
diplomatic theory, it is important to consider a significant development that underpinned theory 
construction in International Relations scholarship. When analysing what is referred to as the 
debates of International Relations theory, three debates must be considered. In general terms, 
the first debate examined the distinction between idealism and realism and focused on theory 
in International Relations.304 The second debate explored methodology in International 
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Relations from the perspectives of the traditionalists and behaviouralists.305 The third debate, 
and most important for consideration in this section, concerns “both ontology and epistemology 
of the discipline, that is, about the nature of knowledge sought in IR, and about how best to 
find it”. 306 This third debate started toward the end of the Cold War and is now commonly 
known as the distinction between positivism and post-positivism. When considering social 
research, it was in the second half of the 20th Century that the field of International Relations 
began to adopt “standard social-scientific conceptions of ‘explanation’ and ‘prediction’”.307 
This impacted the construction of theory. Scholars would look for causal regularities among 
events and coupled those regularities with mechanisms and principles to build theory.308 It was 
these considerations that challenged the traditional positivist perspective, opening the way for 
a post-positivist approach to the development of International Relations theory.  
When critiquing positivism, post-positivist scholars “identified a connection between 
the pursuit of objective truth in theory and domination and violence in practice”.309 This created 
a general separation in thinking, with positivists presented as relying on ‘common-sense’ when 
considering truth, and post-positivists assuming the role of sceptics.310 When this distinction 
between positivism and post-positivism is debated, it often takes “a highly politicised tone”.311 
The traditional conception of positivism has been challenged. The main criticism of the 
positivist perspective is that “positivism is not only epistemologically and ontologically 
flawed; it is also co-responsibile for many of the social ills and political catastrophes of the 
modern world”.312 In response to this, positivits argue that the “post-postivist assault amounts 
to advocating subjectivism, irresponsible relativism and lack of standards, which work against 
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conducting proper research and the effort to make the human condition better”.313 At the time 
of serious debate on the issue of positivism in International Relations, observers recognised 
that the term post-positivism had an expansive scope which suggested the consideration of a 
broader array of activities.314 Although this is beneficial, in that it expands the scholarship 
within International Relations, the broader array of activities did not necessarily translate into 
practice. A reason for this may be the technicality in defining the competing terms.   
When defining the term positivism, Riley identifies three meanings: “it can be a 
commitment to social evolution”; “it can refer to an articulated philosophical tradition: logical 
positivism”, or, “it can refer to a set of scientific research practices: methodological 
positivism”.315 A pursuit in the development of post-positivist theory in International Relations 
is the understanding of its epistemological foundations. Where positivists assumed that “truths 
could be identified, free from the interference of interests and values”, post-positivists argued 
that power and interests play a significant role in “constituting the objects of knowledge”.316 
This allowed the emergence of a plurality in critical approaches to the construction of 
International Relations theory.317  Post-positivism suggests that “truth is still a practical and 
normative matter which might play a role in constituting international political realities”, and 
that the critics of post-positivism cannot “maintain the boundary between the nature of truth 
and political norms and practices”.318 Consequently, when caught in the tension between these 
approaches, theory is in a tenuous position of either being too broad in evaluation, or too 
specific in application. Analysts applying a post-positivist lens typically are concerned with “a 
self-conscious reflection on the larger social and political context within which theoretical 
activity takes place”. 319 This includes the way that theory “both reflects and reproduces 
dominant power positions and interests”, while others prioritise the “social construction of 
theoretical tradition”. 320 With these considerations in mind, the essential benefit of the post-
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positivist approach is seen to lie in its pluralism.321 Critical theory, historical sociology, 
feminism, postmodernism, scientific critiques – all have been applied to the cases of 
International Relations to build a base for post-positivism.322 As a result, it has been observed 
that IR theory “has become richer and wider thanks to the emergence and development of post-
positivism”.323 To aid in this more substantive development of theory, post-positivist scholars 
use multiple methods and approaches to achieve their goals. For example, post-positivism does 
accept historical evidence and narratives as a basis for critical analysis.324 Another approach 
and primary contribution of post-positivism is the focus of reflexivity in International Relations 
theory. The core elements of reflexivity in scholarship include:  
1. Self-awareness regarding underlying premises  
2. The recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the 
normal science tradition they sustain  
3. The affirmation that reasoned judgement about merits of contending paradigms is 
possible in the absence of neutral observation language. 325 
Chatterji summarises the value of reflexivity in that it “challenges the positivist idea that theory 
can be tested in terms of its correspondence to fact”.326 This assists in achieving another goal 
of post-positivism: to enhance the validity of predictiveness within social science theory. 327 
This is done by isolating and verifying key causal factors to identified outcomes.328 Although 
these achievements are advantageous for the advancement of International Relations theory, 
they are not without criticism.  
 While the central tenets of post-positivism have been identified, even the very definition 
of post-positivism is still debated. Ryan demonstrates this by arguing, “to respond that the 
term’s meaning is contested does not do justice to the challenge: the term is so protean that one 
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cannot even tease out a ‘family resemblance’ among uses”.329 Warranted, this is a significant 
challenge to the construction of theory. In its original formulation, post-positivism is thought 
to contain very little of substance for International Relations.330 However, some of the results 
from the influence of post-positivism include the awareness “of the need for humility in our 
theorising claims”, the adoption of “a critical attitude to our theoretical assumptions as well as 
to the character of evidence”, a greater sensitivity to the normative implications of findings, 
and generally moving International Relations scholarship “closer to the epistemological and 
ontological issues raised in some of the other human sciences”. 331 Even considering the 
advancements in critical approaches to theory, post-positivist research is not fully accepted or 
practised; indeed, concerns have been expressed that scholarship in the field will ultimately be 
marginalised.332 To bridge this gap, some scholars look to the contribution of Alexander 
Wendt. He developed a theoretical lens through the advancements of post-positivism; this is 
referred to as constructivism. Wendt, when designing constructivism, applied a positivist 
approach to epistemology and a post-positivist understanding of ontology.333 Wendt also 
considered central tenets of science and social science into defining and understanding the aims 
of constructivism.334 To construct a valid theoretical approach, Wendt had to take into 
consideration the critiques of post-positivist thought.  
The post-positivist approach does engender some reservations from scholars. Biersteker 
was concerned that, even though post-positivism may open methodological pluralism and 
relativism, the founding scholarship of post-positivism does not provide criteria by which to 
choose between competing explanations.335 For Biersteker, this is not an insoluble problem. 
The scholarship “could be evaluated according to explicit normative criteria, in full recognition 
of the intellectual interests being served”.336 Another form of evaluation could be by assessing 
the avenues of research, consensus building and pluralism in research.337 Some scholars 
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remarked that post-positivism occupied the “intellectual high ground in the policy field” by the 
early 1990s.338 This declaration was short lived, however, as the translation of theoretical ideas 
into policy was not as substantial as first thought. When evaluating the debate between both 
schools of thought broadly, both positivists and post-positivists have applied problematic 
assumptions which limit the contribution of the opposing theory to International Relations 
scholarship.339 To contrast these perspectives, Fluck states, 
Post-positivists’ emphasis on the normativity of truth is linked with the epistemic 
understanding of the concept and with an anthropocentrism which leads them to ignore 
the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Critical Realists, in contrast, 
recognise the importance of the subject–object relationship, but in doing so reject post-
positivist insights into the normativity of truth.340 
These critiques demonstrate that the shift to post-positivist consturctions of theory are still 
being fully recognised. This must be considered when constructing theory in the future, or even 
considering theoretical shifts in fields such as Diplomacy Studies.  
When looking to the future of theory construction in International Relations, benefits 
accrue in judiciously applying a post-postivist approach. Eun argues that a post-positivist 
perspective expands the scope of International Relations to allow for “truth claims” outside the 
purview of positivism.341 A more pluarilistic approach will require a greater degree of 
criticality and self-reflexivity in terms of the theories constructed. These considerations are 
important to recognise in theory construction, but they are also helpful in evaluating the 
theoretical shifts seen in the International Relations discipline. The same tensions that exist 
between the underlining theoretical shift between positivism and post-positivsm are evident in 
the theoretical shift from traditional diplomacy to the new and innovative schools of thought 
in diplomatic theory. Indeed, the post-positivist approach has arguably been a significant 
contributor to many of the changes evident in new and innovative diplomacy.  
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Expansions in Diplomacy Theory  
 The New Diplomacy    
While the influence of the post-positivist approach had been expanding the theoretical 
frameworks of International Relations, so too did diplomacy undergo significant revisions. The 
general concern was that traditional diplomacy was proving inadequate in fulfilling its 
responsibilities, and therefore the theory and practice of diplomacy would require a new 
approach to meet the changing agenda of global politics.342 This made significant inroads in 
theory construction because “just as feminism, post-colonial theory, and postmodernism have 
long challenged cultural historians to ‘deconstruct’ society, the same motivation is now leading 
diplomatic historians to deconstruct the state and rethink the relationships between peoples and 
societies.”343 This section will focus on the emergence of the new school of diplomacy from 
the traditional school, indicating how new diplomacy formed following the First World War, 
and how new diplomacy is congruent with a changed system including the expanding presence 
of nonstate actors. The school of diplomacy that challenges the traditional school of thought 
has been referred to by several titles including new diplomacy, the nascent school, and future 
diplomacy. New diplomacy, as explored by Brown, is intended to be a replacement for, and 
rejection of, traditional power politics that is state-centric; instead, there would be an ideal 
world government that would govern relations through international law and institutions above 
the state.344 This would entail elevating human rights, for example, above “narrow geopolitical 
interests” where “the measure of power in the new age will be morality, not military 
strength”.345 Hence ethical elements of foreign policy, or even the interests and nature of other 
states, became associated with the new diplomacy. Progress in the evolution of diplomacy 
“occurs when broad public recognition of the unacceptability of conditions creates pressure on 
governments to act”.346 As global priorities began to shift, and new diplomacy gained critical 
attention, diplomatic practice needed to respond to a reorganised international agenda.  
Before outlining the key developments in new diplomacy, it is noteworthy that 
advances in theory are reflected in how new diplomacy is defined. Evidence of a shift from 
traditional to new diplomacy is clearly found in the definitions given to diplomacy in the 
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contemporary international system. Essentially the new definitions for diplomacy have been 
derived from a non-traditional environment where diplomacy works “more fully and 
consistently in a stateless context”.347  This has enabled the scope of diplomacy’s definition to 
expand. Paul Sharp offers a definition of diplomacy in this setting by stating that it is:  
[T]he way in which relations between groups that regard themselves as separate ought 
to be conducted if the principle of living in groups is to be retained as good, and if 
unnecessary and unwanted conflict is to have a chance of being avoided.348 
This definition is distinct from the definitions for diplomacy offered in the previous chapter. 
Notions of morality are considered to be important in diplomacy when diplomats must consider 
what is good. Furthermore, the primary diplomatic actor, traditionally the state, is not expressly 
mentioned. This definition proposes that diplomacy is an act between groups, suggesting that 
a myriad of nonstate actors could engage in the process. The central goal of avoiding conflict 
is still considered the key goal of new diplomacy, but what is significant is the consideration 
of new actors and new priorities on the diplomatic agenda. While the definition is distinctly 
different from the definitions put forward from the traditional school, the historical 
development from which this definition emerged is important to consider.  
The shift to new diplomacy resulted from the impact of World War I and the influence 
of Wilsonian Idealism. In simple terms, Woodrow Wilson predominantly championed new 
diplomacy initially by emphasising “parliamentary participation and transparent practices” 
with consideration to what Butterfield described as social laws.349 Harold Nicholson noted that 
the ‘Old Diplomacy’ was being undermined by the events of the First World War, and exposed 
the classical realist approach to international relations to scrutiny. 350 This is because the 
traditional form of diplomacy was unable to safeguard against the devastation caused by the 
First World War. The reputation of a successful form of diplomacy was ruined as “the entire 
diplomatic profession was blamed for being unable to halt the drift towards war and strong 
calls to action were heard for a fundamental revision of diplomatic practices and 
institutions”.351  Bjola and Kornprobst argue that three factors, other than the inability to halt 
                                                          
347 Murray, "Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy." 24. 
348 Ibid. 24 
349 Iver B. Neumann, "The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled," International 
Relations 17, no. 3 (2003). 344 
350 Riordan, The New Diplomacy. 31; For Nicolson’s perspective on the changing nature of diplomacy, see 
Harold Nicolson, "Diplomacy Then and Now," Foreign Affairs 40, no. 1 (1961). 
351 Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst, "The New Diplomacy after World War I," in Understanding 
International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2013). 29 
57 
 
World War I, substantiated the transition from traditional diplomacy to new diplomacy. The 
first is that great powers desired widespread colonial expansion, however “the balance of power 
limited this desire” as there was a general recognition that expansion would be too damaging 
to relations between great powers. 352  Powerbalancing, which was so central to traditional 
diplomacy, was no longer working in favour of great powers. The second factor which brought 
about the shift to new diplomacy through the First World War was the advent of fast 
communication.353 This influenced the methods of interaction and the processes of negotiation. 
The development of telegraphic and telephone communication shifted the landscape of 
diplomatic interaction through the war. The third influential factor was the rising power of the 
United States in international relations. The rules of diplomatic conduct needed to be adjusted 
to consider the new prominence of the United States as American diplomats were “deeply 
distrustful of the European diplomatic methods”.354 The American influence on new diplomacy 
was characterised by self-determination, equality, democracy, legal formulations, conference 
diplomacy, and collective security. 355  These principles were spearheaded by Woodrow 
Wilson. Tucker suggests that there are a number of changes to old diplomacy that Wilson 
established. These include: 
The ostensible emphasis on moral principle rather than material interest, the 
distinction drawn between a people and its (illegitimate) rulers, the belief that 
public opinion might be effectively appealed to over the heads of recalcitrant 
governments, the propensity to find in almost every conflict of interest a conflict 
of principle that could not be readily compromised, the disposition to threaten 
force only to later back away from the threat – these distinguishing features of 
the new diplomacy had come to the fore. 356  
These changes were developed and realised throughout the 20th Century. However, the 
diplomatic agenda was tested again in the wake of the Second World War with other interests 
coming into play.357 The advent of the Second World War reminded the international 
community that “the existing nation-state diplomatic relationship will not suffice” and that 
“new patterns of global management will need to be developed”. 358 World War I was a catalyst 
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for change toward a new diplomacy, with World War II reaffirming that not enough had yet 
evolved from the traditional school of thought.359 Emerging from this time, a changing 
international agenda reinforced the need to further develop new diplomacy.  
 In essence, the traditional international diplomatic agenda focused on political and 
economic relations between states, but could not prevent the two World Wars or the rise of the 
Cold War, all of which in turn irrevocably changed the constitution of the international agenda, 
even into the 21st Century.  In his text, The New Diplomacy, Riordan outlines several key issues 
that have taken precedence on the international agenda. These include organised crime, 
international terrorism, the environment, human rights, finance, trade, health, and migration.360 
Traditional security concerns do still exist, but the international agenda must be shared with 
these non-traditional factors. Scholars of diplomacy’s new school argue that traditional 
diplomacy is distanced from these global issues.361 The current diplomatic structures must 
address the concerns of the new diplomatic agenda, and this agenda requires specialists who 
can apply the “rapidly changing nature of knowledge”.362 The inclusion of these specialists will 
significantly impact the traditional diplomatic mechanism, including the loss of “many of the 
honest and hardworking diplomats who have in the past staffed the consulates, commercial 
sections and geographical desks in foreign ministries” in favour of professionals who are not 
part of the traditional diplomatic service.363 To assist in addressing the new international 
agenda, other methods have been employed, including international law. New diplomacy and 
its processes are apparent through the implementation of the Ottawa and Rome treaties.364 The 
idea of professionals entering into the diplomatic service illustrates that those who traditionally 
engaged in diplomacy, state diplomats, may be required to share the stage with new actors 
within the scope of new diplomacy. More broadly, however, new diplomacy also considers the 
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expanding cast of diplomatic actors on the international stage, beyond the state. New diplomacy 
gives a place for the role of nonstate actors and legitimises their engagement in diplomacy.  
The new global agenda has brought about a myriad of actors to address the expanding 
goals of the international community. New actors will frame the agenda and the diplomatic 
process will be modified as a result.365 The central skills of diplomats and diplomatic 
institutions, being negotiation, representation, communication, skills of information gathering 
and dissemination, reporting and symbolism, will henceforth also be adopted by nonstate 
groups in the new diplomatic environment.366 This new position of influence has come about 
because, as some observers such as Brown believe, “the era of sovereign states is dead”.367 
States may have influence, but not dominance in globalised activities, including finance, 
markets, the movement of people or information. The unitary power of the state is “being 
displaced by forces from below (international civil society), from above (regional organisations 
such as the European Union and the United Nations), and at the side (multinational 
corporations)”.368 This is not to say that the state no longer exercises power. But rather, even 
the political structures of the state are complicated by an “odd combination of post-Westphalian 
(nation states), pre-medieval (city states) and medieval transnational entities (like the Holy 
Roman Empire)”.369 This brings a level of complexity to the order and position of actors on the 
global stage. The state must still contend with its place in new diplomacy, if indeed one can be 
found. Since the post-World War era, the ability for states to address global issues has been 
undermined by the misconception that internal and external affairs can be kept separate. In 
other words, the structures built by sovereign states are not capable of dominating international 
affairs when the domestic affairs of one state affect the other. 
As the state attempts to fill the gaps of an adjusting diplomatic structure, other actors 
have emerged to engage in the diplomatic process. The way in which nonstate actors engage 
in diplomacy will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4. However, here it is important to appraise 
the changing role of actors. International civil society is increasing in its influence, particularly 
when considering its ability to organise and manage international conferences on global issues, 
with the most prominent case being that of the landmine treaty, but also in its engagement with 
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women’s rights, trade, finance, economic development, and the environment.370 The 
participation of nongovernmental organisations has garnered significant international attention 
and, together with civil society, wields influence in international processes that include 
diplomacy, dialogue and consultancy, surrounding global issues.371 Their impact is enhanced 
by addressing the “democratic deficit” in global affairs, resulting in a form of governance that 
allows for multi-stakeholder dialogue.372 The prominence of nongovernmental organisations 
continues to rise based on the increasing number of organisations in the world, and their 
integration into governance and decision making positions through institutions such as the 
United Nations. The role of the nongovernmental organisation has evolved since their 
emergence on the international stage, with observers realising that “both the extent of their 
contemporary existence and the scope of their participation exceeds by far any role that was 
originally envisioned for them”.373 New diplomacy, as an approach to international diplomacy, 
seeks to replace the prominence of the state with nonstate actors to achieve the goals of the 
new global agenda.  
Given its emphasis on nonstate actors, it is understandable that the foundations of the 
new diplomacy can be found in an environment of plurality, that is, one in which multiple 
actors are pursuing multiple goals. It is believed that within this notion of pluralism and 
theoretical equality put forward by the nascent school, diplomacy can flourish.374 The 
effectiveness of diplomacy in this school of thought is aided by the networked connection 
among a broader-based membership of multiple groups beyond the state, enhanced by 
technology and other communicative channels.375 Emerging within the new school of 
diplomacy is a separate track of diplomacy, commonly called ‘track two’ diplomacy, wherein 
communities, civil society and nongovernmental actors engage in the diplomatic process.376  
As this track is strengthened, the power enjoyed by sovereign states is eroded. Five principle 
features emerge in the study of this new school of diplomatic thought. They are:  
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1. The current state of diplomatic institutions is fragmenting;  
2. Diplomacy is becoming more public in terms of a global public domain; 
3. New diplomacy relies on grassroots mobilisation and therefore is agile in response to 
new policy and entrepreneurs;  
4. Official diplomacy is superior in terms of accountability and legitimacy due to its 
proximity to policy makers, yet;  
5. New diplomats compete with the government in this space, compensating for 
government inaction in new spaces.377 
The support for the new diplomacy approach has been bolstered by theories within 
International Relations that concur with its central tenets. An example is the growing 
prominence of the notion of ‘soft power’. Soft power moves beyond the traditional 
measurements and ‘hard’ material resources of power, stating that if attraction or influence can 
be gained without military coercion, power can be achieved beyond the state.378 Other 
theoretical constructs will be examined later in the thesis, but the example of soft power 
illustrates that theory has been constructed to affirm the approach of new diplomacy.  
Although the idea of new diplomacy has been successful in many areas, it is not without 
its critics. When considering the role of the state in the new diplomatic environment, states 
have consistently integrated new approaches into the classical diplomatic model without 
necessarily sacrificing state power.379 In turn, as Davenport recognises, ‘new’ does not 
necessarily mean improved.380 Even though conceptions of power have evolved over time, the 
way that diplomacy functioned did not necessarily match advancements in political thinking. 
Morgenthau noted the emergence of new diplomacy in the late 1940s (in a post-World War II 
environment), and revealed that “the old diplomacy has failed, it is true, but so has the new 
one” due to the lack of penetration in political problem solving.381 This frustration between the 
traditional order and its outright replacement led scholars to explore possible alternatives for 
balancing out the tensions that had been created. This raises another central concern, that “there 
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is perhaps a new diplomacy, but not a new world order”.382 This suggests that the new 
diplomacy will possibly reach its limitations. Other observers state that the presence of new 
diplomacy is a desire to revert back to the 18th Century style of diplomacy, which Butterfield 
suggested would have been the most effective in the post-World War II period.383 As much as 
the methods of diplomacy evolve, it appears that a firm grounding in traditional diplomacy will 
persist as “new diplomacy has its origins in the old”.384 Central characteristics of traditional 
diplomacy, such as good faith, discipline, and loyalty, will remain hallmarks of negotiation.385 
When writing at the time of a great shift in diplomacy, Rossow indicated that “the qualities that 
[traditional diplomacy] embodied are as valid for the new diplomacy as for the old”.386 The 
calls for transparency and openness will also come at a cost for nonstate actors. The diplomats 
of the postmodern world “must legitimate their policies and implementation”.387 Most 
importantly, regardless of the pressure for change, all embassies maintain the same structure.388 
Their key functions are the same, leaving some to consider that the new diplomacy has not 
penetrated deeply enough.389 
When new diplomacy emerged, its supporters did indeed seek to replace traditional 
diplomacy. However, new diplomacy does still have central challenges that need to be 
addressed, despite the international agenda having changed, and an increase in the types of 
actors on the international stage. Riordan in examining the role of new diplomacy in the 21st 
Century found that “governmental diplomacy must deal with the non-state actors”. 390 This has 
not, however, meant that the role of the government in diplomacy has completely disappeared. 
Riordan continues by stating that “although the entry of these new players has ended the 
effective monopoly diplomats once enjoyed over international relations, governmental 
diplomacy continues to have an important role. It can ensure democratic accountability and 
legitimacy in the conduct of international affairs.”391 It may be contended that the theoretical 
distinction between traditional and new diplomacy is too polar. If one seeks to replace the other, 
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the success and effectiveness of diplomacy in the future may be hindered by this impasse 
between theoretical camps. It is as a result of these issues that another school of thought in 
diplomacy emerged. The innovative school of diplomacy came about as a way to seek an 
effective middle ground between opposing theoretical positions, as the next section shows.  
 
Innovative Diplomacy  
In the search for theory within Diplomacy Studies, it is important to recognise that 
diplomacy is a human institution that of necessity reflects the environment in which it finds 
itself.392 Diplomatic innovation is no new phenomenon, but the complete transformation of the 
diplomatic institution is still in question.393 Appreciating a growth in multilateral diplomacy, 
the application of advanced technology, and the integration of poor and weak states into the 
diplomatic system through institutions, the international system is left with a diplomacy that is 
neither old nor new, but rather a blend of the two fortified by respected legal regimes and 
norms.394 The traditional tasks of diplomats, being reporting, communicating or negotiation 
over borders, are increasingly being performed by non-diplomats.395 This indicates that 
traditional diplomats must expand their usual tasks within diplomatic practice to remain as 
relevant and effective as possible. In the same way, non-traditional diplomats must also apply 
themselves to these traditional roles indicating a widening of diplomatic responsibility across 
a breadth of actors.  Hocking argues that the challenging of state-centrism by emergent actors 
has created patterns of behaviour that “are generating symbiotic relationships between 
governmental and nongovernmental actors, reflecting an incapacity to achieve policy goals in 
an increasingly complex policy milieu”.396 Melissen suggests that the changing nature of the 
international system is increasingly in a state of tension with traditional modes of diplomatic 
action.397 Murray summarises four key assumptions of the innovative school of diplomacy:  
1. Innovators share a criticism of the divisionary relationship between the traditional and 
nascent schools of diplomacy,  
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2. Polarisation of diplomatic thought forces the observer of modern diplomacy into 
making binary either/or choices, 
3. Banishing this binary appropriation is a common goal for innovators who seek to 
reappraise the state and non-state relationship, and  
4. The balance of this relationship is key to these thinkers. In seeking to define 
diplomacy, innovators would aim to avoid familiar theoretical terrain.398 
In the 21st Century, the study and practice of diplomacy are enjoying a renaissance,399 
and this has contributed to what Zartman refers to as the widening scope of diplomacy.400 Some 
scholars have taken this widened scope to explore the relationship between diplomacy and 
other fields that would typically sit outside of diplomacy’s constructs. The mass proliferation 
of hybrid terms such as “sports-diplomacy” has created a condition of “over-hyphenation”, 
compounding the distillation of the essence and utility of modern diplomacy.401 For scholars, 
the distinction of diplomacy as its own institution can be diluted, while for practitioners the 
complex needs of the increased number of stakeholders in diplomacy are not being adequately 
addressed when the term diplomacy is constantly hyphenated.402 However, this type of cross 
fertilisation would broaden the canon giving the scholarship a theoretical identity that the 
subfield lacks.403 While training in the practice of diplomacy would still continue, education of 
diplomatic actors must now take a multidisciplinary approach.404 As Wiseman notes, scholars 
of diplomacy have embraced the notion that diplomacy is a process of continuity and of 
change.405 This capacity for change indicates that more inventive models of governance and 
diplomacy can realistically be achieved in order to address the complex agenda of the 
prevailing international system.406  
Where traditional diplomacy sees diplomacy as being effective through the state, and 
new diplomacy views diplomacy as being effective away from the state, innovative diplomacy 
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finds an overlap between the two schools of thought. This provides fertile ground for the 
exploration and construction of contemporary diplomacy theory. Within Diplomacy Studies, 
the innovative approach allows scholars to contend with the entire cast of actors, through a 
multiplicity of approaches, while addressing a variety of global goals. The previous chapter set 
the foundation of theory in Diplomacy Studies by critically outlining traditional diplomacy. In 
this chapter, new diplomacy has been examined to demonstrate how diplomacy theory evolved 
from its traditional origins. The emergence of innovative diplomacy is a welcomed reminder 
that Diplomacy Studies represents a rich arena for the development of theory to address the 
complex issues of the 21st Century. In the next chapter the way that nonstate actors engage in 
diplomacy will be examined. Just as traditional diplomacy focused on the state, Chapter 4 will 


















Nonstate Actors and Diplomacy 
  
With post-positivism encouraging a plurality of approaches in International Relations 
research, the scope of theory within Diplomacy Studies expanded. Where traditional diplomacy 
maintained the state as the unitary diplomatic actor, new diplomacy presented nonstate actors 
as viable diplomats on the world stage. Innovative diplomacy expressed the need to consolidate 
both state and nonstate actors into an effective diplomatic process. Before examining how faith-
based diplomacy may fit within the expanding scope of theories in Diplomacy Studies, it is 
important to examine the application of these fundamental changes. To do so, this chapter will 
explore how nonstate actors engage in diplomacy. This will include an analysis of 
intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, 
and the individual.  
 
Intergovernmental Organisations  
As the international system adapted to the changing international agenda, actors gained 
prominence in the diplomatic landscape. Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) became 
prominent through the 19th and 20th centuries, as independent states began to seek cooperation 
through institutions.407 IGOs can at some levels be considered as nonstate actors, even though 
their membership comprises states, and sometimes have intergovernmental rather than 
supranational structures. The institution itself has the capacity to engage in the international 
sphere as an actor in its own right, engage in organizational learning, and develop its own 
identity and culture. As a result of deepening levels of globalisation, international institutions 
became empowered in place of traditional notions of national authority. 408 In the contemporary 
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environment, IGOs have become integral because “without them, modern governance would 
not be possible” as so much of the day-to-day business of diplomacy is now embedded in these 
institutions.409 The number of IGOs in the international system have grown, but beyond that 
they also exercise influence over the global rule-making process which impacts states, 
transnational actors, and even individual citizens.410 As their importance and influence 
continues to grow, their engagement in the diplomatic sphere needs to be understood.   
In defining IGOs, the founding principle is that “intergovernmental organisations are 
established and governed, directly or indirectly, by sovereign states”.411   That states still play 
a significant role in IGOs shows the importance attached by independent governments for IGOs 
to be functional and effective, and that they are perceived as legitimate rule-making 
institutions.412 IGOs have a bureaucratic structure and regularly engage in meetings to establish 
dialogue between members for information to be exchanged.413 An IGO typically has a 
permanent secretariat, with staff “who embody not only the institutional, scientific, and 
technical knowledge but also distinctive cultures and norms”.414 This general structure is 
relatively standard in formalised IGOs, but informal IGOs are emerging, such as the G-
group415, which maintain high-level interactions between states, but are not governed by 
bureaucracy and a permanent secretariat.416 The central defining features of IGOs, including 
also institutions as proponents of norms and procedures, are cemented in the goals and aims 
pursued by IGOs. 
When IGOs are constructed, they are guided by a mandate which embodies the aims of 
the institution. That mandate gives the IGO a level of authority in its activities but also 
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establishes the scope of its influence.417 As IGOs are constituted by states, these states can 
engage in the IGO to achieve several goals. Vabulas and Snidal suggest that both informal and 
formal IGOs will allow states to attain different outcomes. These outcomes are presented in 
the table below.  
 
Table 1: State Goals in Informal and Formal IGOs418 
Outcome of informal IGO Outcome of formal IGO 
Maintain greater flexibility  Achieve a binding commitment  
Maintain state autonomy  Strong collective oversight  
Maintain closer control of information  Collective control of information  
Lower short-term transaction costs and speeds  Lower long-term costs for implementation  
Minimal bureaucracy and costs  Centralised bureaucratic capacity and stability  
Managing high uncertainty (crisis)  Managing routine problems 
 
When states choose to work through IGOs, they do so to achieve some of the goals mentioned 
above. There are several areas of benefit which make IGOs an attractive actor to engage with 
in the international system. Dorussen and Ward argue that the main benefit of IGOs in the 
international system is their ability to “link states in a network that allows for direct and indirect 
transmission of information about interests, intentions, and resolve”.419 This is a machinery 
which favours diplomatic engagement. From a liberal and constructivist perspective, IGOs 
have the capacity to minimise friction in the international system as they are able:  
. . . to coerce norm breakers, to mediate between conflicting parties, to reduce 
uncertainty by conveying information, to assist in problem solving through altering 
members’ perceptions and beliefs, to socialise members and shape norms, and to 
generate a sense of mutual identity.420 
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In terms of managing the behaviour of states in the international system, IGOs can pursue a 
variety of ways to support or enforce norms and rules. To coerce state behaviour, IGOs often 
apply sanctions as punitive measures for straying from the central purpose of these 
organisations.421 More commonly, however, IGOs are using diplomatic pressure and mediation 
to maintain order.422 From this analysis, a benefit of IGOs as an actor on the international stage 
is that they allow a platform for a rules-based order to be maintained. IGOs are also able to 
offer a coherent message to the global community. Rettig and Avraham study the way in which 
IGOs are able to engage with the media and notice that IGOs are able to utilise terminology 
and their reputation to frame the way in which issues are perceived.423 With a variety of 
significant benefits offered by engaging with IGOs, states are utilising the institution as a 
platform to engage in diplomacy. There are, however, critiques of IGOs which may impact 
their effectiveness.  
The most pressing critique is that an IGO still comprises independent states. 
Independent states pursue independent interests, and this can often complicate the ability of the 
IGO to manage competing goals.424 With the state ultimately determining the success of the 
IGO, the increase of the IGO’s influence is epiphenomenal when considering that great power 
competition has adapted to performing within the IGO arena.425 Fundamentally, “nations 
sometimes cooperate despite [International Organisations] and fail to cooperate even in the 
presence of them”.426 A further criticism concerns the IGOs wielding power in the international 
system, and yet channels of accountability to mediate the relationship between the IGO, its 
members and then global citizens, are often lacking.427 Accountability provides legitimacy to 
institutions, but remains “at odds with the ‘ethos of confidentiality’ entrenched in the systems 
of diplomacy”.428 These are discernible challenges that influence how effective IGOs are in 
international diplomacy.  
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IGOs have had significant influence on the diplomatic process, and diplomacy more 
broadly. From a realist perspective, IGOs derive their influence from their more powerful 
members by providing a platform for state communication and decision making.429 Thus, 
integral to the success of global governance in IGOs, is the role of the diplomat who acts as 
gatekeeper of information, makes decisions on plenary or executive organs, enhances the 
IGO’s functionality, and provides technical expertise to increase the legitimacy of the IGO.430 
This shows that the diplomat as the state representative within an IGO manifests the traditional 
elements of diplomacy. These, therefore, must still be utilised in multilateral settings like IGOs. 
When considering the role of an IGO in diplomacy to mitigate conflict, Babbitt proposes some 
key points to enhance the effectiveness of IGOs. An IGO must be able to intervene in conflict 
where agreement must be sought, or the IGO must ultilise its leverage to entice or coerce a 
conflicting party to an agreement.431 To do so, the normative and shared values of the members 
of the IGO can be employed to leverage and attract conflicting parties to agreement.432 The 
IGO must offer consistent mediation for both the short and long-term, where impartiality, 
inclusion, skilled operationalisation, multiple problem-solving approaches, and the 
incorporation of party interests are all done to the highest level to generate opportunities for 
resolution.433 Finally, Babbitt suggests that the most sustainable resolution of conflict can come 
from IGOs whose commitment to catalysing change in conflict zones, such as their domestic 
laws and institutions, can “help countries translate abstract values into realities” as the IGO is 
engaged over an extended period of time.434  
Undeniably, the presence and influence of IGOs in the modern international system 
have changed the diplomatic landscape. Although the IGO may be considered a nonstate actor, 
it is still beholden to the interests of its member states. This means that traditional diplomacy 
continues to operate but has now extended to a mutlilateral platform emergent from new 
diplomacy. The secretariat and civil service who work for the IGOs, however, may be 
distinguished as a new brand of diplomat who do not necessarily serve the interests of a state, 
but rather the IGO that states construct. Regardless, the rise in prominance of IGOs is an 
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important event for diplomacy, for the the diplomat, and for effective diplomatic proccesses in 
the contemporary international system.  
 
Nongovernmental Organisations  
Along with IGOs, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and INGOs have become 
more significant in the international system as nonstate actors who engage in the diplomatic 
process. This is especially so after World War II when the world was in dire need of reform 
and NGOs found their place in the subsequent restructuring. As they became more involved in 
the field of conflict resolution, their presence in the institution of diplomacy increased.435 This 
section seeks to define NGOs, elaborate on how NGOs engage in diplomacy, and the 
implications for the study and practice of diplomacy.  
  Defining NGOs cements the role of the NGO as a nonstate actor. The term NGO was 
coined by the United Nations at its inception through its Charter, of which Article 71 states:  
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation 
with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its 
competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organisations and, 
where appropriate, with national [organisations] after consultation with the Member of 
the United Nations concerned. 
Beyond consultative engagement, NGOs then attained rights to participate in diplomacy when 
recognised as legitimate actors by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.436 Farris 
puts forward two definitions of an NGO, one simply being a “legally constituted organisation 
which is operated by legal persons who act independently from the government”.437 Farris also 
cites Willett’s definition of an NGO, being, “an independent voluntary association of people 
acting together on a continuous basis for some common purpose other than achieving 
government office, making money, or illegal activities”.438 It is evident in these definitions that 
NGOs are distinct from state or government activities. Martens further refines the definition by 
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saying that NGOs are “formal (professionalised) independent societal organisations whose 
primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level”.439 This 
clear separation from the state that gave rise to the term ‘track two’ diplomacy, which is a 
channel of negotiation between unofficial agents, often shuttling among parties to present 
proposals and reach agreement.440 This has created a valuable space for NGOs and other 
nonstate actors to become influential in the diplomatic process.  
An element of confusion surrounds the understanding of what can be classed as an 
NGO. When identifying different nonstate actors, some observers refer to NGOs as civil 
society organisations “to distinguish them from the other two major sectors of society – 
government and the for-profit private sectors”.441 This is problematic as other scholars provide 
clear distinctions between NGOs and civil society organisations and consider them to be 
separate nonstate actors. However, it is clear that “NGOs like to see themselves as the 
representatives of civil society, acting as a necessary check and balance on the actions of 
governments and multinationals”, meaning that there is some overlap in the goals and processes 
of the two actors.442 This will be discussed in more detail in the following section on civil 
society organisations, but essentially NGOs are a significant actor within a broader array of 
civil society organisations. Some distinct and central characteristics of NGOs become apparent 
when NGOs are observed engaging in international affairs. Ryfman highlights five notable 
characteristics concerning the role of NGOs. This study is specifically in the sphere of 
humanitarian aid. However, the characterisations listed below are relevant to NGOs and their 
involvement in conflict resolution and diplomacy:  
1. The concept of volunteering for not-for-profit entity in terms of grouping 
together individuals who are free and considered to be vested with rights with a 
view to achieving a common purpose for the benefit of others and not for the 
members alone;  
2. The special legal framework it [the NGO] symbolises, depending on national 
legislation;  
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3. The relationship with public and private authorities both at the national level 
(with the state and its institutions, in particular) and at the international level;  
4. The reference to values involving both the voluntary commitment and the 
declared will to ensure that the work of the volunteering group is consistent with 
a civic approach geared, to a varying extent, to the “civil societies” which NGOs 
form an essential part; and of  
5. The transnational nature of the work carried out, irrespective of the conditions 
and procedures that govern it.443 
This list demonstrates that NGOs can have a distinctive role in international relations and 
conflict resolution. As a result, the institution of diplomacy has been strongly impacted by the 
growing role of NGOs in international affairs.  
 The increased role of NGOs reduces the relevance of traditional diplomacy insofar as 
it only relates to the professional representatives of the state.444 This has consequently changed 
the structural dimensions of diplomacy.445 As previously mentioned, the emergence of a second 
track of diplomacy changed the channels by which effectual diplomacy could take place. Here, 
unofficial (nonstate) agents engage in diplomacy; however as the study of this area became 
more prominent, observers recognised the need for identifying a track one-and-a-half 
diplomacy (track 1.5 diplomacy) whereby nonstate actors work with official, government 
agents to mediate agreement.446 Tracks one and 1.5 diplomacy have provided marginalised 
groups with a forum and represent an “alternative form of diplomacy”.447 The diplomatic 
landscape has indeed evolved to suggest that the state is not the only actor capable of engaging 
in diplomacy.448  
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Not only are the structural elements of the diplomatic institution impacted by NGOs, 
but so too are the operational dimensions of diplomacy.449 The large number of NGOs active 
in these channels has created a substantial transnational network of NGOs – with this network 
being a valuable asset to the success of NGOs and their diplomatic influence in the international 
arena.450 Tapping into that global network, NGOs are also important in more contemporary 
forms of diplomacy, including public diplomacy. NGOs are able to use their network to utilise 
channels of communication with numerous constituencies globally to influence the image of a 
state to a global public.451 Success in this area can be attributed to the way that NGOs have 
been able to take advantage of new technologies, notably the internet and associated social 
media, in a much more effective way to communicate with governments and corporations.452 
While using these technologies and the networks provided by NGOs, the NGO has the capacity 
to fill the gap that is left by other states. Traditional, state-centric diplomacy has major 
limitations, and can often hamper success in conflict resolution and peaceful mediation. This 
leaves a need for NGOs to fill. 
 The role of NGOs in diplomacy has been criticised by some observers. For those who 
believe that the primacy of the state still dictates diplomacy, “the role of NGOs is likely to be, 
at best, of secondary importance to that of national governments”.453 Here, the NGO may 
engage in diplomatic activities, but the activities are always defined in terms of the professional 
diplomat being a governmental official.454 This suggests that the influence of the NGO will be 
circumscribed by that of the state. Other observers also suggest that “NGOs do not have the 
legitimacy of international organisations to mediate, and their behaviour in the mediation of 
violent conflicts is similar to that of other informal mediators”.455 Branco notes that NGOs are 
limited in their resources, they have very few strategies to mediate conflict, and the strategies 
to which they are limited (namely communication and facilitation), make constructing and 
maintaining an environment conducive to conflict management difficult.456 As a result of the 
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purpose of NGOs, they can often have separate and competing interests to states which can 
impact the way the NGO can function. These challenges notwithstanding, the position of NGOs 
has grown steadily.  
 As noted above, NGOs gained prominence in the international system when they 
became a key consultative player in the United Nations. Willetts, in writing about the status of 
NGOs and diplomacy through the United Nations,  suggests that provisions of the NGO statute 
through the United Nations are so deeply embedded they could be regarded as part of 
customary international law.457 The strongest evidence of this status is “the way in which NGOs 
can often gain access to intergovernmental proceedings even when the political climate turns 
against them and there is significant opposition to their presence”.458 To this point, NGOs have 
the right to be participants in the policymaking bodies of the UN system, but they are not 
members of those bodies. This means that they do not possess the right to vote, but can still 
play a valuable role in the dialogue. From this platform, NGOs have grown in influence, 
working alongside governments, engaging in issues on the international agenda, and become 
more involved in contributing to global governance.459 Willett’s study into the United Nations 
and the role of NGOs highlights one significant shift in international relations, and that is that 
“the interstate system has been transformed since 1945, both politically [and] legally, into a 
multiactor system”.460  
 For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that NGOs have made a clear 
impact in the area of faith-based diplomacy. While this will be addressed in Chapter 8, it is 
worth noting here that NGOs have a rich history in religious advocacy.461 Religious advocacy 
groups, a form of NGO, were studied in a Pew research report titled, The Pew Forum on 
Religion in Public Life, that found the majority of religious advocacy groups listed human 
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rights as a top priority in their agenda.462 This means NGOs can claim historical experience in 
addressing global issues and engaging effectively in dialogue. Indeed, Farris suggests that it is 
of crucial importance for governments “to recognise the vital role that NGOs can play and 
incorporate their ideas and experience so that together they can advance this critical human 
right, international religious freedom, which can contribute so much to long-term stability and 
security”.463 Farris writes on religious freedom as a central issue that NGOs have had the 
capacity to promote and protect, a factor that encourages the future potential of faith-based 
diplomacy, and the key role of NGOs in diplomacy.  
 The role of NGOs in the international arena is set to increase. Riordan attributes this to 
their “access to information that allows them to challenge on increasingly equal terms the 
assertions of governments and multinational corporations” with the added benefit of NGOs 
being “unfettered by the bureaucratic baggage of generations”, “more apt at networked 
organisation”, and, “quicker on their feet and more adaptable in a rapidly changing 
international environment”. 464  Ignoring the role of NGOs in the future of international 
relations and of diplomacy would be of great detriment to the field. NGOs are better trained 
and equipped at responding to the needs of humanitarian crises and interventions leaving them 
to fill the voids in the international arena.465 While the value of engaging with NGOs in 
diplomacy is evident, the challenge of genuine cooperation between the state and NGOs 
remains. Cooper and Hocking argue that “defining appropriate relations between government 
and NGOs, identifying clearly the strengths of each, and helping NGOs do what they do best 
will be critical tasks for a New Diplomacy”.466 As the study and practice of diplomacy has 
expanded beyond the traditional, state-centric approach, New Diplomacy has presented an 
opportunity for a recent actor, the NGO, to engage and influence diplomacy.   
 
Civil Society Organisations  
The impact of new diplomacy in the study and practice of diplomacy has underscored 
the newfound role for civil society organisations (CSOs). In the area of human security in 
particular, CSOs continue to influence the global agenda, and like NGOs, “the exponential 
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growth in the numbers, prominence, and sophistication of these organisations and the 
campaigns they orchestrated” substantially impacted the institutions of diplomacy. 467 
Moreover, the significance of globalism needs to be considered, where the national confines of 
societies, polities, and economies are superseded by a global civil society.468 Its rise from the 
end of the 20th into the present Century has been likened to the rise of the nation state in the 
19th Century.469 Civil society is assigned a lesser role in international affairs than traditional 
political structures. However, the idea of civil society is evolving as a concept with expanding 
influence across many sectors, including the political, historic, cultural, social and economic.470 
Importantly, the development of civil society has been linked to successful governance in 
democratic states.471 Beyond looking at the NGO as a specific nonstate actor, the broader area 
of CSOs must also be considered to understand the impact they have had on diplomacy in the 
time of its manifestation as the so called new diplomacy.  
 Prior to a closer definition of a CSO, the notion of a civil society needs to be examined. 
Black highlights that civil society is an embodiment of several characteristics, including “the 
sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks and individuals located between 
the family, the state, and the market” that can have an impact domestically, internationally and 
globally through transnational networks.472 In an age of globalisation, the global civil society 
will also influence the way that organisations operate. The current global civil society, 
according to Kaldor, may be discerned in its activist, neoliberal and postmodern forms. These 
are elaborated as: 
1. A social movement-based ‘activist version’ of global civil society;  
2. A tamed or ‘neoliberal version’ of nongovernmental organisations that have become 
increasingly institutionalised and professionalised in the course of routine 
collaborations with governments and international organisations; and  
3. A ‘postmodern version’ encompassing more ascriptively based forms of association, 
such as those associated with ethnic and religious identities.473  
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It is within this broader context of civil society that organisations can function to achieve their 
goals on the global agenda. Advocates for CSOs have highlighted that CSOs can provide 
“governance without government”, a statement that suggests that CSOs are able to satisfy some 
functions of the state more effectively, specifically at a societal level.474 Venturi identifies two 
helpful definitions for CSOs. The first, from the World Bank, sees CSOs as the “wide area of 
nongovernmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, 
expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, 
political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations”.475 The second comes from the 
Civil Society Index, which defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state 
and the market where people associate to advance common interests” - indicating that any 
political or diplomatic engagement does sit in the second track of diplomacy as a clearly 
defined nonstate actor.476 When considering institutions that exist within civil society, the 
organisations “are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the 
boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and 
negotiated”.477 This is because the scope of CSOs is broad and complex, involving a 
multiplicity of actors to address common concerns. Although the organisations that operate 
within civil society cover a wide spectrum of issues and operations, when considering peaceful 
resolution and diplomacy there are some central purposes that CSOs must achieve. These 
include:  
• Protection of the rights of civilians  
• Promoting reconciliation  
• Confidence building among the conflicting parties and groups  
• Monitoring for accountability of reconciliation  
• Advocacy and public communication for wider dissemination of peacebuilding  
• Socialisation  
• Practice of democratic attitudes among citizens 
• Intermediation and facilitation between the citizens and the state.478 
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These central goals are helpful in substantiating the definitions of CSOs previously provided 
as they present the pursuits and aims of the organisations in international affairs. It is apparent 
that CSOs have the potential to engage and impact the processes and institutions of diplomacy 
in an effective way. The emergence of CSOs into the diplomatic arena requires consideration 
in view of the impact of CSOs on the political and diplomatic structures of international 
relations.  
 In a study on the achievements, limits, and prospects of civil society in human security, 
David Black outlines common factors which may be attributed to the success of CSOs and their 
emergence as an actor in the international system. He suggests that the global environment in 
the aftermath of the Cold War encouraged transnational civil society to engage in the 
diplomatic and political process.479 During this time, the scholarly literature started to show an 
interest in civil society when examining anti-statist perspectives to theory (being neoliberal and 
post-structural).480 Along with this, the advent of new information and communication 
technology enabled a greater reach and a more effective mobilisation of civil society.481 The 
leadership of civil society organisations also gained a level of influence in policymaking as 
they could inspire capable strategies above the regular bureaucracy of the state.482 The final 
factor which Black suggests contributed to the successful emergence of CSOs was that their 
novel approach to diplomacy brought about a rise in media and popular interest, which 
reframed the global agenda and enhanced access to the political and diplomatic domain.483 
These factors may account for the reasons CSOs gained power in the political landscape, but 
at the same time several critiques emerged about the role of CSOs in diplomacy. 
 CSOs have encountered several limitations to their effectiveness in engaging in 
diplomacy. Fundamentally, civil society is not given as much weight in the decision-making 
process. Essentially, while the political elite exists in the Westphalian system of nation states, 
civil society will be assigned a lesser role due to the structures of power and international 
relations embedded in the system..484 CSOs exist to represent civil society, and are often then 
susceptible to civic influences, but the citizens are not empowered to control the political 
                                                          









systems that are accountable to the polity.485 This means that the structures for influence are 
not yet sufficiently effective to create a channel between civil society and high-level decision-
making. By virtue of the role and constituency of CSOs, there is the potential that CSOs could 
undermine areas of human security, such as those that forestall the negotiation and signing of 
a global Arms Trade Treaty as a result of different CSOs protesting some points while others 
may struggling implementing the programs advocated for.486 This could bring about divisions 
between CSOs and ultimately lead to a level of cynicism toward their involvement at a high 
level. Another pressing concern is that as CSOs continue to seek collaboration with 
governments, a level of institutionalisation and professionalisation can gradually diminish the 
CSO’s critical independence from the state.487 Indeed, this may progress and see some CSOs 
formed to reflect state interests or even advocate for regime change. Although new diplomacy 
has allowed for a more participatory form of diplomacy, the engagement of CSOs with the 
machinery of the state has often impaired the legitimacy and effectiveness of CSOs in the 
diplomatic process.488 These challenges have impacted the way that CSOs have engaged in 
diplomacy, and the potential successes that the nonstate actor can achieve. However, it is 
undeniable that the rise of CSOs has challenged the traditional constructs of diplomacy.  
 The engagement of CSOs in diplomacy and global governance has indeed influenced 
the study and practice of diplomacy. For one, CSOs have gained access to the negotiating table, 
directly or indirectly. CSOs are able to affect or even change policies designed by states, 
challenge the diplomatic agenda, and become key contributors to informal, or backdoor, 
diplomacy.489 This has become apparent with the high-level engagement of CSOs in issues of 
climate change. This is where civil society positions itself as an arbiter of the interests of 
society, essentially holding the state to account for lack of transparency and accountability.490 
This increased access has brought about a deepened level of participation in the political 
process – whether it be in supporting policies, opposing proposals, or applying pressure as an 
advocate for civil society.491 Through multilateral institutions like the United Nations, CSOs 
have a space to facilitate communication, to engage with the global agenda, and to improve 
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linkages and networks, both among other CSOs and with regional or international social 
movements and campaigns.492 This cements the role of the CSO as a consultative agent in many 
areas of international affairs, including security and humanitarian concerns.493  
This is where CSOs can have a distinct role in conflict resolution and diplomacy. When 
examining CSOs in conflict resolution, there are two approaches to peacebuilding in which 
CSOs can play a pivotal role. Firstly, reconstructive peacebuilding seeks a breadth of aims, as 
suggested by the United Nations. These include “monitoring a truce, disarming, and 
[demobilising the] army; providing humanitarian assistance; strengthening participatory 
governance; protecting human rights and rehabilitation; reconstruction; and reconciliation 
building”.494 Each of these areas provides scope for CSOs to be involved. Also, within a 
reconstructive peacebuilding approach, root causes of conflict such as insecurity, identity 
issues, and development, can all be strengthened through CSOs.495 The transformative 
approach to peacebuilding can be enhanced by CSOs. This approach looks to leadership in 
conflict resolution, managing root causes of conflict formation and structural violence; this in 
turn lends itself to the construction of mechanisms for addressing a crisis, creating political 
reconciliation, and developing a sustained system of peace.496 Again, CSOs can play a vital 
role in development. To succeed in this area, “the commitment and motivation of the parties 
concerned, mechanisms to resolve differences, and institutional transformation” is necessary 
from all actors involved.497 Looking to a more conceptual level, the development of 
institutionalised norms and practices are often strengthened by CSOs.498 The CSO could be 
used as a conduit for translating policies and decisions at an institutional level to the constituent 
level. The multiple channels of potential engagement demonstrate the way in which diplomacy 
has adjusted to enable CSOs to be considered as a legitimate actor, to varying degrees of 
success.499  
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 There are many ways to improve the effectiveness and role of CSOs in diplomacy. The 
first is that CSOs have the capacity to adapt and learn from their growing engagement, whereby 
they have enough distance from other actors to maintain their own distinctive role.500 With the 
substantial network of CSOs that has been established, momentum can be gained through 
cooperation between various CSOs that pursue similar goals.501 This can strengthen the scope 
and influence of the CSOs in addressing their priorities on the global agenda. It is important 
for CSOs to remain innovative as they have the space within the new diplomatic landscape to 
challenge the control of the state, while not “implicitly subscribing to the restrictive and ‘safe’ 
conventions of diplomatic orthodoxy”.502 This is a concern for the involvement of CSOs on 
different levels of structural and operational engagement. For example, after examining the 
engagement of civil society in conflict resolution, Ghaplanyan proposes eight 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of CSOs in future conflict resolutions. They 
are:  
1. Civil society should seek better and more efficient ways to link their conflict 
transformation initiatives to the official conflict negotiation process. This could be 
done, for example, through third party mediators.  
2. Civil society and particularly NGOs and other civic initiatives that undertake 
peacebuilding projects and activities must strive towards joining forces, coordinating 
activities, mobilising more NGOs to join them and exerting pressure on governments.  
3. Civil society must continue raising awareness among the wider population about the 
complexity of the conflict and the eventual necessity of compromise, despite the 
governments’ failure to do so.  
4. Changing the nature of media would require more attention from international donors 
and, more importantly, political will from national governments. Civil society, too, can 
play a significant role in mobilising its efforts and creating alternative media sources, 
internet and print, which would provide opportunities for interactive discussion of 
issues usually not tackled by the official, government-controlled media.  
5. Civil society should continue engaging youth in peacebuilding activities and attempt to 
organise not simply ad hoc meetings, but longer term projects where the same groups 
meet regularly throughout the year and discuss and brainstorm the contending issues. 
This will provide the opportunity for youth to connect with each other and slowly 
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overcome the preconceived notion of seeing the other as the enemy. Conducting similar 
activities with other age or sex groups, or among journalists, civil activists or scholars, 
should be aimed at diffusing the ‘enemy’ image and helping the conflicting societies 
look for constructive solutions. 
6. Respected think tanks and research institutes in [zones of conflict such as] Armenia and 
Azerbaijan should seek opportunities to launch joint research initiatives, involving 
scholars from both countries and producing policy or white papers intended for their 
respective governments. 
7. Grassroots organisations and relevant NGOs should aim at building capacity to support 
and/or implement educational programs for youth on peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention and resolution. 
8. Civil society should aim to establish closer contacts with the media or invest time, effort 
and finances in creating independent media sources to ensure regular and informed 
coverage of issues and the work of civil society in the context of national reconstruction 
and rehabilitation.503 
These recommendations are only some that could be suggested to promote improvement in the 
way that CSOs engage in diplomacy. This is significant because it does demonstrate that CSOs 
can have a more robust role in the field in the future. As political institutions continue to 
develop the mechanisms and structures to allow for productive engagement from CSOs, the 
potential benefits from CSO involvement in diplomacy will continue to grow. In conjunction 
with IGOs and NGOs, CSOs are an increasingly important actor to consider in the future of 
diplomacy, and the state needs to continue to learn how to engage with them effectively. 
Importantly for this thesis, these recommendations provide areas for future engagement in the 
area of faith-based diplomacy if indeed these CSOs are either faith-based or operate on an 
interfaith basis.  
 
Individuals  
To this point in the chapter, the role of nonstate organisations has been examined to evaluate 
how they have influenced the study and practice of diplomacy. At a more foundational level, 
observers are beginning to study the impact that the individual can have on diplomacy. In the 
                                                          




current international environment, “the individual citizen – the private person – also is in a 
position to challenge state control” with high profile cases such as Edward Snowden 
demonstrating that platforms exist for the individual to engage in traditionally state affairs.504 
There are several ideas that suggest why the individual has emerged as a significant player in 
diplomacy. In 1949 James Marshall observed that foreign affairs were democratising, a 
phenomenon which has increasingly seen the role of the individual strengthen.505 He proposed 
that if people, rather than the state, formed the foundation of goodwill, then people should 
become active participants in the expression of international goodwill.506 When it comes to 
diplomacy and maintaining peace, states “must now speak the minds of citizen diplomats, of 
great masses of people, rather than of dynasties, political parties, or ruling groups”.507 This 
attitude emerged following the Second World War, and has gained support in different areas 
since. An example of a more recent push to see the role of the individual enhanced was the 
anti-globalisation movements at the turn of the Century. These movements “highlight the 
critical importance of citizens’ perspectives of global politics” which seek to transform existing 
conditions of the global system.508 One implication of this movement is that citizens would 
express their trust or mistrust of other states, which ultimately affected the preferences of 
foreign policy objectives as a result.509 The individual, therefore, merits study as a potential 
actor on the international stage.  
 There is a simple argument to be made about the role of the individual in diplomacy. 
Irrespective of whether the state is the primary diplomatic actor, the actual operation and 
function of diplomacy is carried out by an individual – the diplomat.510 In examining this 
concept, Faizullaev argues that the state cannot be reduced to structural units and functions, 
but “on an individual level, people experience the state as a living being and personalised 
phenomenon, as a unitary and purposeful actor with distinctive selfhood”.511 This entity then 
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translates to the diplomats who represent that state, essentially individualising that experience. 
This enhances the role of the individual when considering state-centric diplomacy. However, 
“diplomacy is not just an operational tool of foreign policy, but a personal art too”.512 The 
diplomat’s individual personality intersects with their diplomatic performance. The more 
complex point that Faizullaev makes is that “the diplomatic self, on the one hand, is part of the 
personhood of a diplomat, but on the other hand, it is also part of the state personhood”.513 This 
is the outcome of the personal self-merging with the identity assumed by representing the 
state,514 thereby concluding that the state and the individual identity are compatible. This 
validates the deepened understanding of the role of the individual in international relations. 
The functions of the diplomat, however, are seen as operating on the individual level. For 
example, from Henrikson’s perspective, the individual has some control over how they are 
represented, and also the platforms on which to engage for global representation.515 If the 
individual can fulfil the diplomatic functions outside the locus of the state, then their potential 
role in diplomacy should be taken more seriously. To demonstrate how the individual has 
engaged in the theory and practice of diplomacy, two areas of individual diplomacy – that of 
citizen diplomacy and celebrity diplomacy – will now be examined.  
 The concept of citizen diplomacy has changed the participation and form of diplomacy. 
Paul Sharp suggests four broad types of citizen diplomats. The first is the conventional 
understanding of the citizen diplomat, where the citizen is “a go-between, representing to one 
another countries that find direct and open communication difficult”.516 Private citizens may 
be used in this sense to preserve secrecy, avoid official status, and avoid embarrassment, or as 
a way to utilise the citizen’s expertise on an issue, or as a result of personal relationships with 
political leaders.517 Each of these potential outcomes places the individual in an important 
position when engaging in diplomacy. The second type of citizen diplomat that Sharp defines 
is the idea of citizen diplomacy “as a representative for a sectoral, regional, or local economic 
interest”.518 Individuals act as consultants to represent the interests and needs of the local 
community they represent. The third conception of citizen diplomats entails their ability to 
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engage as lobbyists or advocates for a particular cause. Typically, citizens will lobby and 
campaign at a domestic level, lobbying their own government. However, “it is reasonable to 
suppose that the internationalisation of this sort of lobbying will increase as a result of the 
developments in communications and information technologies”, meaning that the citizen will 
have a more global scope.519 This final type of citizen diplomat put forward by Sharp is “the 
citizen diplomat as a subverter or transformer of existing policies and/or political arrangements, 
domestic and/or international”.520 This is a high level of political engagement which does place 
the individual at the centre of diplomatic agreement. For example, Bishop writes in the way 
that individuals are able to peruse and show support for United Nations Treaties using the 
internet.521 Ramseur examines the role that citizens played during Cold War tensions to address 
issues of nuclear testing and environmental related impacts.522 Furthermore, while the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines is hailed as a successful case of nongovernmental 
organisations impacting the international system, there is a strong presence of citizen 
diplomacy at work to achieve the results recognised by the institution today.523  
When applying these ideas to conflict resolution, citizen diplomacy provides both sides 
of a conflict with the opportunity to interact with one another, potentially leading to peace. The 
aim is that “gradual shifts in attitudes among a critical mass of people can yield major changes 
in the course of conflicts”, noting importantly that “this change must come from all aspects of 
society – decision makers, civil society and civilians”.524 The transformative element of 
conflict resolution requires the involvement of civilians, thus presenting another opportunity 
for the citizen diplomat to play a noteworthy role in diplomacy. The “dominancy of themes of 
change and transformation in any contemporary discussion of diplomacy” has presented the 
opportunity for citizen diplomats to be considered more seriously in the literature of 
diplomacy.525 However, a critique is that although citizen diplomats are growing in number, 
they may not be sufficiently representative if they are so eclectic. This may lessen the 
legitimacy and influence the individual can have on the diplomatic process. Ultimately, “a 
                                                          
519 Ibid. 139 
520 Ibid. 140 
521 Christopher W. Bishop, "Citizen Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, no. 135 (2003). 
522 David Ramseur, Melting the Ice Curtain: The Extraordinary Story of Citizen Diplomacy on the Russia-
Alaska Frontier (Farmington Hills: University of Alaska Press, 2017). 
523 See Jody Williams et al., Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008). 
524 Aviva Shemesh, "Citizen Diplomacy - Creating a Culture of Peace: The Israeli-Palestinian Case," Palestine-
Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 18, no. 2/3 (2012). 59 




diplomat with no one to represent is a diplomat who does not need to be recognised”.526 The 
presence of citizen diplomats in international relations is increasing, but there are still areas of 
limitation that require improvement for citizen diplomats to be as effective as possible in their 
diplomatic endeavours.  
Along with citizen diplomacy, which looks at a broader range of participants, celebrity 
diplomacy is a concept that is gaining more influence in the contemporary diplomatic 
landscape. The rise in prominence of track two forms of diplomacy has presented the 
opportunity for celebrities to play a role.527 Kissinger observed that the “revolution in global 
telecommunications had created a new hybrid world where politics and pop culture mixed” and 
so institutions would employ strategies where celebrities would become representatives and 
advocates for certain global issues.528 This approach to diplomacy has gained favour in the 
United Nations, forming out of Kofi Annan’s conferences in 2000 and 2002, the second being 
titled “celebrity Advocacy for the New Millennium”.529 The goal at this point was for 
celebrities to be used as a way to influence “reluctant governments to take seriously the 
rhetorical pledges they make during every General Assembly”.530 This strategy has expanded 
within the institution with the role of Goodwill Ambassadors cementing the presence of 
celebrity diplomacy in the United Nations. A celebrity will demonstrate their “commitments to 
humanitarian causes and international issues of inequality, and other celebrities follow their 
lead”.531 A benefit of this approach is that it bridges the gap between generations, where 
celebrities can appeal to a youth audience  on international, political and humanitarian issues.532 
Although the concept of celebrity diplomacy does garner several criticisms, when a celebrity 
takes an active role in advocating for particular policies in relation to global issues, the public 
is willing to listen to celebrities speak.533 Not only are celebrities attractive to the public, with 
the ability to speak eloquently and passionately, but the celebrity also “represents a collective 
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identity of the public in which an articulation of culture is embodied”.534 This may give 
celebrities a position to engage in global issues through diplomacy, but there are several 
limitations that must be taken into consideration when deciding on the effectiveness of this as 
a diplomatic strategy.  
While UN programs that utilise celebrities to avoid upsetting member states can be 
helpful to communicate a message, such a strategy can be criticised as an instrument of 
propaganda.535 Actors such as Liam Neeson, performers such as Katy Perry and athletes like 
Serena Williams have all been named Ambassadors by UNICEF536 due to their talents and 
achievements, but mostly due to their “commitment to improving the lives of children 
worldwide”.537 The strategy may be convenient “but this maxim should be subjected to careful 
interrogation” to ensure that it is genuine in its pursuits and outcomes.538 The public should not 
uncritically accept the celebrity-conveyed message, but see celebrities “as legitimate, educated, 
and aware individuals, not just superficial entertainers”.539 This is a significant limitation to the 
perceptions of celebrities in this position. The legitimacy of celebrities who speak with 
authority on development and other international issues must be questioned. One reason for 
this is because “celebrities lack a mandate to become active in global politics”.540 Another 
reason is that celebrities are often self-appointed to these positions, where their own personal 
credibility is the source of their legitimacy.541 The message presented by the celebrity must 
also result in substantive change in the issues to which they are responding. If the improvement 
of governance and development is a goal, the constant proliferation of celebrity diplomats 
could bring about a trivialisation of development challenges, and the consequences of this are 
detrimental to achieving the desired change.542 Some studies suggest that the overall impact of 
celebrity diplomats can be quite negative. When celebrity diplomats speak on behalf of victims, 
Kogen suggests that they do a disservice to the victims they represent by “entrenching historical 
narratives of the other as a child, a victim, and politically underdeveloped, and the United States 
as saviour and hero; and narrowly defining for viewers how they can engage politically with 
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the global other”.543 These limitations have severe consequences and thus must be considered 
when celebrity diplomats are being employed to achieve foreign policy goals.  
The potential drawbacks of celebrity diplomacy must be emphasized when celebrities 
are used to engage in high-level political decision making. Regardless of the limitations, the 
presence of celebrity and citizen diplomats does recognise that in this globalised international 
system, the individual does have the platform and potential to engage diplomatically. Perhaps 
most poignantly, individuals are able to make complex global issues accessible. An individual 
speaking on development concerns in their community, for example, localises and personalizes 
a typically complex debate, which can foster global support and enhance shared understanding 
on issues. Mechanisms and structures are already in place, such as at the United Nations and 
its various agencies, which allow individuals to become a part of the diplomatic process. This 
is a reflection of the changing nature of the diplomatic system, where individuals and other 
nonstate actors are challenging the unitary strength of the state. 
 
Conclusion  
Chapters 3 and 4 have focused on the shift in the study and practice of diplomacy since its 
traditional foundation. The scholarship on diplomacy has transitioned from a positivist to a 
post-positivist approach, enabling scholars to consider the role of nonstate actors in 
international relations. Thus, the emergence of theory in new and innovative diplomacy 
garnered support in Diplomacy Studies. The theory established several different goals for 
diplomacy, but importantly created scope for other actors to engage in the diplomatic process. 
This chapter then introduced notable nonstate actors that have entered the diplomatic 
landscape, namely IGOs, NGOs, CSOs and individuals. The purpose of considering these 
actors is to understand what they are and how they engage in diplomacy. Later in this thesis, 
each of these actors will be assessed in terms of the way they engage in faith-based diplomacy 
– however, it is important to have established how these actors impact diplomacy as a whole. 
In doing so, this chapter has prepared the ground for examining how nonstate actors in new 
and innovative diplomacy can deal with the challenges presented by religion in the 
contemporary international system.  
 
                                                          





The Context and Framing of Faith-based Diplomacy 
 
Having examined the traditional, new, and innovative schools of diplomacy, the 
following chapters will explore the concept of faith-based diplomacy to understand its place as 
a theory within the context of Diplomacy Studies. This is performed in five stages. The first 
(the current chapter) will explore the wider context of faith-based diplomacy. The second 
(Chapter 6) will undertake an overview of faith-based diplomacy as it exists to date. The third 
(Chapter 7) will examine the impact of faith-based diplomacy in scholarship and theory. The 
fourth (Chapter 8) will apply faith-based diplomacy to other frames of analysis. The final and 
ninth chapter of the examination of faith-based diplomacy provides a summary of key findings 
and a proposal of the central tenets of faith-based diplomacy as a theory.  
 
Introduction 
The study of faith-based diplomacy is complex and multifaceted. Understanding the 
intersection between significant areas of study such as politics, diplomacy, the state, religion, 
and faith, represents a task with which scholars have been re-engaging in recent times. 
Complexity is no reason for this field of study to be neglected. Studies have highlighted that 
intervention in future conflicts will be based more on moral and ethical justifications, and yet 
the opportunity for religion to be seen as a force for positive engagement is strikingly absent 
in the literature.544 Following the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, religious tension has 
contributed to violence in the United States, Western Europe and the Middle East, indicating 
the challenges posed by religious conflict are global in scope.545 Usually, if academic attention 
is given to the study of religion in diplomacy, it looks at “extremist beliefs and actions of a 
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minority, rather than the ways it guides and inspires the majority and can be harnessed for 
good”.546 This thesis aims to contribute to the latter. As Madelaine Albright states, “religion is 
a powerful force” that is indeed “a subject worth studying”.547 The scholarly investigation of 
faith in diplomacy has accelerated in part due to change in the very nature of conflict itself. 
The change has become noticeable as conflict is derived from communal identity which is 
informed by religion.548 As a result, religion takes a central role in much of contemporary 
conflict.549 Yet, “policymakers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars… are still in the habit of 
disregarding the role of religion, religious institutions, and religious motivations in explaining 
politics and conflict”.550 If, however, as Huston Smith asserts, “the surest way to the heart of a 
people is through their faith”, then the field is ripe for understanding how faith can positively 
engage with diplomacy.551 The question arises, why has religion as a positive force in this field 
been ignored? Luttwak explains that, 
One is therefore confronted with a learned repugnance to contend intellectually 
with all that is religion or belongs to it – a complex inhibition compounded out 
of the peculiar embarrassment that many feel when faced by explicit 
manifestations of seriously religious sentiment; out of the mistaken 
Enlightenment predication that the progress of knowledge and the influence of 
religion were mutually exclusive, making the latter a waning force; and 
sometimes out of a wilful cynicism that illegitimately claims the virtue of 
realism.552 
If ignorance of religion has been learned and reinforced, then it is possible that the addition of 
religion into scholarship can also be learned and reinforced. However, this shift - to engage in 
critical scholarship and integrate faith into the practice of diplomacy - is, as Seib notes, both 
simple and profound. He states that it is “simple in its common sense and profound in its 
implicit challenge to the commitment to secularism that pervades the diplomacy of the United 
States and many other states”.553 With the knowledge that the world is increasingly shaped by 
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religion, observers have noted that the success of diplomacy is going to be found in the ability 
of diplomatic institutions to understand and connect with people whose identity is defined by 
religion.554 As the international system has experienced the mass-movement of people around 
the world as a product of globalisation, people are crossing borders with their own religious 
traditions and values.555 This has highlighted the need for scholars to pay closer attention to the 
field as the religious dimension of how people live cannot be marginalised.556  
In the literature, there has emerged across numerous disciplines a recognition of the 
need to bypass conventional ideas about “modernity and secularity”, as “the intertwined 
relationship between religion and politics poses new puzzles”.557 While recognition of the 
neglect of religion in the International Relations literature is to be applauded, the danger still 
exists that “religion is topically recognised” and “is still often substantively misrecognised”.558 
In the contemporary field of Diplomacy Studies, scholars echo the words of Victor Hugo, 
stating that faith-based diplomacy is “an idea whose time has come”.559  Before engaging with 
the concept of faith-based diplomacy itself, this chapter will endeavour to settle some 
fundamental contextual concerns. The first section will evaluate the changing nature of conflict 
and conflict resolution in light of the contemporary international system and the role that 
religion has within it. The following section will outline the complexities of religion by 
contending with the definition of religion and faith while also extrapolating on some of 
religion’s central characteristics. Before fully exploring faith-based diplomacy, attention is 
drawn to the notion of secularisation and its impact on the international system and the field of 
Diplomacy Studies. The final section of this chapter will examine the rise or re-emergence of 
religion in the 21st Century, thus establishing the foundation for analysis in faith-based 
diplomacy. 
 
The Changing Nature of Conflict  
 The changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War international system is an integral 
element of the construction of faith-based diplomacy. It is widely recognised by observers that 
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religion and religious affiliation does have a divisive character that can fuel conflict, even at 
the social level.560 Resultantly, religion has become a central feature to many of the conflicts 
around the globe.561 These conflicts are “intractable, identity-based conflicts that exceed the 
grasp of traditional diplomacy”, and manifest as ethnic, tribal, or religious conflicts. 562 This 
form of conflict reveals the insufficiencies of traditional diplomacy in what Sharp describes as 
“the nightmare of the Westphalian story of religion and diplomacy”.563 The ‘nightmare’ occurs 
when “at least one party makes non-negotiable, faith-based claims upon others, enjoys 
considerable capacity to affect them, and acts in a way which appears to bear no relation to the 
moral precepts of its own faith”.564 This has far-reaching implications as the younger 
generation will be drawn to view that religion through the frame of conflict, not by its spiritual 
enrichment.565 It is within these spiritual depths that the individual is able to find the positive 
elements of faith that counter violent conflict. If this trend continues, a cycle of religiously 
motivated violence can become protracted in societies. These resurgent cultural identities 
entrench divisions and exacerbate ethnic conflicts.566  
This is not only limited to the societal level. Koesel suggests that religious majorities and 
minorities, as well as religious actors have cooperated throughout history with authoritarian 
state officials, meaning that the impact of religion and conflict can affect multiple structures in 
the international system.567 Not all religions, however, are the same in this respect. As a result, 
the way that religion may have changed the nature of conflict is different depending on the 
religion in question. For example, inclusivist religions are “less likely to prompt the type of 
large-scale violence that has come to be associated with religious war”.568 Furthermore, 
different regions of the world have experienced different patterns of religious war.569 Kang 
defines religious war as “a war in which religious belief or practice or the use of religious ideas 
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or symbols are either a central or peripheral issue in the conflict”.570 In a post-September 11 
society, where terrorism is a key antagonist to global security, conflict with religion as a factor 
has continued to fester in these conditions.571 Johnston posits four reasons for religious 
conflict’s intensification:  
1. Economic globalisation produces profound confrontations with traditional values, often 
embedded in religion; 
2. An increasing fraction of the world’s population is left behind by rapid technological 
change; 
3. The economic gap continues to widen between the “haves and have nots”, and;  
4. Secular governments in hard-pressed areas fail to meet the legitimate expectations of 
their populations.572 
Fundamentally the nature of conflict has changed and therefore by extension conflict resolution 
methodologies have also evolved. 
 
The Changing Nature of Conflict Resolution  
A key feature of successful conflict resolution is the active role of effective diplomacy. 
However, the changing nature of conflict has impacted the broader field of conflict resolution. 
As conflicts have become increasingly more identity-based, the resolution process for this type 
of conflict is “not well understood by practical-minded diplomats accustomed to operating in 
the old East-West context of nation-state politics”.573 The seriousness of the West’s inability 
to manage religious differences in conflict resolution will only continue to intensify. In the 
scope of traditional diplomacy, the rational-actor framework is being stretched to consider 
elements of reconciliation, unofficial channels of diplomacy and societal reconciliation.574 This 
sees conflicts exceed the grasp of traditional diplomacy. The frameworks of conflict resolution 
are indeed being tested.  
                                                          
570 Ibid. 968 
571 Loramy Gerstbauer, "Faith in Religion's Reconciling Power," Brandywine Review of Faith & International 
Affairs 2, no. 2 (2004). 50 
572 Douglas M. Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy," in Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public 
Policy and Conflict Transformation, ed. Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney L. Peterson (Philadelphia: 
Templeton Foundation Press, 2002). 
573 Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 3 
574 Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 7 
95 
 
In this study, the scope of conflict resolution is applied to conflicts where violence 
contains religious elements, or the conflict resolution features some form of religious 
involvement. This is most apparent in conflicts where religion is a determining factor of the 
violence, yet increasingly there is a role for religious actors as mediators of conflict resolution 
even if religion was not principally involved in the conflict.575 Historically, the emotional or 
spiritual element of an individual or community is merely tolerated in conflict resolution. 
However, the recognition of the spiritual needs of the parties involved can enhance the 
effectiveness of the resolution process.576 The new mechanisms of conflict resolution extend 
beyond the state-centric approach or the involvement of a religious individual, but now also 
consider the role of institutions, non-state actors and other constructs in international relations 
that have a space for faith-based engagement.577 These emotional and spiritual stakes of the 
parties involved in conflict resolution are “deeply rooted in history, and their respective 
interpretations of first principles such as self-determination, justice and freedom”.578 Thus, at 
a micro level of conflict resolution, religion must become a part of the solution of intractable 
conflicts.579 The ability to see virtues and ethics in religious tradition has the capacity to foster 
conflict transformation.580   
Scholarship accepts that religion and religious beliefs can contribute to conflict; 
however, the literature is now exploring the notion that religious principles might be used to 
ease conflict as well.581 A challenge to resolving conflicts of a religious nature is entrenched in 
what scholars have called ‘theological overattribution’, that is, “the tendency to attribute all 
hostility to the theology of an unfamiliar religion”.582 This continues to highlight the relatively 
unknown nature of religion in conflict, which limits the effectiveness of conflict resolution. To 
move to a “just and peaceful settlement” in resolving a conflict, it is necessary to “address a 
conflict’s religious aspects” to provide a resolution that is “consistent with each side’s religious 
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imperatives”.583 This trend is supported by research that suggests the significant influence 
religious freedom has on the achievement of transitional justice.584 Concepts such as religious 
freedom are becoming increasingly important in the analysis of conflict resolution for its ability 
to assist in conflict prevention, mitigation and support national stability.585 This is an example 
of one of the many ways that there has been a transformation in the conflict resolution 
approach.  
In a standard form of conflict resolution, conflicting parties would engage in a bilateral 
process of communication and negotiation in the pursuit of peace and justice. When a party of 
a religious disposition then engages in this bilateral process as a mediator, they assume the role 
of a peacemaker – a bridge between two communities – that does not victimise the ‘other’, but 
rather senses a common humanity or origin under God.586 However, just being religious does 
not immediately mean successful peacemaking as “not every leader claiming to work for peace 
successfully reaches opposing parties and resolves conflicts”.587 This then remains a critical 
task of foreign service officers, so that they learn how to identify effective religious 
peacemakers from the community to engage in the resolution process.588 The religious 
peacemaker must be able to dissect the meaning of religious symbols, rituals, traditions and 
meanings, and how these elements pervade through a community.589 Whether this be in the 
form of official mediation, or nonofficial diplomacy, third-party interveners have often 
changed the configuration of negotiations.590  
This has been a challenge to the field of conflict resolution. In the traditional sense, 
states and even international organisations were the central and primary feature of the conflict 
resolution process. However, an “observable expansion of the role played by citizens outside 
of government – religious figures and spiritually motivated laypersons among them – in the 
conduct of various forms of mediation and conflict resolution” has occurred.591 This is where 
the use of multiple tracks of diplomacy for the purposes of conflict resolution has come into 
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evaluation within faith-based diplomacy.592 A mediator adopting a faith-based approach has 
the ability to “draw from unique social-psychological emotions and perceptions” to understand 
religious convictions and behaviours “for the purposes of peacebuilding” which address the 
deep-rooted elements of conflict.593 Religious actors are especially valued for their possible 
contribution to the conflict resolution process when it reaches the impasse stage, typically once 
the high political agenda points – politics, economics and security – have been resolved.594 
This role can expand beyond being just a negotiating mechanism, and move toward the 
introduction of “the authority of religion” which means that parties are not conceding to 
antagonists, but rather to that religious authority.595 As religious leaders are often perceived as 
acting in good faith, they are often viewed as representatives of communities, thus 
strengthening their potential authority. This has led some scholars to critique how faith-based 
diplomacy utilises religious authority because It may be seen as a challenge to political 
authority, especially if it is motivated by a political will.  
As a theoretical approach in the conflict resolution field, peacebuilding has been 
gaining influence. Peacebuilding is considered as the “holistic efforts to build sustainable, 
positive peace in a society or relationship between societies” – which has yet to fully appreciate 
the role that religion can play in aspiring toward holism.596 At the core, however, theorists of 
faith-based diplomacy see that there is “common ground in different religions’ approaches to 
peace, respect, opposition to killing, and the capacity to reach out to those of other faiths to 
resolve conflict”, and these ideas form a strong basis upon which to develop.597 
Beyond the mechanisms for resolution and the role of actors within that process, 
religions themselves represent a rich source of advice in building peace and resolving conflict. 
The field of conflict resolution still focuses on religion in relation to conflict, though it is 
promising to observe that scholars are beginning to pay attention to “religion as a site of 
reconciliation”.598 The notion of reconciliation, both in terms of when conflict threatens or after 
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it occurs, is a principle fostered in many religious traditions.599 This, in theory, follows the 
constructivist approach to resolving conflict by utilising reconciliation as a tool to achieve 
progress.600 The role of conflict reconciliation is now being recognised as an effective counter 
to religious fanaticism.601 A difficulty in resolving extremist conflict is effectively countering 
“the ideas behind the guns” where hard power has only exacerbated the cycle of revenge that 
has mobilised those engaged in politically motivated violence and expanded their base of 
support.602 Reconciliation in conflict resolution is a restorative process that impacts every level 
of society, particularly the grassroots, and requires “a broader array of roles than those normally 
associated with traditional diplomacy”.603 This shift sees the diplomat acting in roles including 
an “impartial observer to message carrier to advocate to activist” which are all strengthened by 
a sense of moral authority.604  
Reconciliation is not the only value that is leveraged in conflict resolution. There is a 
depth of hope and positive aspiration that religious peacemakers can provide, breaking through 
the intractable nature of conflict.605 Incorporating reconciliation, hope, compassion and 
forgiveness into conflict resolution has assisted in the development of diplomatic techniques 
to aid in the peaceful settlements of conflict.606 Although this is beneficial to the faith-based 
diplomacy approach, researchers are developing the tool more as a way to achieve 
reconciliation in and of itself, which can move beyond the scope of conflict resolution.607 This 
difficulty does demonstrate the complexity of effective conflict resolution mechanisms and 
also highlights the need for a comprehensive strategy when employing a faith-based approach. 
It is undeniable that, as a result of the changes in the nature of conflict, conflict resolution 
theory and practice has had to adapt with mechanisms and theories that can effectively integrate 
the constructive engagement of religion. This is where faith-based diplomacy has found favour.  
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Defining Religion, Spirituality and Faith 
 The concept of religion has not hitherto been defined or evaluated within this thesis. 
This section will endeavour to perform the complex task of operationally defining religion, and 
other related terms such as spirituality and faith. International Relations tends to use the terms 
religion and faith interchangeably, which reflects the usage of the term found in the mainstream 
literature. Scholars, however, have discussed the nuances of these terms and the related issues 
in defining what they mean. This is supported by the work of Zinnbauer et al. who highlight 
that the conceptualisation and usage of faith, spirituality and religion is not consistently applied 
in current research.608 They describe the result of this confusion as ‘fuzziness’ which may prove 
disadvantageous for legitimate social science research.609 This section will explore the 
definitions provided by scholars to explain the implications of these definitions in theory and 
practice.  
Religion has been an evident phenomenon in human history for millennia. Religio, in a 
general sense, to Ancient Rome meant “fear of the preternatural”. It emphasised maintaining 
relationships of peace between the Roman gods and the human world, particularly in times of 
crisis or victory.610  In the Middle Ages it referred to “the consecrated life of nuns, monks and 
friars”, and then after the Reformation, religion began to take a form as it is known today.611 
The scholarship on religion and international politics aligns with the early modernity of the 
international system from the late 15th to early 18th centuries.612  During this time there was a 
decline in, and a withdrawal of, religious power from the public to the private sphere, even 
though this was at first fiercely contested and largely due to the resultant ferocity of the wars 
of religion that had embroiled much of Europe.613 While the notion of secularisation will be 
elaborated below, it is noteworthy that this is where the scholarship surrounding the current 
understanding of religion began to emerge. The study of religion itself has been defined as “a 
scholarly enterprise without an identity, one that lacks any widely shared understanding of its 
central topic, or of the methods appropriate to the study of this topic”.614 This explains why the 
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definition of religion is contested by scholars and by separate fields of inquiry and has evolved 
since frameworks began being tested in the 17th Century.615  
In simple terms, “religion is meant to imply an institutional framework within which 
specific theological doctrines and practices are advocated and pursued, usually among a 
community of like-minded believers”.616 Religion “fills a central social function in most 
societies in the world” where places of worship, congregations, and communities “constitute a 
substantial part of the civil society”.617 Appleby expands on this concept, noting that “religions 
inhabit a unique social location, display a powerful and pervasive institutional presence, and 
exercise significant cultural power”.618 The way that religious leaders engage in this process 
has ultimately afforded them “an unparalleled legitimacy”.619 Pauletta Otis considers these 
elements and writes an extensive definition of religion in the context of the 21st Century. This 
definition captures the many facets of religion, while giving explanation to its organisational 
manifestations. The definition also firmly sits within the scope of International Relations, 
making it beneficial for the elucidation of this thesis. She states:  
Religion is an integrated, systematized set of beliefs, behaviours, values, 
institutions, modes of communication, and leadership. It institutionalizes 
transcendence and provides preferred patterns of behaviour for human beings 
in relationship both to a supernatural power and to fellow humans. It is an 
ideology and a set of normative behaviours reflective of that ideology. 
Moreover it derives from an external framework, linking individuals to the 
greater whole and providing formal institutions that help to define and organise 
that whole. It provides a meaningful worldview as well as the rules and 
standards of behaviour that connect individual actions and goals to the 
worldview. It has the ability to legitimize actions and institutions.620 
This definition, however, can change depending on the perspective of the field to which it is 
applied. In a legal sense, religion has been defined by the United Kingdom Supreme Court as:  
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A spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, which 
claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with the 
infinite and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives in conformity 
with the spiritual understanding associated with that belief system.621 
From a sociological perspective, “religion is understood as a set of beliefs, symbols and 
practices oriented towards and demarcating the ‘sacred’”.622 By allowing the world religions 
to define what they mean by the term sacred, analysis can be conducted across world religions 
which can bypass differences in beliefs and practices.623 This also helps to delineate the secular 
from the sacred.624 The institutional and behavioural character of religion, being religious 
practice, mainly derives from the scriptures or sacred texts.625 These beliefs and practices vary 
from religion to religion as “each religion is constituted by a set of stories that make up its 
central identity” which are then “transmitted and developed across time”.626 This then means 
that religion also encompasses “a system of ideas that purport to offer a true understanding of 
the world and our place within it”, suggesting an element of the divine first and foremost, a 
spiritual essence to life, and a moral code governing the lives of believers providing support 
for degrees of social cohesion.627 This is why the term religion has been coupled with terms 
such as movements, organisations and institutions.628  The variety of different perspectives do, 
however, share common ground across the definitions of religion, and these are the central 
features of religion which are important for this study.  
Within contemporary scholarship, religion certainly remains a contested term. Some 
suggest that a better way to think about religion is that it is an adaptive phenomenon, be it at 
the personal level or on the larger scale of organisation and institution, “to new social, 
economic, political, and cultural contexts and demands”.629 In this sense, religion goes beyond 
beliefs and encompasses the full spectrum of ritual, community and the patterns of people’s 
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lives.630 This demonstrates the broadening scope of religion in its potential application. 
However, when categorised in scholarship, the tendency is for categorisation of religion into 
(a) its features and (b) its functions.631 Thompson sees this as problematic. He applies the 
concept to diplomacy and finds that “the demarcation between what a religion is and what a 
religion does may be unrealistic or at least unnecessary” because perceptions of the religion 
vary according to denomination, region, and other factors.632 The rigidity of this categorisation 
does not allow the appropriate depth of the concept to be realised. This is perhaps why 
researchers have come to separate the notions of spirituality and religion, where religion 
remains closely associated with “a set of beliefs and practices associated with a religious 
tradition” and spirituality focuses on “making meaning”.633 Within this separation, there is still 
room for variation that appreciates the complexity of these ideas and their contribution to 
theory-building with religious or spiritual elements.  
How the term religion is used in the construction of policy carries significant 
implications. Through history, some states construct policies to promote and establish an 
official religion or recognise a set of religions.634 However, identifying the importance of 
religion in foreign policy, for example, engages in the broadest sense of the term – looking to 
representations of faith and values in relation to the state.635 But, as Loskota and Flory 
highlight, it is difficult to have a “homogenised” version of religion in a “pluralistic world” and 
this hinders the way that religion can be included in technical theorisation and policy 
construction.636 Nonetheless, Phillips notes that religion, by virtue of its structures and 
normative values historically underlines the international system and constitutes international 
order.637 Yet, when applied within the theory of International Relations, religion is considered 
as inherently individual, institutional and irrational.638 Scholars like Wilson go further and posit 
that religion “is both individual and communal, both institutional and ideational, both irrational 
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and rational.”639 This understanding suggests that an effective engagement with religion in 
diplomacy can have far-reaching benefits. Gutkowski’s definition recognises religion as 
multifaceted and “as a form of command and/or intellectual identity, as a series of practices or 
rituals, as an informal or formal set of doctrines, as an articulated discourse or set of symbols, 
and as a worldview and/or ethical and political system”.640 This follows the argument of 
scholars in International Relations who warn that the thinking of religion “should shift from 
mutually exclusive interpretations to an interlinked set of perspectives that complement each 
other”.641 In an attempt to achieve this complementarity, the notions of spirituality and faith 
will now be explored.  
While the definition of religion has been well-documented in scholarship, the definition 
of faith and spirituality is, at least in the context of International Relations, much harder to 
come by. Faith or spirituality “transcends the normal parameters of organised religion, 
suggesting a less bounded and, at times, more far-reaching scope of human involvement”.642 
This approach looks beyond the institutional nature of religion. It considers the “foundational 
character of the beliefs they embody and may make manifest”, which becomes central to the 
way that a person, or peoples, see the world and their place within it.643 An example of a 
definition of spirituality is cited by Lazenby who states that it is “the aspect of humanity that 
refers to the way individuals seek and express meaning and purpose and the way they 
experience their connectedness to the moment, to self, to others, to nature, and to the significant 
or sacred”.644 One challenge encountered when defining spirituality is that “a variety of 
concepts, ranging from faith and meaning to religious beliefs and well-being, are reflected in 
measures of spirituality”.645 Therefore, understanding these terms is integral to analysing and 
constructing theory. Thus, spirituality and faith may be said to be central to identity, whereas 
religion has been linked more to the structure and institutions constructed around faith, 
spirituality and belief. That is why, in the study of faith-based diplomacy, the term faith is used. 
It suggests a precursor to the organised expression of religion in the value and belief system 
inherent in the individual. For the purposes of developing theory, this is most helpful as it 
enables flexibility in theory’s construction.  
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Central Characteristics of Religion  
With the terms religion, faith and spiritually now discussed, the definitions will be 
further expounded to consider the characteristics and features of religion pertinent to the study 
of faith and diplomacy. An important consideration to make is the linkage of religion to the 
construction of culture and its underpinning dynamics.646 The influence of religion in the 
international system is multilayered, whether it be in terms of religion itself, how religion 
inspires motivation, or religious institutions.647 Religion also has the ability to define the 
characteristics that construct a social community.648 This community is supported and 
enhanced in every sphere of society through ecumenical and denominational bodies at the 
international, national, ad hoc, and individual level.649 The capability, credibility and 
constituencies of these religious groups then impact a variety of major issues of concern on the 
international agenda, even from the perspective of the state.650 As religious identity is 
constructed socially, so too are the structures which inform global institutional norms, 
normative practices, interconnectedness, and the dynamics of socio-political interaction from 
those religious groups.651 This then sees religion recognised as “an intractable force that can be 
quite unresponsive to all the normal instrumentalities of state power, let alone the 
instrumentalities of foreign policy”.652  Religion, by nature of its construction, can be seen as 
divisive and yet embedded are religious influences that can contribute positively to areas such 
as peacemaking.653 This is due to religion and religious institutions having “control of 
resources, interpersonal relationships, communications and expertise” that are all advantageous 
in the international area.654 Faith can be a strong force for socio-political involvement, and this 
can translate onto the international stage both positively and negatively.  
Historical experience suggests that not only can religion be divisive, but it can also 
become fanatical with extremist forms of politicised religion threating security. 655 In recent 
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years this has manifested as the fear of militant groups such as Daesh, Al Qaeda or Boko Haram 
engaging in campaigns of de-stabilisation and eroding state structures with such instability 
enhanced by demagogues who manipulate religion for their own power.656 These extreme 
positions, however, are outliers in the wide spectrum of religious beliefs and interactions.  The 
stark division between religions can be lessened when it is recognised that the philosophies 
propounded in religion follow identical patterns, including “preaching peace, love, and 
truthfulness” even though there are differences in ritual and culture.657 The similarity of these 
religious roots represents an opportunity worthy of consideration when linked to diplomacy.  
A comparison of historical political constructs and the contemporary international 
system reveals that “religious ideas, practices, framings, and identities” were influential in 
articulating the basis of  European empires, as well as having a normative impact in the opposite 
direction after the Second World War, including the UN Charter and the movement towards 
decolonisation.658 The consideration of religion in the current era of global engagement impacts 
a variety of concerns, including “conflict mitigation, post-conflict stabilisation operations, 
immigration and integration, women’s rights, and engagement of multilateral institutions and 
international law”.659 Such concerns depend on faith being more than a subjective experience 
of one’s spirituality; it also needs to be “demonstrated through social justice and action”.660  
The contemporary nexus of politics and religion contends with how religion develops and also 
what its normative implications are on a global scale. Observers also note that political 
structures are more than ever “institutionally attentive” to the role of religion,661 a trend also 
reflected in religion becoming more prominent in the scope of scholarly enquiry. The 
scholarship surrounding religion in the post-Cold War era reflects the complexity and diversity 
of the subject. Some difficulties in the scholarship still surround the question of “whether 
                                                          
extremism. Research is often done on a regional basis to explore cases of extremism too, for example see D. 
Suba Chandran and P. R. Chari, Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and 
Religious Violence (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011).  
656 Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 5. Examples of such demagogues in Johnston’s context 
include leaders of violent religious groups such as Osama Bin Landen of Al Qaeda or Joseph Kony of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army. Trends of populism in the 21st century might also result in demagoguery in other 
manifestations.  
657 Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 49 
658 Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”."739. On the history and 
impact of empires in global history, see John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 
1405 (New York: Bloomsbury, 2007). 
659 Liora Danan, "A Public Diplomacy Approach to International Religious Freedom," Review of Faith & 
International Affairs 10, no. 3 (2012). 59 
660 Henry  Wooster, "Faith at the Ramparts: The Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 Revolution," in 
Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 158 
661 Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It." 112 
106 
 
religion should be treated instrumentally; whether its substantial dimensions are adequately 
addressed; whether it is sui generis; and whether extant frameworks are up to the task”.662 New 
theories, however, are emerging that provide alternate perspectives about religion in politics.663 
This momentum has given space for faith-based diplomacy to be seriously considered in 
theory.  
 
Secularisation and the Separation of Church and State  
 Through the examination of literature on faith-based diplomacy, a re-emerging theme 
is the role of the relationship between church and state – namely, the idea of separation or 
secularisation. Before the theory of faith-based diplomacy can be examined in full, 
consideration needs to be given to secularisation and what impact it has had on faith and 
diplomacy. This section will not be analysing the Thirty Year War and the religious conflict as 
a case, but rather it will examine the implications of this violence leading to secularisation. The 
most significant problem posed by religion in international relations was the breaking apart of 
the civilisational unity of Western Europe, leading to intensified conflict. Paul Sharp notes that 
“Christendom’s ability to stand and act as a single political unit, whether under pope or 
emperor, had been in long decline” and this resulted in disunity, an inability to restrain ambition 
or moderate conduct, and a weakened moral frame that increased the levels of alienation 
between groups.664 This heightened the challenge of maintaining peace between religious and 
political authority.665 At this time of the beginnings of a plural religious environment, neither 
the Catholic Church nor the various Protestant sects “had lost the solidarist assumptions and 
universalist habits of thought of the order they had replaced”.666 It was a situation which saw 
these sects become linked secular power centres. To counter this concern, European states from 
the 17th Century sought to diminish the power of religion by circumscribing its influence so 
that faith became restricted to the interior life.667 Scholars named this phenomenon 
secularisation, which can be summarised as follows:   
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As societies modernised economically and politically, and as science became 
ever more important and dominant in how reality is understood, religion would 
naturally lose ground and be a relic of past superstitious ages. In this, if religion 
were to survive at all, it would only be in the private sphere as an aid for 
individuals who might need this type of psychic support.668 
This separation is entrenched in the international system as secularisation, linked to the Treaty 
of Westphalia and thus the formation of the modern state system, the implications of which are 
still being contended with today.669 Although Church institutions sought to retain some areas 
of privilege, for example, via roles in education and shaping moral and legal codes, their 
influence was further reduced by revolutionary movements and freedom of religion. This is 
most evident in France and the evolution towards laïcité, or secularity, which saw strained 
relations between political and religious institutions.670  
Secularisation informed the belief that, from the time of Enlightenment, progress and 
knowledge would make the influence of religion a waning force in the international system.671 
This post-Enlightenment prejudice toward religion has lasted for centuries. Virtually no 
significance was placed on “religion as a factor in the policymaker’s calculus”, except in a few 
specific cases.672 The modernisation of the developing world was also considered to be a 
driving force in the decline of religion’s influence; however, this has not been the case.673 
Modernity and secularism are not necessarily coterminous. Western expectations that 
economic development would diminish the power of religion over a nation’s affairs failed to 
account for how deeply in society religion penetrates.674 The challenge is what Luttwak refers 
to as “secularizing reductivism”, which is an intentional ignorance of the role of religion in 
foreign affairs and policy construction.675 This was a common approach to international politics 
for much of the 20th Century. Nonetheless, religious actors retained a role in diplomatic 
practice.676 The complexity of the nature of secularisation is apparent and prone to confusion. 
                                                          
668 Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 10 
669 Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding."  3 
670 See Ann Margaret Doyle, "Catholic Church and State Relations in French Education in the Nineteenth 
Century: The Struggle between "Laïcité" and Religion," International Studies in Catholic Education 9, no. 1 
(2017). 
671 Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 9 
672 Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy." 
673 Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs." 21 
674 Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 243-4 
675 Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 10 
676 Cecelia Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretentions," International 
Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 66, no. 3 (2011). 613 
108 
 
As Miles indicates, being secular does not mean being anti-religion, and yet it does not 
necessarily mean being supportive of religion either.677 This does not, however, suggest that 
the separation of church and state should be viewed in a negative light. Indeed, “when religion 
gets political power, with no separation of religion and state, and officially tries to replace 
culture and diplomacy, violence usually follows.”678 This has created an environment where 
the “fundamental constitutional principle of separation of church and state” is misunderstood, 
resulting in a reticence to see religion as a relevant factor in policy construction.679 A 
consequence of this misunderstanding is that it can manifest in some believing that secularism 
is a denial or indifference to religion which has resulted in secularism carrying negative 
connotations in many regions of the world.680  
 This reflects the historical and social construction of modern secularism that goes back 
to the time of Westphalia. With respect to policy construction, Western separation of church 
and state has obscured non-Western understandings of the role of religion in political and 
societal affairs. In the West, for a government to apply religion to their political agenda, it is 
necessary to overcome the limitations posed by separation of church and state. This may 
compromise the necessary balanced neutrality of religious representatives on political issues.681 
Within the context of the United States, for example, incorporating religion into the problem-
solving approach is difficult. This is because “the first amendment establishing the separation 
of church and state has been a site of contestation domestically as religious and secular actors 
have argued over the permeability of the wall of separation”.682 Policies designed to divide 
church and state are now seen as counterproductive to diplomacy and diplomats as these secular 
projects can direct people toward intolerance, even in powerful political positions.683 Confusion 
surrounding the place of religion in the modern international system is the result, as well as the 
rise of extremist actors in conflict. This being said, the current world order has changed 
considerably from 17th Century Europe and solutions may be found.684 The idea of a 
“desecularisation” of some diplomatic methodologies can be viewed as a promising prospect 
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in that the role of religion, be it through its doctrines or actors, can serve the cause of liberty, 
as opposed to advancing against freedom as some secularists might assume.685  Instead, it has 
been found “the religious lurking in the secular, doing away with overwrought secularisation 
and modernisation theses and establishing a powerful new research agenda”686 As such, 
theories associated with faith-based diplomacy are increasingly more pertinent to the study of 
International Relations.   
 
The Re-emergence of Religion  
 The final point of consideration in the context and framing of faith-based diplomacy is 
the apparent re-emergence of religion in the 21st Century’s international agenda. This section 
will suggest reasons as to why religion has increased in importance in Diplomacy Studies, and 
what this means for theory construction. Essentially, the expectation of religion’s decline was 
mistaken.687 Secularisation theory was exercised for most of the 19th Century, but in the last 
two decades of the 20th Century that theory came into question with the rise of religion as a 
politically potent force.688 When scholars consider the idea of religion resurging, careful 
observation reveals that “religion, as beliefs, associations, and a motivator for public action, 
has never gone away” and currently religion remains a force and influence for people and their 
everyday lives.689 This is why some scholars refer to religion’s role in the current international 
system as a ‘rediscovery’.690 
In response to the question of why religion has emerged as a critical factor of conflict 
in the 21st Century, Otis offers three potential reasons:  
1. The seeming failure of other ideologies and institutions;  
2. The power of religion in providing ideological resources supporting social justice; and  
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3. The power of religion in providing an ideological basis for social coherence and 
comprehensiveness.691 
Through the lens of conflict in particular, the rise of religion has been accelerated since the 
attacks on September 11 and the surge of transnational terrorism.692 Generally, religion is seen 
as a source of conflict, violence, terrorism and as a limitation to individual liberties, and yet 
religious actors are gaining positive attention by some observers suggesting a post-secular age 
where religion is reinvigorated.693 With the rise of religiously-fuelled conflict, particularly in 
the Middle East, the relationship between faith and diplomacy has been strengthened in various 
diplomatic and political contexts.694 When considering how this impacts policy construction, 
particularly in the context of the foreign policy of the United States, Patterson has highlighted 
five trends contributing to the resurgence of religion globally. They are:  
1. Individual religiosity is rising the world over;  
2. Public expression of religion by individuals and groups worldwide matters more in 
political discourse;  
3. States are no longer the sole legitimate centres of authority and authenticity, nor are 
they always the most reliable providers of initial services;  
4. Religious actors, identities, and ideas are vigorously transnational; and  
5. Whether at the individual or collective level, religious impulses can transcend what 
scholars typically define as “rational” or material interests.695 
Whether considering religion as increasingly central to conflict and conflict resolution, or even 
seeing religion as an opportunity for diplomatic engagement in the construction of foreign 
policy, the presence and influence of religion in the 21st Century is increasing.  
Religion’s importance can only grow, according to Johnston, in light of community 
fears that long-held values are being compromised by “economic globalisation and the 
uncertainties stemming from rapid technological change”.696 This notion of religion’s influence 
has been shared elsewhere in International Relations scholarship. Famously, Huntington’s 
‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis suggested that religions, which influence culture and civilisation, 
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would be an increasing motivator in the international system, potentially even leading to violent 
conflict.697 The rise of religion is regarded as a critical issue on the international agenda insofar 
as it impacts global security. However, the problems posed by religion for inter-faith peace and 
also for tolerance between believers and non-believers are open to resolution.698 These issues 
are being addressed through diplomatic channels as the emergence of the role of religion in 
international affairs has coincided with the phenomenon of people themselves having the 
power to behave as diplomatic actors, empowered by social media and the growing use of 
multitrack diplomacy.699 The scope of this rise is global, as major religions are becoming more 
influential across new regions of the world. This has been supported by empirical studies which 
find that the number of people adhering to religion is increasing demographically in developing 
countries and the spread and rise of major religions is also growing, along with religiously 
related concerns such as challenges to religious freedom (see below).700 This study recognises 
these trends as an opportunity for the expansion of theory in Diplomacy Studies, namely in the 
area of faith-based diplomacy.  
 
Table 2: Size and Projected Growth of Major Religious Groups701
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In this chapter the theory of faith-based diplomacy is examined, beginning with the 
scholarly literature introduced in 1994. While there was discourse pertaining to the nature and 
structures of incorporating faith into diplomacy before this time, it was the published texts in 
1994 that gave the substantial theoretical frames of reference to the notion of faith-based 
diplomacy. Available definitions of faith-based diplomacy are then compared and contrasted, 
leading to a proposal of the most appropriate definition of the theory. The chapter proceeds to 
discuss the role, function, and suggested characteristics of a faith-based diplomat. Finally, a 
contrast between faith-based diplomacy and interfaith diplomacy is conducted to firmly scope 
the theory of faith-based diplomacy. In doing so, this chapter endeavours to provide an 
analytical overview of the theory.  
 
An Overview of Faith-based Diplomacy  
 The exploration into faith-based diplomacy is based on some simple premises. After 
serving as the Secretary of State for the United States, and then as US Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Madelaine Albright began to recognise the benefits of faith-based diplomacy as an 
approach to conflict resolution. She suggests that “if diplomacy is the art of persuading others 
to act as we would wish, effective foreign policy requires that we comprehend why others act 
as they do”.703 If this is the case, she continues, “No American ambassador should be assigned 
to a country where religious feelings are strong unless he or she has a deep understanding of 
the faiths commonly practiced there.”704 This premise identifies a simple link in the central 
goal of diplomacy and the presence of faith. Thompson affirms this position by positing that: 
If diplomacy is about the strategies used to manage the negotiation and 
exchange of what happens between individuals, groups and states, it should not 
be surprising to see that a religious view of the world and reckoning with 
religious worldviews can be part of diplomatic strategies. In fact, the surprise 
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should rather be that the awareness and appreciation of the role of religion in 
diplomacy has only recently come to be formalized.705 
Such a premise has motivated the emerging space for faith-based diplomacy. Douglas 
Johnston, founder of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, has been recognised 
as a leader in this area of study for being the first to consolidate theoretical underpinnings 
related to faith-based diplomacy in the discipline of International Relations.706 For this reason, 
his writings feature heavily in this thesis. His pursuits in faith-based diplomacy are also 
distinguished by the way in which he conceived of religious faith in relation to peacemaking 
rather than the instigator of conflict.707 In this perspective, faith is reassessed as a locus for 
positive diplomatic engagement, as “religion, with its unmatched authority among many 
communities in every region of the world, carries within it a diverse set of traditions and 
methodologies that promote peace”.708 However, before being recognised as faith-based 
diplomacy, senior officials of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy debated as 
to whether the concept would be considered as faith-based diplomacy, or as a model of religious 
peacebuilding that incorporated faith-based initiatives.709 Through this initial dialogue, and the 
foundational publications presented by Johnston, it was decided that integrating faith and 
politics into the resolution of intractable identity-based conflicts was evidence of an emerging 
paradigm. From this basis it was found that faith-based diplomacy, then, could potentially be 
an effective and far-reaching tool in diplomacy if developed and applied appropriately.  
The development of a framework for faith-based diplomacy from a scholarly 
perspective has been continuing since 1994. The need came from the inadequacy of existing 
diplomatic approaches used in religious conflict. Thus, as a conceptual tool, faith-based 
diplomacy is still relatively new to the discipline of International Relations. The conditions in 
which faith-based and religious actors are more effective in conflict resolution have not yet 
been fully explored in scholarship.710 Even though faith-based diplomacy is conceptually new, 
diplomatic interactions between Christian and Islamic groups, along with the spread of 
evangelists across diverse cultures, can be a source of insights. They demonstrate that 
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diplomacy between and within faith groups is possible, but not easy.711 Powerful states have 
also been recorded interacting with faith groups. China, for example, has a rich history of 
engagement with religious diplomacy when Buddhism was first introduced over 2000 years 
ago.712 Through those centuries, China actively engaged in foreign relations with a variety of 
other faith groups.713 Internally it also managed relations among its three major spiritual 
traditions of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. In recent times, the increasing role of 
religion in political contexts, particularly in the Middle East, has revealed the extent of the 
faith-diplomacy nexus.714 This has been recognised on the international agenda, and observers 
are now tasked with addressing religious influences in conflict. As the then Secretary of State 
for the United States, John Kerry, implored:  
So I say to my fellow State Department employees, all of them, wherever you 
are, I want to reinforce a simple message: I want you to go out and engage 
religious leaders and faith-based communities in our day-to-day work. Build 
strong relationships with them and listen to their insights and understand the 
important contributions that they can make individually and that we can make 
together.715 
 The above historical and contemporary instances indicate that faith-based diplomacy may be 
a viable approach in the current international system.    
 The central, distinctive principle of faith-based diplomacy is that it is oriented towards 
the divine. This may be understood as a personal revelation of God, or as a source of meaning, 
identity, existence and belonging. However, this notion of ‘the divine’ motivates a particular 
vision of politics, suggests assumptions about human nature and political order, and generates 
norms that govern conduct and behaviour.716 With this assumption comes the role of divine 
agency in human affairs, where a diplomatic actor performs the role of an intermediary between 
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divinity and humanity to represent human concerns.717 In this context religion is understood to 
be at the heart of identity, whether that be individual identity or a communal identity, and if 
that identity is not properly understood, effective resolution cannot be achieved.718 Thus, the 
priority of diplomacy becomes personhood as opposed to efficiency and convenience.719 This 
distinguishes faith-based diplomacy from other diplomatic approaches because faith-based 
diplomacy moves beyond the absence of conflict – being negative peace – and engages in the 
reconciliation of respectful relations between parties.720 The dynamics of religious faith are 
introduced into peacemaking to support the pursuit of a positive peace.721  
Where diplomatic processes stagnate, faith-based initiatives can revive them by 
incorporating elements of reconciliation and forgiveness into conflict resolution. Due to faith-
based diplomacy seeking reconciliation as a priority beyond conflict resolution, it “is not a 
classical peacemaking tool, and certainly not a classical tool of diplomacy either”.722 What is 
clear, however, is that the main impacts of this approach are felt on the individual and societal 
level, as faith-based communities, such as churches and congregations, define the main 
contours of civil society, predominantly in developing countries.723 As an example, churches 
have a unique ability to promote solutions to conflict issues where problems that seem 
insolvable can be thawed through the support of the church and the influence of the broader 
sense of common universality inspired by the church, as has been seen in parts of Africa and 
Southeast Asia.724  
A primary goal of diplomacy is to mediate estrangement, and faith-based diplomacy 
sees this as a key task.725 An instance of this process in history was the expansive spread of 
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Christian missionaries, but contemporary humanitarian groups “function in a context of 
contradictory diplomatic norms regarding proselytism and religious freedom”.726 The values 
used in the approach to diplomacy could be called ‘virtue ethics’727 and it is an approach being 
tested in other frameworks, such as restorative narrative-building which sees diplomats reframe 
their methods of dialogue to enhance reconciliation.728 Within this frame the common ground 
that may be held by multiple faiths is revealed and then incorporated into contexts relevant to 
the various faiths with the aim of building engagement and ultimately resolving conflict 
between previously estranged groups.729  
 The potential viability of faith-based diplomacy is best nurtured “in the spaces where 
the actual practice of the religious tradition in all its multivalence still remains possible”.730 In 
these societies, the traditions of religion are vast and spiritually enriching where valid 
alternatives to the violence of religious, ethnic and ethnoreligious wars can be found.731 One 
author suggests that the foundational position of a spiritual view of diplomacy is that one must 
recognise the omnipotence and omnipresence of God because from this starting point peace 
and reconciliation are more viable than through the conventional wisdom of diplomacy.732 
From this perspective, religious authorities can dissuade conflict-prone behaviours by 
suggesting that “such activity will provoke divine disapprobation”.733 In this sense, religious 
authority is a valuable preventative tool. However, the context in which the faith-based 
approach is used must be carefully considered and need not always depend on application 
within religious spaces. “The impulse to engage … on issues of religion need not stem simply 
from progressive liberal values”, or as a more sinister form of proselytization from different 
sects, or even a progress of building a ‘national faith’.734 Faith-based diplomacy, therefore, 
must be applied strategically. Troy has outlined four areas of implementation for faith-based 
diplomacy that have been deemed as most appropriate. These are:  
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1. In conflicts ‘in which religion is a significant factor in the identity of one or both 
communities’; 
2. In conflict situations ‘in which religious leaders can be mobilized to facilitate peace’; 
3. In situations in which ‘two major religious traditions [are] in a conflict that transcends 
national borders’; and 
4. In ‘third-party mediation in conflicts where there is no particular religious dimension 
present’.735 (See below for applications to secular societies.) 
This is a strong framework for application of the faith-based approach. But upon further 
development this could still expand in terms of scope and efficacy in the future. The application 
of faith-based approaches to diplomacy should not aim to establish an official religion, as may 
have been the case through history, but rather it should recognise and incorporate the role of 
religion and religious freedom as a diplomatic asset.736 If this is maintained as a central feature, 
it should assuage the fears that faith in diplomacy will dismantle a healthy separation between 
church and state and lead to evangelisation. Importantly, pluralistic approaches to conflict 
resolution initiatives that involve a faith-based element are continuing to expand, even in 
secular countries.737 An example of how this is paralleled constitutionally is the Indonesian 
political philosophy of Pancasila.738 
This raises the question of the role of the state in faith-based approaches to diplomacy. 
With modern states categorising religion as an internal affair in the personal sphere, institutions 
and international organisations have not intervened in conflicts of a religious nature, resulting 
in citizens and actors outside of government engaging in the mediation process.739 Foreign 
policy structures have not yet achieved the capacity for spiritual engagement in their diplomatic 
outreach.740 Consequently, faith-based diplomacy has been deemed ill-suited for 
representatives of the state where in many cases “religion will be an unstable partner for 
statecraft”.741 This is why analysis in faith-based diplomacy has hitherto focused on the 
perspective of non-state actors. This does not mean, however, that the state is unable to engage 
in this process. One area of complementary engagement from official and non-official agents 
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lies in the use of religious and cultural resources for peace. Indigenous cultural practices, in 
particular, can provide an avenue for engagement that bridges the gap between religion, culture 
and politics.742 This is why US military chaplains have made concerted efforts to formally 
include indigenous religious groups and leaders into stability operations post-conflict, such as 
in the case of Iraq.743 Some are calling for the need to treat religion and religious freedom “not 
just as ‘soft’ culture but ‘hard’ geopolitics”, where the conceptual basis of faith-based 
diplomacy can translate to effective policy.744  
Still, it is primarily non-state actors, namely faith-based organisations, which are able 
to engage both locally and transnationally – in such areas as emergency relief, education and 
health services – to achieve the aims of faith-based diplomacy. Religious leaders and 
organisations are able to offer humanitarian assistance and community reconstruction efforts 
effectively as they already have the infrastructure to deliver services locally.745 Religious 
delegations in people-to-people diplomatic settings are increasingly more familiar, but the 
“asymmetrical, state-to-society diplomacy with religious reform as its target is virtually 
without precedent in the modern West”.746 Scholars are still debating on the future of faith-
based diplomacy as an approach in official channels. By viewing faith-based diplomacy as a 
tool to integrate into frameworks and diplomatic institutions to inform social relations and 
social meanings, a faith-based approach may still be useful for the state.747 The central point 
on the state’s engagement in faith-based diplomacy is that “the possibility that religious beliefs 
can contribute either negatively or positively to nations’ foreign policies depends on how those 
beliefs are being interpreted and implemented by the people who adopt and practice them”.748 
The examination offered in this thesis seeks to provide a framework which allows for positive 
engagement even for the state.  
 As an approach within the diplomatic process, faith-based diplomacy must be equipped 
to address conflict. An assumption within faith-based diplomacy is the recognition that the 
human soul harbours the potential for evil which can translate to violent conflict.749 Translated 
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to non-Abrahamic traditions such as the Indic spiritual tradition of Buddhism, one may speak 
of a karmic cycle of ignorance and aggression. However, “fulfilled through the divine”, or in 
the case of Buddhism through compassion and the quest for ‘enlightenment’ (or bodhi, spiritual 
awakening), “the person is the site of potential spiritual transformation” – which is where faith-
based diplomacy can be conducted to see conflict resolved.750 This contrasts with common 
perceptions in international relations that associate religion with the extremist behaviours of 
minority religious groups. Faith-based diplomacy aims to find the common ground in religion 
which “guides and inspires the majority and can be harnessed for good”.751  
A concern here is that each case of conflict is unique, and when constructing a 
theoretical framework this creates problems when comparing experiences which are not the 
same. This is especially when not every case is about the same aspect of conflict.752 Arguments 
based on incommensurability, however, pertain more to methodological issues (discussed in 
the introduction) than a denial of the potential for faith-based diplomacy. Babb recommends 
that comparative analysis is at its strongest when identifying commonalities is the primary goal 
of inquiry, as opposed to simply highlighting disparate opinions.753 In the case of understanding 
different religions, this notion of ‘equivalences’ is methodologically useful,754 as illustrated in 
the above example that positions the importance of the ‘divine’ in one religion with that of 
‘enlightenment’ in another.  In essence, scholars will recognise that in spite of there being 
differences between cases, there are commonalities which are cause for study. The strength of 
seeking commonalities is that it presents the space for religious actors to be successful 
mediators who can work through debilitating impasses;755 while at the global level it permits 
the religious dimension to play a role in the conduct of international relations.  
More challenging, however, is the consideration of faith-based diplomacy at the 
operational level, which finds ways to involve religion as a part of the solution to intractable, 
identity-based conflicts.756 This area of mediation can see faith-based actors leverage religious 
convictions, qualities and behaviours which impact the deep-rooted sentiments and structures 
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in religious conflict.757 This strength is highlighted by Assefa, who states that “religious 
peacebuilders are much more likely to lead conflict parties to reconciliation and international 
transformation … because they have the language, the concepts, and the legitimacy to talk 
about [the root causes of conflicts]”, where typically secular actors do not.758 This sentiment is 
echoed by scholars who state that “the argument that religious actors are best equipped to deal 
with problems with a religious dimension, even (or especially) where this involves those of a 
different religious persuasion advanced by the faith-based diplomacy school are in the 
ascendancy”.759 As this continues to rise, diplomatic approaches must be adapted to see the 
cooperative involvement of a myriad of actors in the diplomatic process. Ultimately, a new 
framework for analysis is required to face the challenges posed by religious extremism that 
enhances the capacity for spiritual engagement on various levels of the diplomatic process.760 
 The methodology that has been employed to construct faith-based theory must also be 
understood to demonstrate how theory has been formed. When the theory began to emerge in 
1994, Johnston noted the research methodologies employed to introduce faith-based diplomacy 
and recognised some of their faults. Each study in the area of faith-based diplomacy featured a 
series of case studies which would estimate how influential the factors of faith-based diplomacy 
would be in conflict resolution.761 At this time, the scholarship had only really engaged with 
the Christian religious tradition, while other religious traditions were difficult to find in 
research.762 This is no longer the case as scholars from a variety of regions have put forward 
diverse perspectives on the topic. Indeed, Johnston intentionally integrated multiple religious 
perspectives in his 2003 edited text, Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Real Politik, where 
Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all featured in analysis. As the scholarship has 
considered this a more viable field of analysis, this area of inquiry has continued to expand. 
Inherent in the case research approach has been an emphasis on personal interviews as the main 
method of data collection, and this presents the danger of subjectivity, especially when 
considering religion.763 Furthermore, when investigating the intersection between religion and 
politics, the treatment of the data carries the danger of being oversimplified or overcomplicated, 
meaning that conclusions made from the data are often understood by either extreme, 
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potentially skewing the outcomes of the study.764 When presenting faith-based diplomacy as a 
theory in 1994, Johnston was forthright in indicating these methodological weaknesses. The 
body of research has, however, gained momentum and scholarship is reflecting advancements 
in these areas. As this thesis serves to assess the literature and theory of faith-based diplomacy, 
these methodological challenges will be taken into account when evaluating faith-based 
diplomacy and ultimately reconceptualising the theory within a diplomatic framework.  
 
Defining Faith-based Diplomacy 
 The foregoing definitions for faith-based diplomacy provide an insight into the theory’s 
central aims, features, and mechanisms.765 Therefore, it is vital to examine the definitions 
articulated by scholars to gain a better understanding as to how the theory has been constructed. 
Although scholars have generally been congruent in their definitions, there are some areas of 
dissimilarity that potentially shift the scope and core focus of faith-based diplomacy. These 
will be discussed to elucidate how and why the definition has changed as the field has continued 
to expand. Before doing so, it is important to recognise that definitions are framed from the 
perspective and experience of the author. For a topic such as faith-based diplomacy, this means 
that definitions may have different forms based on a differing religious predisposition. The 
scholar who provides a definition may also frame that definition based on their academic 
perspective. Taking these considerations into account, and after having compared and 
contrasted the definitions, the most appropriate definition for this thesis will be proposed.  
 The first two terms to be defined are religious diplomacy and religious peacemaking. 
Both of these terms highlight certain elements that are consistent in the definitions offered by 
faith-based diplomacy. However, they are relatively simple and serve as a general foundation 
for the definitions to follow. Hall defines religious diplomacy as “a diplomacy in which 
advocates of religious traditions speak their understating of religious truth in such a fashion 
that adherents of other religious traditions are enabled to hear, investigate and safely accept or 
reject the religious claims offered”.766 This definition suggests that the purpose of religious 
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diplomacy is to open dialogue between two parties of different religious perspectives, thus 
more in the scope of interfaith diplomacy rather than faith-based diplomacy. This is an 
important consideration to make because this definition limits the actors able to engage in the 
dialogue process, but it also narrows the scope of the functions and practical application of this 
form of diplomacy. When religious principles are applied more directly to peacemaking, where 
peacemaking “encompasses the multitude of efforts required to resolve and transform the 
intractable, identity-based conflicts prevalent today”, an expanded form of religious 
peacemaking would be defined simply as “a variety of actions guided by religion toward the 
specific end result of peace”.767 This definition starts to apply the concept of religion to conflict, 
more specifically to identity-based, intractable conflicts. The aim provided here is that the 
actions of these processes will pursue peace. This definition does provide a good aim, objective, 
and a clear application to conflict, but it does not recognise the methods and approaches 
applicable to this form of peacemaking.  
 Looking more directly at faith-based diplomacy, Appleby poses some of its defining 
features. Centrally, “faith-based diplomacy makes sense where religion is seen to be a genuine 
and in some cases a decisive factor in the conflict, rather than a dispensable sidebar, artefact, 
or instrument of propaganda”.768 This sees faith-based diplomacy become a more integral 
feature in the consideration of policymakers when constructing a diplomatic approach to 
conflict. Hall notes that when religion is a driving force in conflict, whether in a determining 
capacity or as a supporting factor, “faith-based diplomacy can make a difference in that religion 
is simultaneously a way of life, an intellectual heritage, and a social tradition, all of which are 
constantly being contested and reinterpreted”.769  This element of the definition sees the depth 
and complexity of faith realised, but also the influential force that it is to multiple areas of 
identity. Additionally, it recognises different sources of religious influence, from which the 
meaning of faith is derived. Finally, Hall broadens the scope of possible engagement for faith-
based diplomacy when he states that “faith-based diplomacy can also play an important role in 
certain conflicts, where there is no religious involvement, normally in a third-party mediating 
capacity”.770 The acceptance of faith-based diplomacy in a mediating role sees the concept 
being broadened in scope and application.  
                                                          
767 Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 113 
768 Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 
238 
769 Ibid. 239 
770 Ibid. 239 
124 
 
The expansion of faith-based diplomacy’s application has come with its consideration 
through different theoretical lenses within Diplomacy Studies. From the perspective of public 
diplomacy, “faith diplomacy can be defined as ‘the use of religion to communicate with global 
publics.’ It incorporates ‘religious insights and influence with traditional diplomatic practices 
(realpolitik) for the purposes of peacemaking’”.771 The notion of communicating with global 
publics is a central tenet of public diplomacy, but this sees religion as a method of achieving 
that engagement. The second part of the definition suggests that the traditional diplomatic 
process is engaged in order to achieve sustainable peace. This, fundamentally, is supported by 
other scholars – in that the traditional processes of diplomacy are used – however, there is some 
contestation surrounding whether traditional diplomacy, as governed by the state, is the best 
actor to instigate faith-based diplomacy.  
 From the perspective of Diplomacy Studies more broadly, Cox and Philpott put forward 
an extensive, descriptive definition of faith-based diplomacy. Their definition is as follows:   
In the parlance of diplomats, faith-based diplomacy is ‘track two,’ that is, 
diplomacy practiced by non-state actors, officials of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), religious leaders and private citizens. Most distinctively, 
it is rooted in religions – their texts, their practices, their traditions, and the two-
vectored spiritual orientation around which all of them revolve: first, the proper 
orientation of politics to the transcendent, and second, the active role of the 
divine in human affairs. Practitioners of faith-based diplomacy will, to be sure, 
draw upon secular expertise in conflict resolution and analysis, political science 
and philosophy, experience in national security, diplomacy, community 
development, and the like. But their central, orienting compass is their faith.772 
There are several features to this definition that can be highlighted as pivotal to the composition 
of faith-based diplomacy. The first point is that Cox and Philpott label faith-based diplomacy 
as a Track Two form of diplomacy. The use of this track of diplomacy is supported by Johnston, 
whose definition will be discussed shortly. It is important to note, however, that even though 
the use of non-state actors is encouraged in faith-based diplomacy, the type of Track Two 
diplomacy pursued in faith-based diplomacy is unique to other Track Two approaches. Troy, 
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after examining the constructs of faith-based diplomacy, elaborates on the use of Track Two 
diplomacy in light of faith-based diplomacy’s pursuit of reconciliation. He writes,  
Faith-based diplomacy seeks to transform the individual’s life so that the 
individual can in turn transform the life of the community. That very approach 
forms the bases of the fundamental differences between faith-based diplomacy 
and other styles of track-two diplomacies: faith-based diplomacy seeks to 
transform conflict situation through faith and personal beliefs, which is different 
from those of other track-two diplomacies dealing with religious issues.773 
These considerations set faith-based diplomacy apart as a unique approach to conflict 
resolution, even when considered solely within the realms of Track Two diplomacy. Returning 
to Cox and Philpott’s definition, the next significant feature is that the methodology of faith-
based diplomacy is informed by religion. Texts and practices are both included, but then 
scholars begin to highlight a spiritual orientation to faith-based diplomacy. A reordering of 
priorities and principles in the diplomatic process would see the divine (or equivalent principle 
in other religions) placed as the pinnacle. Here, the relationship between world politics and the 
divine would come back into alignment from the perspective of that religious position, and the 
acknowledgement would be made that the divine has a part to play in human affairs – including 
conflict. The final point made by Cox and Philpott relates to the role of the diplomat in faith-
based diplomacy. This definition encourages the faith-based diplomat to use their skills from a 
variety of areas, but faith will always be their guiding principle. This definition is extensive 
and recognises the essential elements required when defining faith-based diplomacy.   
 The final definitions of faith-based diplomacy that will be examined in this thesis are 
the definitions that are proposed by Douglas Johnston. Johnston offers some simple definitions 
of faith-based diplomacy in his 2011 text. His overview of the theory states that:  
At the macro level, faith-based diplomacy simply means incorporating religious 
considerations into the practice of international politics. At the operational level, 
it involves making religion part of the solution to intractable, identity-based 
conflicts that escape the reach of traditional diplomacy. Typically these 
conflicts include an ethnic, tribal, or religious dimension.774  
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These two understandings of faith-based diplomacy identify the level at which they are applied. 
When considering the type of resolution that faith-based diplomacy seeks to achieve, Johnston 
remarks that, “a distinguishing characteristic of faith-based diplomacy is the fact that it is more 
about reconciliation than the absence of conflict. It is about restoring respectful relationships 
between the parties” which are achieved “through a broader array of roles than those normally 
associated with traditional diplomacy – from impartial observer to message carrier, empathetic 
advocate, or activist”.775 These are the foundations upon which the primary definition of faith-
based diplomacy is built.  
Johnston and Cox have provided the most succinct and encompassing definition of 
faith-based diplomacy. It is one that has been used in multiple articles and is often regarded as 
authoritative in terms of theory: 
Faith-based diplomacy, while conceptually new to the field of international 
relations, is a form of Track II (unofficial) diplomacy that integrates the 
dynamics of religious faith with the conduct of international peacemaking. As 
such, it is more about reconciliation than it is conflict resolution. The peace that 
it pursues is not the mere absence of conflict but rather a restoration of healthy 
and respectful relationships between the parties.776 
This definition has four central elements that form the bedrock of faith-based diplomacy as a 
theory. First, the definition frames faith-based diplomacy as a Track Two form of diplomacy. 
Second, religious faith is incorporated into the processes of peacemaking. Third, the focus is 
on reconciliation, not just conflict resolution.777 Finally, the process aims to achieve restoration 
of relationships. As seen throughout this section, there is generally corroboration between 
authors about these key features, which is why this definition is maintained as the primary 
definition for the theory. As stated above by Johnston and Cox, faith-based diplomacy is 
conceptually new to the discipline of International Relations, and thus there must be scope in 
this definition to appreciate how it may change over time.  
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As such, there are two major limitations to this definition which can be identified upon review 
of the current literature. The first is that the definition states faith-based diplomacy is only a 
Track Two form of diplomacy. By saying this, traditional tracks of diplomacy are isolated. 
Track Two is most preferred and most effective when considering faith-based diplomacy, but 
disengaging official diplomatic agents from applying faith-based approaches to the diplomatic 
process may be disadvantageous for developing the field in the future. Furthermore, the latter 
part of the definition places reconciliation as the primary target above conflict resolution. 
Again, this may be a limiting factor. Faith-based diplomacy may have a role in a mediating 
capacity in conflict resolution, and its primary goal can still be reconciliation, but the 
involvement of faith-based diplomacy for the long-term can see this approach to diplomacy 
cemented as a method to achieving a more encompassing positive peace. Essentially, these two 
limitations have been identified because as the body of literature has expanded, so too has the 
role of faith-based diplomacy – and this should be reflected in any evolving definition. 
Borrowing Johnston and Cox’s definition as a framework, a definition that accounts for these 
points may be proposed as follows: Faith-based diplomacy is a form of diplomacy usually 
conducted by, but not limited to, Track Two agents. Faith-based diplomacy integrates the 
dynamics of religious faith with the conduct and processes of international peacemaking. As 
such, reconciliation is the primary goal of faith-based diplomacy in conflict resolution as faith-
based diplomacy seeks not only the absence of conflict, but the restoration of relationships 
between parties to establish positive peace. This definition provides the capacity and flexibility 
to see faith-based diplomacy applied to a broader context, accounting for its growing viability 
as a diplomatic approach in the 21st Century.  
 
Faith-based Diplomat  
 Along with defining the term faith-based diplomacy, scholars have also identified some 
central characteristics of a diplomat who engages in faith-based diplomacy. These 
characteristics will help expand the definition of faith-based diplomacy and suggest how the 
principles of faith-based diplomacy are manifested through practice. Appleby presents some 
elements of the role and skills of an effective faith-based diplomat. He writes:  
Can the faith-based diplomat be seen, therefore, as a technical consultant, a 
member of a new class of religious experts, one who could serve, for example, 
as a cultural attaché assigned to an embassy or a ministry of foreign affairs? Yes 
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– but that is not enough. … The faith-based diplomat . . .  should be a person of 
faith, one who understands the psychodynamics of religion and spirituality 
because he or she has experienced them personally and has mediated or 
reflected on them and on their relevance to conflict transformation. …the faith-
based diplomat must find and widen the narrow path between religious 
extremism and religious commitment that exists within a threatened religious 
community.778 
This would create what Appleby describes as a “new breed of diplomat” that can enable 
elements of a community to accept reconciliation and enhance the peacemaking capabilities 
within a community.779 In this approach, the diplomat’s “central, orienting compass is their 
faith”, but they will draw upon the skills of secular diplomacy to augment this approach.780 
This is reinforced by the understanding that “political order is shaped by a divinely grounded 
vision” (or other equivalences) where the relationships with society – the horizontal plane – is 
informed by the relationship with the divine (or sacred) – the vertical plane.781 The work that a 
faith-based diplomat does for the peace process will be based on how they understand the 
divine plan for humanity782 – or, to use a non-Abrahamic religious concept, the dharma 
(teaching) in Indic thought.  
 When the elements of faith that are conducive to peacemaking have been identified, 
this will translate into revised policies. This idea looks to “particular ambassadorial virtues and 
character traits that mark the religious diplomat…”.783 Hall studies how these traits are evident 
in the Abrahamic religious traditions and suggests that they are conducive to interfaith 
diplomacy. Identifying how a diplomat is situated within a particular religious tradition is 
important to understanding their viewpoint and how this will inform their diplomatic 
engagement.784 Johnston and Cox identify five characteristics that inform the actions of a faith-
based diplomat. These are: 
1. There is a conscious dependency on spiritual principles and resources in the conduct of 
peacemaking;  
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2. They operate with a certain spiritual authority;  
3. A pluralistic heart;  
4. A transcendent approach to conflict resolution; and  
5. Their ability to persevere against overwhelming odds.785 
 In this approach, the fundamental principle of an effective faith-based diplomat is a deep 
understanding of qualities that constitute the religious and the way they see the world.  
 There are several skills that should be employed for effective faith-based diplomacy. 
One such skill is that faith-based diplomats bring “a distinct ability to address the complex role 
of religion” to clarify the conflict puzzle.786 Another is “a practical on-the-ground 
understanding of the nature of conflict among the people” which enables “the knowledge and 
authority to take action and move communities toward peace”.787 These skills are revealed in 
the way that faith-based diplomats engage in the mediation process. Through ‘corridor 
diplomacy’, looking at behind-the-scenes, nonofficial tracks of diplomacy, faith-based 
diplomats can intervene as a third-party to change the form of negotiations.788 Brewer, Higgins 
and Teeney examine the role of religious peacemakers, and support Little’s claims who found 
that the religious diplomat can make a noticeable difference in peacemaking for three reasons. 
First, it supplies a theology or hermeneutics of peace; second, it gives religious peacemakers 
detachment and trustworthiness; and third, it serves as a corrective to the focus on the 
specifically religious dimensions of violence.789 While this helps establish peacemaking in 
cases where religion is the fundamental cause of violence, religious peacemakers can at times 
exacerbate tensions and lose their perceived neutrality.790 This may occur if the religious leader 
is too one-sided, attempts to consolidate their power, or indeed adds to the violence. Being 
aware of the potential negative impact is important when employing a faith-based diplomat, 
which is why observers have worked to observe integral qualities of the religious agent to 
ensure that neutrality is protected, and conflict does not intensify. Thompson has identified 
four central qualities which should be visible in faith-based diplomats to assist in achieving 
success. First is what can be called divine/transcendent dependence.791 Second, the faith-based 
diplomat would treat perseverance and patience as imperatives into which they must grow in 
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the diplomatic process and not as potential options.792 Third, the faith-based diplomat is aware 
of and weighs spiritual authority appropriately.793 This spiritual authority is derived from the 
individual or institution that the diplomat represents.794 The fourth quality entails the faith-
based diplomat having an awareness and knowledge of religious pluralism.795 Thompson 
suggests that “the formidability of the inclusion of religion, let alone plurality of religions, is 
to be admitted” as religion represents a “structural component of the social order” and is 
therefore difficult to remove from the process without complications.796 These central 
characteristics help inform how a faith-based diplomat can operate in the diplomatic process.  
 Looking at how the faith-based diplomat can be employed in the diplomatic landscape 
is an area that has yet to be fully realised in scholarship. Research does indicate the constructive 
role faith-based diplomacy can play as a third-party mediator, but the training of diplomats 
should also be reviewed to assess the viability of introducing faith-based diplomacy at a more 
influential level. For example, when negotiating with disputants that apply a faith perspective, 
a diplomat who has been trained in religion has the credibility to engage with that party and, in 
a sense, ‘call their bluff’.797 The counter to this, however, is that religious peacemakers will be 
able to identify the religious actors in the community who may be able to assist in the 
peacemaking process.798 Thus, diplomats must be skilled at evaluating the dynamics of a 
religion’s actors at the negotiating table and also in the processes of community reconstruction. 
With respect to the formal training of diplomatic staff, ambassadors and diplomats should have 
a deep understanding of the faiths practised in the country to which they have been assigned 
and also in conflict areas where they may be negotiating, for example as special envoys in 
shuttle diplomacy.799 This changes the required training of diplomats and recognises the central 
role religion plays in individual and communal identities. As a result, the home nation should 
train core specialists in religion to then assign them as experts to key strategic embassies.800 
This urge for more explicit training was offered by Albright, who identified this as a major 
weakness in the US State Department. To appropriately train diplomats, particularly diplomats 
who operate in the conventional state-centric diplomatic environment, a more rigorous 
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framework of faith-based diplomacy must be created. The goal of this thesis is to provide the 
parameters of such a framework so that diplomats may be armed with the rubrics of application 
of faith-based diplomacy, allowing it to become a viable arm of national strategy.  
 
Interfaith Diplomacy  
 The final section of this chapter explores the concept of interfaith diplomacy. This is 
important as many elements of interfaith diplomacy are predicated on the principles espoused 
in faith-based diplomacy. In interfaith diplomacy, however, the primary function is to practise 
diplomacy between faith groups. Some elements of interfaith diplomacy may be important in 
informing a framework for faith-based diplomacy. Fundamentally, “moral warrants for 
peacemaking exist in the theologies of all major world religions”, however, “their development 
and articulation have been inadequate, despite the increasing need to apply religious principles 
and instruments to the practical work of conflict prevention and resolution”.801 This area is, 
therefore, still developing and being tested. Yet, the raw materials are available to see this 
method improved. Essentially, many view “interfaith dialogue as the religious bodies’ 
equivalent of the United Nations”, where dialogue between different perspectives is maintained 
as the highest priority.802 In a simple form, Sookhdeo sees that interfaith dialogue, “advocates 
a value-free approach to other faiths and cultures that accepts them all as valid spiritualities 
and ways to God”.803 This is a starting point in the area of interfaith dialogue, but the 
methodologies employed to achieve this are being severely tested in the 21st Century. Notably, 
the frameworks of interfaith dialogue have been drastically impacted in the post-September 11 
era, and the ‘interrogation’ of interfaith diplomacy began in earnest.804 
 Studies have been conducted to look at the potential of interfaith diplomacy in 
enhancing dialogue between faiths. Azumah examines the relationship between Christianity 
and Islam after September 11, 2001, drawing out key features that promote success in interfaith 
diplomacy. In an aim to define interfaith dialogue, Sookhdeo identifies driving motivations. 
They include:  
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1. A perception that Christians have treated Muslims badly in the past (as in the Crusades 
and the colonial period) and even in the present (as in contemporary neo-colonialism), 
and a belief that Christians should acknowledge these mistakes and repent. Often the 
behaviour of Christians is identified with that of Western governments.  
2. A conviction that the contemporary policies of Western governments, particularly since 
1979 (from the creation of the Taliban to the current war in Afghanistan), are 
responsible for the recent Muslim violence toward the West, and a call to the West now 
to redefine its relationships with the Muslim world.  
3. A sense that Christian mission activities in the Muslim world, and indeed among 
Muslims in the West, embody Western hostility towards Islam. This position is now 
being argued not just by Muslim countries and organisations but also by Western 
governments and even some Western Christian denominations. The freedom to 
propagate one’s faith, enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, is 
quietly overlooked in this context.  
4. The embracing by many participants of a relativism and postmodernism that affirms 
everything and denies nothing. This includes not only an affirmation of Islam’s 
legitimacy, but also the belief that Islam should be protected legally, both 
internationally and nationally; as a result it tends to privilege Islam and downgrade 
Christianity.  
5. A widespread belief among Muslim participants that Christianity [is] a religion of 
violence, inextricably linked with a corrupt West.805  
These five motivations are argued to have resulted from the events of September 11 and 
demonstrate the deep-rooted tension that exists between the two religious perspectives. If this 
is the perspective of Muslim participants in interfaith dialogue, the Christian counterparts have 
noted their limitations to interfaith dialogue, including: the denial of truth claims and the 
uniqueness of Christ; suspicion and concerns about compromise and syncretism; questions 
about dialogue, evangelism and mission; and the lack of ‘a level playing field’.806 This is only 
one perspective of these interactions post-2001, and while other findings may suggest other 
perspectives on the issue, this example does illuminate the underpinning tensions that must be 
recognised, if not resolved, before entering into formal diplomacy between faiths.807  
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There are some problems evident in the contemporary international system that must 
be identified when considering interfaith diplomacy. One key area of concern in interfaith 
diplomacy is the use of language. Other religious traditions contest many elements of a given 
religion. This means the language used in dialogue is imperative. As Sayeed-Miller notes: “Not 
only are intercultural, interethnic, and interfaith sources of conflict and epistemic commitments 
being contested, so too are languages of terms”.808 Disagreement exists, even within the same 
religious tradition, about how to approach a different faith to engage in dialogue. An example 
identified by Azumah is that of American Christian “conservatives” denouncing their 
“progressive” counterparts for their more liberal stance on Islam. 809 Before entering into 
negotiations to represent one religious tradition, the internal positions of that faith must first be 
settled. A trend that has emerged in the international arena in the 21st Century is that of 
Islamophobia. The rise of the fear of Islam has many contributing factors, from the persecution 
of Christians in Muslim countries, the harsh methods of militant groups, and the impact of 
provocative pronouncements by social conservatives.810 Interfaith diplomacy may be an 
effective strategy to combat the rising trend of Islamophobia and its divisive influence on 
society. One way to achieve this is to encourage dialogue between religious leaders of different 
faiths, then urge social and communal engagement between congregations.811 These ideas are 
formative but do demonstrate that there is a pressing need for positive interfaith relations. An 
example of where this is taking place is in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, an 
institution which supports dialogue among religions as a way to reduce Islamophobia around 
the world.812 So central is this aim that it has been enshrined in the institution’s charter, stating 
that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation determined to “to contribute to international peace 
and security, understanding and dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions and 
promote and encourage friendly relations and good neighbourliness, mutual respect and 
cooperation”.813 
While such a pursuit is desirable, there is a gap in the diplomatic literature regarding 
the similarities between religious traditions that could form the basis of positive interfaith 
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dialogue. Despite the work done in addressing this lacuna, such as Küng’s formula for a global 
ethic which noted that there would be no peace among religions without dialogue,814 September 
11 and resultant global events have reinforced this gap in literature. Appleby notes that, 
“indeed, the cultural capaciousness of Islam and Christianity is a woefully underdeveloped 
resource in conflict resolution in general”.815 The history of religions and their tradition 
demonstrates that there are spaces of similarity, such as the connection between Jesus and 
Abraham, the continuity between the Abrahamic community and the new covenant, Christian 
community, and recognition of major Jewish and Christian figures as prophets within Islamic 
viewpoints.816 The connections between the Abrahamic faith traditions are reinforced in 
scripture, which affirms that Christian identity and Judaism are shaped from common 
foundations.817 Indeed, “as the Abrahamic faiths understand it, God reveals his vision for how 
his people are to live together through scriptural texts”.818 Some literature also suggests that 
traditionally Western concepts, such as democracy, are potentially compatible with Islam.819 
The effective models to facilitate this wider dialogue have not as yet been developed.  
In application, interfaith diplomacy was a central feature to the negotiations between 
US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli President Menachem 
Begin. Carter entered the negotiations with the hope that "religion would ultimately contribute 
to finding a resolution of the differences in the Middle East”.820 To best prepare for the 
negotiations, Carter realised his need to understand the position of his interlocutors and 
intentionally equipped himself with knowledge of the Islamic faith.821 When preparing for 
interfaith dialogue, Carter noted that he would reinforce the role religion would play in the 
talks and encouraged the three parties to discuss their individual beliefs informally to build 
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confidence in their relationships.822 Positively, Egyptian president Sadat famously spoke in 
Israel about pursuing peace on this mutual basis and later received the Nobel Peace Prize.823 
This example demonstrates that there are fruitful elements of interfaith diplomacy that can 
translate into the diplomatic process, but these remain underdeveloped.  
 This section on interfaith diplomacy has indicated a need to understand it better, and to 
construct frameworks for interfaith engagement to resolve the complex issues within its remit. 
The significant consideration to be made here is that interfaith diplomacy suggests improved 
dialogue and diplomacy between two different religious perspectives. This differentiates 
interfaith diplomacy from faith-based diplomacy. Faith-based diplomacy looks more toward 
the inherent values of religion that inform a diplomat and the diplomatic process. As a result, 
faith-based diplomacy could theoretically be conducted between parties of the same religious 
tradition, of different religious traditions, or even in processes where the faith-based diplomat 
plays a mediating capacity. Essentially, faith-based diplomacy considers the precursors that 
inform diplomacy, whereas interfaith diplomacy is concerned with the practical application of 
diplomacy between faith groups. An effective framework of faith-based diplomacy could 
eventually enhance the application of interfaith dialogue, which is why it is being examined in 
this thesis.    
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The Scholarship of Faith-based Diplomacy 
 
 The focus of this chapter is to examine the linkages between faith-based diplomacy and 
the scholarship of International Relations and Diplomacy Studies. The first section will 
highlight the scholarly considerations that form the basis of faith-based diplomacy. How this 
connects with International Relations scholarship will then be discussed. Faith-based 
diplomacy’s scope within the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies is the third section, followed 
by an examination of sub-disciplines within Diplomacy Studies that demonstrate a level of 
compatibility with faith-based diplomacy. Finally, available frameworks for understanding 
faith-based diplomacy in the wider scholarship will be identified to present the theoretical and 
intellectual foundations of faith-based diplomacy.  
 
Scholarship of Faith-based Diplomacy  
In 1994 Burnett examined the impact of faith-based diplomacy on the foreign policy 
community, concluding that “there will be no attempt here to construct a fresh theoretical 
framework because a satisfactory framework already exists”.824 This may have been the case 
in the 1990s, but since then much has changed in the international system and the theoretical 
bases of faith-based diplomacy need to be reconsidered. As Johnston recognised, the models 
used to integrate faith into diplomacy simply took old frameworks and adapted them to new 
problems even if they were not designed to accommodate those changes.825 Academics and 
practitioners alike have called for the role of religion in diplomacy to be more critically 
examined, with Albright urging that spiritual matters be considered as an integral part of 
diplomatic study in the future.826 Hehir argues that “if you look at standard textbooks of 
international relations or the way we organize our foreign ministry, there’s no place where a 
sophisticated understanding of religion as a public force in the world is dealt with”.827 This gap 
is evident in that a systematic assessment of the engagement of faith-based and religious actors 
in conflict resolution does not exist. In view of this, it is not surprising that policy decisions 
                                                          
824 Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community." 296 
825 Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 333 
826 Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 4 
827 Hehir as cited by ibid. 4 
137 
 
based on misguided understandings of the diverse religious landscape have become too 
common.828 Although the scholarship in the conflict resolution field is growing,829 it has yet to 
recognise the importance of adapting and applying conflict resolution strategies to religious 
communities at their various levels.830  
There are several reasons for the apparent neglect of religion in scholarship, particularly 
in regard to international political scholarship. Agensky suggests that the underlining reasons 
“were issues of disciplinary identity, positivist American political science, and received 
wisdom about religion’s epiphenomenal nature or irrelevance with respect to collective 
political action, state international, and system effects under anarchical conditions”.831 The 
trend for scholars to abstain from theoretical and systematic study of the role of religion in 
politics also occurred as a result of the general acceptance that wars which were caused by 
religion were primarily an event of history.832 If wars fought in the name of religion were a 
thing of the past, scholarly attention could be better spent elsewhere. However, the neglect of 
religion in scholarship became apparent through the post-Cold War era of international 
relations, and these gaps required urgent addressing following the Global War on Terror. 833 
Even scholarship generated in this climate runs the risk of not addressing religion effectively.834 
Various schools of thought have encouraged the creation of new scholarly disciplines focusing 
on cross-cultural analysis, all being reinforced by improved research methodologies.835 This 
trend in theoretical expansions has been bolstered by the decline in support for the 
secularisation theory. Maddox, in evaluating the progress of scholarship regarding 
secularisation, has noted that the ‘secularisation thesis’ of 19th Century sociology “predicted 
that, with modernisation, religion would fade, to be replaced by enlightenment rationality, 
science, scientific socialism, or some blend”, but that the end of the 20th Century proved 
otherwise: “Only parts of Europe followed the script. Resurgences of religion elsewhere – and 
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politically-assertive religion, at that – forced the secularisation thesis’s surviving proponents 
to reconsider their theory.”836 With the central claims of the secularisation thesis having been 
challenged, a space opened for faith-based theories to be investigated.  
When the initial constructs of theory for faith-based diplomacy were created, academics 
noted the need to go beyond the traditional focus on the state, within the theoretic perspective 
of political realism, and consider nongovernmental actors operating at sub-national levels.837 
Political realism is underpinned by the rational actor model of decision making, which argues 
that the state will pursue its own self-interest and maximise power when deciding on policy. 
838 However, the rational actor model fails to take into account the impact of supposed 
‘irrational’ factors, including the role of religion, when deciding on that policy.839 These 
approaches will be discussed in greater depth in the ‘Available Frameworks of Analysis for 
Faith-based Diplomacy’ section below. By looking beyond this traditionalist approach to 
foreign policy construction, policymakers can more accurately appreciate the complex 
contemporary environment, reorient their thinking toward religion and, ultimately, reshape 
their strategy as a result of this new information.840 Observers have noted that the time is ripe 
for “unconventional approaches”, where traditional methodologies of diplomacy can be 
coupled with religious peacemaking to address communal conflict.841 Already, the impacts of 
religion on “security, rights, aid, foreign policy, track-two diplomacy, and democratization, as 
well as their metatheoretical implications” have been discussed by scholars.842 These 
advancements in theory, like the challenge to the secularisation thesis, suggest that there is 
room for theoretical complementarity.  
When considering faith in the construction of theory, Farr recommends that analysts 
identify that “religion is normative, not epiphenomenal, in human affairs”.843 If religion was 
epiphenomenal, it would be the result of another driving factor. However, if religion is treated 
as a normative force, theoreticians can recognise its ability to influence and drive behaviour. 
The ability of policymakers to meet the challenges of the 21st Century will in large part be 
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influenced by the basic assumptions of the international system which have been informed by 
the conceptual lenses used to examine global affairs.844 When this conceptual lens is applied to 
faith, clear and unique linkages between diplomacy, culture, and religion can be identified to 
form the basis of theory.845 These conceptual and normative frames have enabled faith-based 
diplomacy to advance theoretically in the area of conflict reconciliation impacting the personal 
and societal levels.846 Theorists of faith-based diplomacy are recognising the common ground 
regarding how different religions approach peace, the capacity for interfaith cooperation on 
conflict resolution, and how religious leaders can be more effective in delivering humanitarian 
assistance and assisting in community reconstruction efforts.847 Much can still be done in the 
study across disciplines, such as the examination of peacebuilding and religious freedom.848 
Advancements in this scholarship will strengthen progress made in the broader field of faith-
based diplomacy. The emerging contemporary scholarship “has successfully dismantled 
problematic assumptions about religion and international politics” which has ultimately 
established “a powerful new research agenda”, 849 upon which this thesis builds. 
 Some challenges and limitations are still apparent in the scholarship. There is evidence 
to suggest that religious actors can play a positive role as an intermediary peacemaker. Yet the 
scholarship on this issue is still finding support partially due to the fact that legitimate 
documentation and available research is often fragmentary.850 While there exists a strong 
literature on religious politics, the same cannot be said of more refined scopes of analysis, for 
example, religion-related public diplomacy.851 In this case, Seib sees the potential of religion-
related public diplomacy strategies as an effective counterweight to the violent and extremist 
form of religious politics, but the faith-based diplomatic strategy needs more credence to stand 
alone in the conduct of international relations.852 A further challenge to overcome is what 
Agensky calls a Eurocentric philosophy of religion. Here religion is “contemplative, private, 
and prone to devastating consequences when made public” which “has long maintained a 
foundational, authoritative, and constitutive force within international political scholarship, 
casting religion as exceptional to main-stream politics and religiously identified actors as 
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inherently suspect”.853 This Western-centric scholarship presents “the incomplete nature of 
secularism in the West itself”, and a “misrecognition of religion” resulting in its neglect as a 
potential part of diplomacy.854 The appropriate measures to address these limitations are found 
in developing scholarship that broadens the scope of critical analysis.  
 
Faith-based Diplomacy in the Scope of International Relations and Diplomacy Theory  
International Relations Scholarship  
Faith-based diplomacy relates to a number of theories of International Relations 
showing clear compatibility and explanatory value. This section will explore the way in which 
the metatheories855 in the field of International Relations link to faith-based diplomacy, before 
refining the scope of analysis to Diplomacy Studies. In terms of the research methodology 
employed to study religion in International Relations, Maddox reviewed texts which draw 
“lightly from the existing corpus of religious studies, whose theoretical insights could deepen 
the discussion” of religion in International Relations scholarship.856 What Maddox finds is that 
both approaches to studying religion in International Relations, being either a presentation of 
large empirical data sets on religion, or small empirical studies lending to a qualitative 
approach, could be improved by one another, suggesting that the methodologies themselves 
must be strengthened. Sandal and James note that the marginalisation of religion in 
International Relations scholarship is primarily a result of International Relations theoreticians 
being reluctant to engage with religion, rather than International Relations scholarship itself 
being incompatible with religion.857 They argue that “religion can indeed be employed as a 
variable in explanatory [International Relations] theory as a part of ostensibly objective 
accounts of what is going on ‘out there’”.858 By using this approach, scholars have noted that 
even the challenging forms of International Relations theory can accommodate religion in some 
sense, which is necessary if domestic politics, international politics and foreign policy 
decisions are to be better understood.859 
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The foundational feature of International Relations scholarship is the metatheories that 
have been developed over time. The study conducted by Sandal and James on the link between 
religion and International Relations theory will be used as the basis for discussing realism, 
liberalism and their contemporary forms of neorealism and neoliberalism, and how these 
metatheories intersect with religion. Within classical realism, realists typically demonstrate an 
aversion to the use of ideology or religion, particularly by elites.860 However, ideology is valid 
in the realist lens if the ideology is utilised as a tool of legitimacy, if the state itself is based on 
that ideology, and also if the decisionmakers of that state are affected by a dimension of that 
ideology.861 The place of religion in classical realism is substantiated by the scholars of the 
English School who evaluated the role of Christianity in the roots of international relations.862  
Classical realism does, moreover, provide a suitable lens for sub-state accounts of religion that 
“focus on human nature, the flexible definition of rationality, interest and power as well as the 
widely used terminology of emotions and cognition” which “allow for integration of studies of 
belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence”.863 Still, even 
within this traditional frame, Patterson sees that the national security community can be 
strengthened by bringing more comparative politics, and religious and cultural studies into the 
approaches to education of traditional International Relations concepts such as security.864 In 
enhancing the theories available, the education and training process with be improved, 
hopefully leading to more successful practical outcomes. When looking at the contemporary 
form of this theory, neorealism does not easily accommodate religion, apart from potentially 
allowing the incorporation of moral considerations only as they apply to the actors within the 
international sphere.865 In fact, Sandal and James found that structural realism is the most 
challenging framework within which religion can play a role. They note that “there is always 
the possibility of coming up with a ‘complementary’ model of foreign policy that includes 
religion as a variable” but the challenge to this is that “such a model would still have to accept 
its conceptual subordination to the system-level theory”.866  
The liberal theoretical perspective, however, is more accepting of the role of religion in 
international politics. Neoliberalism, in particular, maintains the assumption that transnational 
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actors pursue their own goals and thus “makes space for religious organisations and groups that 
would seem to exceed any strand of realism”.867 Cultural and normative explanations of 
religion in politics can be understood by using the constructivist-oriented tools founded in 
liberal scholarship.868 The tools of the neoliberal school of thought are able to measure the 
influence of religion in both domestic and transnational politics.869  One area where this is most 
obvious is that neoliberalism is able to account for the rise of religious institutions and their 
related transnational phenomena, making this the most suitable framework for understanding 
religion within mainstream International Relations theory.870 Sandal and James’ study 
concludes that “religion, a relatively new variable in the study of international relations, not 
only can be integrated into [International Relations] theory, but can even benefit from the 
insights of established traditions when there is a need to explain complex interactions”.871 
 Although there are areas of compatibility, limitations are apparent when applying 
religion to International Relations scholarship. According to Agensky, there are two major 
barriers when incorporating faith-based approaches into International Relations scholarship. 
The first is that such scholarship is informed by a secularist outlook that treats religion as a 
homogenous entity temporally and spatially. This limits the analysis of “religiously identified 
actors whose shifting identities, preferences, and modes of collective action often overwhelm 
the frameworks used to understand them”.872 As a result of this limitation, scholars neglect the 
significance of liberal modernity and religion being able to constitute a single field of analysis 
which can incorporate political scholarship.873 The second significant limitation is that:  
scholars continue to identify enduring sets of Eurocentric assumptions in: the 
dichotomization of the religious and the political; the ‘othering’ of religious 
actors within the political mainstream; the selection of largely Southern-based, 
violent religious politics; and the treatment of politically salient religious 
activities as exceptional to politics.874 
As a consequence of these categorisations, religion may be more prominent in academics’ 
scope of analysis, but it may also be misrecognised as a result of the Eurocentric intellectual 
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legacies that have endured over time.875 These limitations, however, are not insurmountable. 
As the complementarities between religion and International Relations theory are found in 
scholarship, these limitations can actively be reduced.  
 
Diplomacy Studies Scholarship  
As an instrument of diplomacy, faith-based diplomacy must fit firmly within the scope 
of Diplomacy Studies. To consider religion in diplomacy, Pokhariyal suggests that “diplomacy 
is represented by a pseudodynamical variable, which in most cases is considered as biased and 
is controlled as well as manipulated by the decisionmaker” and if this is the case, “since religion 
has significant influence on human behaviour and actions, it is treated as a moderating variable 
in the model”.876 Observers note that within the development of diplomatic theory, both idealist 
and realist tendencies prevail, allowing for further advancements with different perspectives. 
877 Troy suggests that faith-based diplomacy can work with both of these tendencies: “idealism 
because it claims to be, as a track-two diplomacy, an altered set of hypotheses about 
international affairs and human behaviour and is therefore progressive”, and also on the side 
of realism as “it claims to be aware of and recognises the evil in the human soul (animus 
dominandi)”.878 Knowing that there are platforms to work from in constructing theory, Sharp 
posits, “all religious thought offers an opening in principle at least, to diplomacy”.879 
 There is a debate among scholars as to whether faith-based diplomacy can be 
compatible with traditional diplomacy. The traditional approach to religion was to “box and 
tame” religion.880  Religion was withdrawn from the public sphere as political structures 
became increasingly secular.881 This approach was sufficient within that system of diplomacy 
where religious faith was excluded to a set of functions dictated from agreements of 
international elites who proposed that religion would remain this way in the future.882 As a 
result of this line of thinking, traditional diplomacy neglected religious factors and placed 
religion at the behest of demagogues who manipulated religion for self-interested purposes.883 
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The West is still ineffective in dealing with these issues as a result of this tendency.884 
Longstanding theoretical constructs in International Relations, such as Morgenthau’s nation-
state model, do not consider religion as a significant factor in the policymaker’s calculus.885 
Albright cautions that, although faith-based diplomacy can be a useful tool, it cannot replace 
traditional diplomacy altogether.886 Rather, she highlights the trend of a religious resurgence 
influencing world events and, as a result, policymakers should balance this influence within 
their traditional decision making approach.887 Johnston agrees, stating that religion in the 
construct of diplomacy is not intended to be a revolution of traditional diplomacy, but rather 
“the addition of a resource and mode of analysis to the peacemaker’s tool belt”.888 In this way, 
the approach to conflict resolution implicit in faith-based diplomacy explores a wider variety 
of tasks than those typically related with traditional diplomacy.889 The contemporary nature of 
conflict has exceeded the capacities of traditional diplomacy, and in this respect it is notable 
that faith-based diplomacy seeks reconciliation as a priority. This has been overlooked by the 
secularist assumptions of global affairs which, when re-examined as Lynch has done, show 
that religious actors who were ignored through the 20th Century have always been active as a 
part of diplomatic practice.890 That is why some scholars suggest that the best way to 
understand faith-based diplomacy is to “apply moral insights and religious concepts towards 
the development of peaceful settlements of conflicts through diplomatic techniques” and faith-
based initiatives into conflict resolution.891  
Beyond traditional diplomacy, faith-based diplomacy does interact with the new school 
of diplomacy too. One area of dramatic change in Diplomacy Studies is the expansion of actors 
on the world stage. Indeed, this challenge to diplomacy has seen the consideration of 
international organisations, religious figures, and even religious individuals into the diplomatic 
process – a development that the theory of diplomacy is still integrating.892 The rise of the 
phenomenon that some observers call paradiplomacy is gaining greater acceptance in 
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diplomatic scholarship.893 Nonstate actors, subnational units, nongovernmental organisations, 
and individuals, for example, are linking the institution of diplomacy with international society, 
and using this forum as a way to integrate religion more favourably.894 This is most evident in 
the asymmetrical, state-to-society paradigm, which sees the active involvement of faith-based 
actors.895 This also suggests that the scholarship surrounding Track One and Track Two 
diplomacy needs to be considered when seeking the most effective implementation of faith-
based approaches to diplomacy.896 The proper track of diplomacy remains an area of contention 
among scholars in the field, but there is debate that is fruitful for generating scholarship.  New 
diplomacy represents  a conducive space for the inclusion of faith-based approaches to 
diplomacy, particularly in the contemporary landscape of diplomacy.897 The modern structures 
of the international system, being the post-World War era, the United Nations system, the 
processes of decolonisation, and the multipolarity of the 21st Century, are all influenced by the 
institutional bases which were informed by religious framings.898 The parallels here suggest 
that faith-based diplomacy does have a foundation to work with in the modern international 
architecture.  
From the perspective of the innovative school of diplomatic theory, faith-based 
diplomacy raises the possibility of “official diplomacy coupled with religious peacemaking as 
offering a greater potential for dealing with today’s problems of communal conflict, 
particularly those involving ethnic and religious dimensions”.899 This fits within the theoretical 
frameworks of innovative diplomacy which seeks to find cooperation between traditional and 
new approaches. These non-traditional approaches to diplomacy can incorporate actors beyond 
the state with contemporary mechanisms of conflict resolution to best integrate faith-based 
approaches to diplomacy. The constructs to support these approaches, however, are still being 
revised; but, importantly, the scholarly foundation exists for further work to be carried out. 
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Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy   
 Advancements in scholarship have resulted in fields of study where faith-based 
diplomacy may be an appropriate strategy to incorporate. This section will examine the theory 
of soft power and two subfields of diplomacy, those of cultural diplomacy and public 
diplomacy. The analysis provided in this section will highlight that existing theoretical 
constructs do have the capacity to engage faith-based diplomacy and suggest that the theorising 
of faith-based diplomacy can use these other frameworks for support.  
Soft power is a theory which seeks to reconceptualise how power is viewed in the 
international system.900 Through this frame “exchanges of ideas, information, value systems, 
traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture – such as art, sports, science, literature, and 
music” are utilised with the “intention of fostering mutual understanding”.901 This process of 
attracting understanding between groups promotes people-to-people diplomacy by leveraging 
soft power assets.902 Ideas, information, values, traditions, beliefs and cultures have all been 
influenced by religion and faith and thus soft power can be a viable theoretical lens to 
understand the potential impact of faith-based diplomacy.  
By extension, using soft power in conjunction with other diplomatic approaches 
provides a viable way to manage the growing role of faith in international affairs. As Seib 
notes: 
Ignoring the role of faith in an increasingly religious world makes no sense. The 
use of soft power can be successful only if elements of culture such as religion 
are integral to the planning and implementation of public diplomacy. This is not 
the easiest of partnerships to establish, but it is essential.903 
Here Seib recognises the potential complementarity between soft power, faith-based 
diplomacy, and public diplomacy. Another way in which soft power strategies are increasingly 
effective may be found in the promotion of religious freedom.904 When articulating values, 
advocating for policies, or influencing global publics, religious freedom and soft power can 
work together to inform successful diplomatic strategy.905 As soft power strategies are tested 
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and expanded in the literature, the scholarly lens for incorporation of faith-based diplomacy is 
also widened.  
  Some theoretical frameworks within Diplomacy Studies also provide a promising 
platform for integrating faith-based approaches to diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy allows for 
more options with which to engage by leveraging culture to bring about understanding between 
groups. The use of the arts and culture for political purposes is well-established through history, 
and yet the theoretical constructs of cultural diplomacy have only been emerging since the 
1990s.906 When examining how the concept has developed over time, “the meanings and 
understandings of cultural diplomacy have been shaped by the evolution of the practices it 
describes, as well as by national traditions and contexts”.907 Since the mid-20th Century, 
International Relations scholars started integrating culture into their examinations of 
international affairs, moving beyond the high political components of economics, military and 
political issues.908 Culture and religion can be seen as independent variables in the model of 
diplomatic decision-making, where the two play significant roles in determining diplomatic 
outcomes.909 As religion is an influential element of culture, they must both be considered in 
the planning and implementation of diplomatic strategy.910  
A challenge to the diplomatic community is the recognition that culture, if integrated 
carelessly, may be a destructive force.911 Resurgent cultural identities can lead to more 
divisions and disputes, so that “deeper cultural understanding” is needed to help prevent 
cultural hostilities from becoming a global phenomenon.912 Successful cultural diplomacy 
strategies provide a context for alleviating these concerns. As the traditional focus of culture 
promoted through states and institutions remains strong,913 cultural diplomacy scholars need to 
broaden their source material and approaches. By examining oral history within case studies, 
for instance, they would be better positioned to understand how people perceive cultural 
policies and how policies impact on communities.914 Within this setting, religions can be seen 
as a vehicle through which the rich tradition of oral and written history can be used to 
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strengthen cultural understanding. Thus, future advancements in cultural diplomacy could 
benefit from a cooperative engagement with faith-based diplomacy.  
 Arguably the field of scholarship exhibiting the most complementarity with faith-based 
diplomacy is that of public diplomacy. The literature of public diplomacy has engaged with the 
role of religion in building effective diplomatic strategy, as is evident in Religion and Public 
Diplomacy, a 2013 work edited by Philip Seib. The relationship between the two concepts has 
been recognised by scholars. Burnett has observed that “public diplomacy has the charge to 
penetrate the culture of the host country beyond the political and governmental institutions” 
which results in “a greater focus on people rather than on institutions”.915  At its simplest form, 
if public diplomacy is a strategy that seeks to attract and influence foreign publics, then the 
most direct way to influence people, especially in more conservative societies, is through their 
faith.916 A simple definition of public diplomacy is that “while traditional diplomacy is state to 
state, public diplomacy is state to people” where “discourse is the essence of public 
diplomacy”.917 This definition becomes more complex when the role of nonstate actors is 
integrated and where, “in the new social media era, publics… not only are able to receive 
messages from foreign governments, but they also have come to expect such 
communication”.918  
Beliefs, norms, and identities (all informed by religion) assist in making truth claims 
which enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the discourse being conducted within the scope 
of public diplomacy.919 Public diplomacy has, in the past, recognised the importance of 
religion, but has not always successfully integrated religious factors in its strategy.920 And yet, 
“if public diplomacy can be defined in part as involving the gentle wielding of influence to 
advance national interests, then the role of religion in people’s lives must not be overlooked”.921 
To construct an effective public diplomacy strategy, Marshall and Farr note that a priority task 
is recognising religion as a driver of culture. 922 This includes political culture as religion 
informs the worldview of many, at both the individual and community level.923 Seib agrees that 
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religion still fails to be integrated fully into the elements of public diplomacy.924 Although there 
have been some beneficial advancements in the field of public diplomacy, practitioners of 
“multitrack diplomacy have still not realised the potential of employing religion as an 
enhancement of public diplomacy.925 In future, as the scholarship continues to grow, faith-
based diplomacy can be applied productively in this field. 
 A concerted effort has been made to understand the use of public diplomacy to support 
international religious freedom. At its core, “promoting religious freedom furthers three of the 
strategic objectives of public diplomacy: shaping the narrative, expanding and strengthening 
people-to-people trust, and combatting violent extremism”.926 The tools of public diplomacy 
accord with the soft power strategy of promoting religious freedoms.927 Soft power and 
religious freedom are compatible as public diplomacy “both raises awareness about 
government restrictions and encourages the social conditions necessary for religious 
freedom”.928 This approach is considered integral to the success of public diplomacy, which in 
itself cannot be separated from the issues of religious freedom, particularly in democracies.929 
This is because “public diplomacy programs are able to account for a variety of theologies and 
worldviews, and they have the ability to promote positive religious freedom developments 
when bilateral efforts are not viable”.930 By exploring questions of religious freedom through 
the medium of public diplomacy, a space for faith-based diplomacy can be fostered. Ultimately, 
when designing public diplomacy strategies in the contemporary international system, the 
expansion of religious beliefs in many parts of the world needs to be recognised, especially for 
future planning.931 When looking to the scholarly constructs of faith-based diplomacy, it is 
therefore instructive that both public and faith-based diplomacy show a compatibility which 
can be more intentionally leveraged in the future of Diplomacy Studies.  
 
Available Frameworks of Analysis for Faith-based Diplomacy  
  This section will examine the literature’s analytical approaches that may not necessarily 
accord with previous thinking, but which would recommend themselves to constructing faith-
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based diplomacy strategies. Some are relatively simple in that they call for a reappraisal of how 
religion is viewed. Farr, for example, suggests that “policy makers should approach religion 
much as they do economics and politics – that is, as something that drives the behaviour of 
people and governments in important ways”. 932 Farr suggests this because, like economic and 
political motives, “religious motives can act as a multiplier of both destructive and constructive 
behaviours, often with more intense results”.933 A simple adjustment of perspective by 
policymakers can make a dramatic difference to how the religion is dealt with in international 
affairs. Other academics have analysed diplomacy by constructing a model where religion can 
be treated as a moderating variable considering its influence on human behaviour.934 
Classifications between religions, such as Kang’s identification of those that are inclusivist and 
exclusivist and their contributions to religious war, are also ways in which frames of analysis 
are expanding to develop the scholarship which, in turn, assists the construction of faith-based 
diplomacy theory.935  
When examining the study of religion through history, Agensky proposes the 
“entangled history” approach to analysis. This focuses on transformative interconnections that 
exist among social groups that have been dispersed,936 highlighting the importance of critical 
dialogism. While evident in other theoretical appraisals, the distinguishing feature in this 
approach is its focus on International Relations, 937  wherein the global religious-political field 
is observed as an interconnected whole. Thus religious agency can be examined in light of the 
heterogeneities, contestations and politics of those connections.938 By adopting this approach 
to historical analysis, religious practice is repositioned to examine social encounters through 
history, showing religious agency as a subject for tension when connected to political 
developments.939 Not only is this achieved when analysing religious practice, but it is possible 
to apply Agensky’s approach to the concept of religion itself; and, more specifically, in the 
way that it interacts with analytical, normative and political tensions.940 This method allows 
religion to be understood through the lens of International Relations when critically analysing 
the history of political developments.   
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 An approach that has been traditionally applied to understanding the international 
system, and the issues within that system, is the use of the rational actor model. As noted above, 
the rational actor model posits that state behaviour is governed by “the rational pursuit of their 
national self-interests, foremost among which is maximizing power”.941 Traditional diplomacy 
has long been tied to the assumptions of the rational actor model, and thus the religious and 
cultural dynamics of contemporary conflicts are testing the model.942 This model, as it stands, 
does not appreciate the impact of religion, but rather classifies religion as an irrational factor 
in decision making.943 Yet, simply viewing religion as irrational does not allowed the issues of 
religion to be dealt with effectively. Instead, Johnston proposes that rather than categorising 
religion as irrational, it is considered asymmetrical. If this is applied, then policymakers can 
focus on the motivating role of religion behind conflict and appreciate the religious nature of 
those conflicting behaviours.944 By viewing religion as an asymmetrical threat, new 
frameworks of analysis can be provided which give greater credence to the impact of religion 
in the international system. 
 One notable approach to integrating religion in conflict management is the OODA 
Loop, or Boyd Cycle.945 The cycle is a continuous process that moves through stages of 
observation, orientation, decision, and action, where feedback is incorporated to adjust to the 
conflict situation on the ground.946 In light of the rational actor model of decision making, 
Johnston suggests that the OODA Loop may be a more viable approach as it highlights the 
complexities of contemporary conflict which exceed the limits of the rational actor approach.947 
The goal of the OODA Loop is to broaden the scope of decisionmakers, providing them with 
the perspective to integrate religion as a factor. The ‘looped’ nature of this process 
accommodates changes within the dynamics of a conflict which suits its contemporary nature 
as they are intra-state and more identity/communal based. Johnston supports this approach to 
decision making as it provides a more nuanced understanding of contemporary circumstances, 
which can reorient the thinking of decision makers to reshape diplomatic strategies.948 This 
                                                          
941 Johnston, Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement. 5 
942 "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 7 
943 Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement. 5 
944 "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat." 9  
945 For a brief summary of the OODA Loop, and its linkage to culture, see: A. Maccuish Donald, "Orientation: 
Key to the OODA Loop – the Culture Factor," Journal of Defense Resources Management 3, no. 2 (2012).  
946 Johnston, Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement. 7 
947 Ibid. 7 
948 Ibid. 10 
152 
 
framework is an example of how the literature and scholarship has been reconsidered to 
account for religious factors.  
 The role of religion within authoritarian regimes has also been studied, and a framework 
of analysis has been provided which helps understand religion within the scope of the state. In 
Koesel’s study, three frameworks are put forward.949 First, “religion-regime relations are 
assumed to be complementary, where both sides stand to gain even if they do not necessarily 
gain equally”.950 In this positive view of the relationship, religion is valued in that it can provide 
political legitimacy for the state’s ruling elite.951 In response to the legitimacy offered, political 
elites may designate an official religion where financial support and freedoms may be offered 
to that religion over other institutions.952 An example would be Putin’s use of Orthodoxy as 
part of the traditional and conservative image of Russia which he promotes and celebrates in 
policy.953 Contrary to this, the second frame of analysis proposed by Koesel is one where 
“authoritarian leaders interact with religious groups as they might with political rivals – that is, 
they employ strategies of ‘encapsulation’ to neutralise potential threats” which sees the 
relationship between religion and regimes as more competitive.954 Koesel notes that the 
Orthodox Church during the Soviet Union and Buddhist groups in Thailand’s military regime 
exemplify this second frame.955 The third frame of analysis is adversarial where “the 
relationship is generally assumed to be one of domination and resistance. The authoritarian 
regime attempts to coerce religion and religious actors, who in turn seek to challenge the right 
and capacity of autocrats to rule”.956 Illustrative of this is China’s policies against religion 
during the Cultural Revolution,957 or the control of Islam at political levels in Central Asia.958 
The theoretical framework of analysis proposed by Koesel considers religion at the 
subnational level to examine the way that the relationship between political elites and religious 
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figures is developed and negotiated.959 By doing so, this analysis can present the ways in which 
the interests of religious and political actors are defined, how the needs of the parties are 
presented, and whether a strategy of cooperation or conflict is most suitable to achieving their 
goals.960 A theory of this nature, according to Koesel, is advantageous for three reasons:  
First, it explores the dynamics between multiple religious and regime actors, 
which exposes subnational variation in how local government officials manage 
diverse and different religious groups. Second, it views religion-regime 
relations as an ongoing and dynamic process in which each side weighs costs 
and benefits to adapt to a changing environment. Third, it unpacks the 
underlying incentives for religion-regime interaction, but remains parsimonious 
enough to be applicable across the authoritarian world.961 
Within the scope of this thesis, this framework is important as it provides a form of analysis 
that studies religion within the state. This area of investigation is typically contentious due to 
secularisation; but advancements in theory assist in considering how faith-based diplomacy 
may effectively be employed by the state.   
 More specifically from the lens of diplomacy, scholars look to different ways in which 
faith-based diplomacy can be integrated as a tool. Some use an issue like religious freedom as 
a “comprehensive framework through which to name and analyse the ideational impulses and 
resulting policies of leaders and regimes”.962 When looking at other approaches that address 
specific issues in international affairs, Sayeed-Miller proposes a paradigm called ‘restorative 
narrative-building’. In this, religious actors consider the role of language and mediation, 
particularly in response to cases of blasphemy and religious offence.963 The restorative 
narrative-building approach could be as follows:  
1. The immediate response is an articulation of understanding of the harm that may have 
been suffered.  
2. The official language used does not just condemn the offenders, it also seeks to open 
doors of reconciliation between the parties.  
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3. Public, symbolic, affinity-making opportunities are sought that show leaders of all the 
parties in each other’s sacred spaces, breaking bread and modelling conciliatory actions. 
This is important because the public presentation is not just a public relations 
opportunity, it is a true process of joint responsibility for making right what may be 
perceived as having been wronged. It also counters any narrative that reconciliation is 
impossible between the communities that might be at odds with one another.  
4. Immediate engagement of religious leaders from all the parties to explain and explore 
the juristic issues present in the actual case.964 
While this framework is a specific approach to dealing with the issue of blasphemy, it does 
demonstrate that scholarship is finding methods of countering religious conflict.965  
 When considering how these frameworks influence the analysis of faith-based 
diplomacy, Thomas argues that faith-based diplomacy:  
…focuses on integrating faith into the existing frameworks of diplomatic or 
political institutions, social relations, and social meaning, and does not, as in 
critical theory or the Revolutionist tradition, challenge the existing framework 
of social order in international relations, nor does it consider how it may be 
fundamentally transformed.966 
As such, faith-based diplomacy must be considered as a viable strategy to be utilised within 
the paradigms of frameworks, such as those discussed within this chapter. In so doing, faith-
based diplomacy can be integrated into the systems and processes of conflict resolution, and 
modern diplomacy. These frameworks do provide a platform for analysis and demonstrate that 
advancements in scholarship since faith-based diplomacy’s introduction to scholarship in 1994 
have enhanced the scope of faith-based diplomacy, allowing it to play a more critical role in 
the decision-making process. 
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The Concepts and Actors of Faith-based Diplomacy 
 
 With faith-based diplomacy now evaluated through the lens of theory and scholarship, 
this chapter will investigate the central characteristics and concepts of faith-based diplomacy. 
Characteristics include the role of values in faith and their influences on the diplomatic 
processes, and the space of reconciliation in faith-based diplomacy and conflict resolution. 
Further, public diplomacy scholars have identified the role of religious freedom as a significant 
feature of faith-based diplomacy. Another critical development is the impact of faith-based 
diplomacy in the construction of foreign policy and the role of religious leaders in the 
diplomatic process. The concept of mediation, particularly third-party mediation, will be 
applied to faith-based diplomacy. Finally, the tracks of diplomacy will be analysed to find the 
most appropriate method of application for faith-based diplomacy in practice. These concepts 
will provide an overview of some of the key features of faith-based diplomacy that have been 
revealed in scholarship thus far.  
This chapter will then focus on the central actors in the international system and suggest 
how each actor may engage with faith-based diplomacy. The actors under analysis are the state, 
the diplomat, intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, civil society 
organisations, the church, and individuals. This review of actors will serve to illuminate the 
potential space for faith-based diplomacy in practice. As a result, this chapter will effectively 
highlight the central characteristics and key actors of faith-based diplomacy, providing a 
comprehensive theoretical framework.  
 
The Concepts of Faith-based Diplomacy  
Values and Faith-based Diplomacy  
 This section considers how the values found in faith can be of benefit to the practitioners 
of faith-based diplomacy. Inherent within faith traditions are values which could be leveraged 
to support the diplomatic process. Religious beliefs and values are vitally important as they 
motivate behaviour but are not always integrated cohesively within society, a situation which 
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could fuel conflict.967 Regarding practical frameworks, this may fit into the ‘virtue ethics’ 
approach to diplomacy, as discussed by Troy, where the main values of a religious tradition 
are present in the construction and processes of diplomatic dialogue.968 Former US president 
Jimmy Carter reflected on his role in the Israel-Egypt peace talks and noted that the pursuit of 
peace in all the religions that were represented girded the negotiations; and that his attempt to 
learn as much of the Islamic faith as possible enabled him to identify compatible values 
pertinent to cooperation.969 Carter understood that through the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam), the way in which people are to live together was, in his perspective, 
authored by God within scriptural texts.970 Utilising the scriptures and sacred texts of religions 
can enable observers to appreciate the values that underpin negotiations. An evident use of 
religious scripture is when it is selectively retrieved and then applied to situations as a 
legitimising tool for acts of violence and extremism. 971 However, when used appropriately 
within the lens of faith-based diplomacy, scripture can reveal the values that can assist in 
achieving a successful resolution.972 Scholarship, policy and self-identification recognise that 
categorisations of religions integrate normative values into behaviour, and thus these values 
require deeper understanding from diplomatic observers.973  
When considering how this values-based approach may impact diplomacy, “each 
tradition’s collection of stories, narratives, religious customs, and artistic expressions can be 
usefully understood as that religion’s primary language”.974 Properly understanding and 
applying this language is crucial in constructing an effective diplomatic strategy. The foremost 
value to recognise in faith-based diplomacy is that people matter.975 For a faith-based diplomat, 
Cox and Philpott suggest that arguably the most important virtue is that of faith as “the belief 
that one’s actions will, through divine assistance, bear munificent fruit”.976 It is this same faith 
that can constitute a social group that answers most of the profound questions of human 
identity.977 Another practical value for diplomats to pursue is that of trust. Johnston remarks 
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that when practitioners engage in faith-based diplomacy, they first set out to establish 
relationships of trust to encourage interlocutors to take steps toward peace which may not be 
available if trust is not present.978  
Recognising another value held in many religious traditions, that being expressions of 
hospitality, can also aid in building relationships and trust between parties. Hospitality is a 
value that is recognisable in the Abrahamic tradition, with religious scripture teaching the 
importance of being hospitable, even to enemy groups.979 Knowing the beliefs, norms, 
identities and values that constitute social structures will allow actors to appeal to, and 
influence, parties to enhance the diplomatic process.980 When dealing with a driver as deeply 
entrenched as religion, historical grievances can influence the potential effectiveness of 
diplomacy. Therefore, seeking forgiveness between parties is crucial in the faith-based 
approach. Forgiveness, “which could be translated as repentance, returning, transformation, or 
restoration” has “the capacity to transform oneself or a community”.981 Forgiveness seeks to 
bridge the gap between the ‘other’, thus repairing that relationship which can encourage 
conflict resolution.982 To achieve forgiveness effectively, peacemakers must develop humility 
in their interactions that recognise the profundity of this value in faith and history.983 Applying 
the frame of analysis provided by public diplomacy, as discussed in the previous chapter, is an 
effective way to see the role of values in diplomatic practice. However, a more substantial 
recognition of the importance and influence of values is  fundamental for scholars and 
practitioners of faith-based diplomacy if they are to be efficacious .  
 
Reconciliation in Faith-based Diplomacy  
 A concept that warrants critical attention is reconciliation, whether that be 
reconciliation as a value within a particular religion, a goal of faith-based diplomacy’s 
approach, or indeed as a reconciliation process within conflict resolution. Reconciliation is an 
area where faith-based diplomacy has made notable progress, so much so in fact that it has 
become a familiar term in public discourse for its ability to engage with the deep constructs of 
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identity.984 Appleby suggests that religion is critically positioned to engage with reconciliation 
as its “unique social location, institutional configuration, cultural power, and remarkable 
persistence … commend that cultivation of elements within them that foster harmonious and 
just relations among peoples” which in turn support reconciliation in conflict prevention or 
even in the post-conflict rebuilding context.985 By way of definition, Cox and Philpott examine 
the Greek and Hebrew derivations of the term reconciliation as these are more accurate 
depictions of reconciliation’s meaning in religious texts. The Hebrew word for reconciliation 
means “to heal, to repair, to transform”.986 In the Greek, reconciliation has a variety of 
meanings, including “to bring forces together that would naturally repel each other”, “to break 
down walls or barriers” and, “to heal or change the nature of a relationship”.987 These varying 
definitions promote several linkages with goals within the conflict resolution process. 
Reconciliation, as a term, is important because it finds its roots in several religious concepts. 
Reconciliation is linked closely to justice and peace in the Old Testament tradition of shalom 
with its literal meaning of “wholeness, fulfilment, completion, unity and wellbeing” in a just 
and reconciled community.988 These definitions are compelling when considering the goals of 
diplomacy and conflict resolution. As such, reconciliation has a central place within faith-based 
diplomacy, even to the point where Troy notes that “academic research and practice show that 
faith-based diplomacy is more about reconciliation than conflict resolution”.989 
The purpose of reconciliation in faith-based diplomacy is to establish it is a broad 
principle “to point to distinctive ideas that religious traditions have to offer about statecraft in 
the hope that in their application, new political possibilities will emerge”.990 Reconciliation in 
a faith-based approach requires broad application because there are complex differences 
between religions, and even within the pluralistic religions, but these challenges do not devalue 
reconciliation as a driver in faith-based diplomacy.991 The historical pain and provocation 
surrounding religious tension have been identified as a constructive approach in conflict 
reconciliation to further the reconciliation process.992 As a result, reconciliation is a potential 
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counter to religious fanaticism.993 Johnston and Cox highlight five forms of reconciliation that 
faith-based diplomats seek. They are:  
1. Unity in diversity through active acceptance of the pluralistic nature of life itself 
regarding race, gender, ethnicity, and culture;  
2. The inclusion of all parties in any final solution, including one’s enemies 
wherever possible;  
3. The peaceful resolution of the conflict between individuals and groups;  
4. Forgiveness as a prerequisite for restoring healthy relationships; and,  
5. Social justice as the appropriate basis for a right ordering of relationships.994 
In light of these forms of reconciliation, if the negotiator is a proxy or representative of an 
offending party, the skills of restorative justice described within mediation can potentially curb 
escalation and generate a deep reconciliation between parties.995 Reconciliation remains the 
distinctive notion that guides actors in shaping transitional justice.996 However, reconciliation 
in transitional justice can be improved when religious freedom becomes a component of 
political consideration by diplomatic actors.997  Reconciliation is a central feature in the 
construction of faith-based diplomacy, and if the strategies employed in the faith-based 
approach incorporate reconciliation effectively, there may be more success in diplomatic 
resolutions achieved.  
 
Religious Freedom and Faith-based Diplomacy 
 Religious freedom is an undervalued concept, particularly in public diplomacy. It may 
provide an avenue for faith-based diplomacy to play a more active role in the international 
system. As a concept, religious freedom is evident in international law, meaning “the right of 
every person and religious organisation to seek out, embrace, practice, express and assemble 
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on behalf of a religious faith”.998 Other scholars see religious freedom as a more personal, 
identity-based concept. Seiple defines religious freedom as “soul freedom”, or “liberty of 
thought, conscience, and belief”.999 What Seiple suggests by this is that for faith to be authentic, 
the individual must freely embrace it. These definitions demonstrate that religious freedom 
influences the institutional, structural, and also the personal, identity-based level. In building a 
theory of religious freedom, Chris Seiple notes that several areas of analysis must be carefully 
understood to define religious freedom accurately. These include:  
The context of global trends, the geo-politics of the region, the national 
narrative, ethnic majority-minority relations, economic and educational 
development policies (especially for ethno- and/or religious minorities), and 
how the culture and majority religion historically and currently understands the 
“other”.1000 
Scholars have examined religious freedom and found that it is “a critical release valve for 
public expression, public assembly, free speech, and property rights” and that societies which 
value religious freedom tend to be “more peaceful and to score higher on numerous indicators 
of social well-being”.1001 Religious freedom has obvious implications in a moral and altruistic 
sense. Danan goes further by asserting that religious freedom can tangibly impact society by 
contributing to conflict mitigation and prevention while critically supporting both national 
stability and international security.1002  
Within the security context, Patterson, in examining the national security of the United 
States, suggests that religious freedom “can be newly envisioned as a comprehensive 
framework through which to name and analyse the ideational impulses and resulting policies 
of leaders and regimes that pose risks to [United States’] national security”.1003 Specifically, 
religious freedom can be a lens that can achieve a more critical evaluation when assessing “(a) 
a country’s political pronouncements, (b) how it treats its own people, (c) how it acts in its 
neighbourhood, and (d) how it acts on the international stage regarding religious liberty”.1004 
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Following this analysis, security analysts can identify more accurately what might be a simple 
miscommunication or political rhetoric derived from an explicit religiopolitical ideology.1005 
This method of analysis can be an effective diplomatic tool when constructing a strategy to 
mitigate conflict. Religious freedom also inherently promotes peace due to its presence in the 
teachings and behaviours of actors that contribute to either peace or violence.1006 Philpott aptly 
recognises the importance of religious freedom in that “the more strongly that religious and 
political leaders or organisations hold a political theology of religious freedom, the more they 
are likely to further peace”.1007 In this way, when religious freedom intersects with traditional 
national security analysis, the most significant parties can be more accurately identified, 
thereby increasing the chances of constructive responses.1008  
Not only is religious freedom valuable regarding security analysis, but it is compatible 
with peacebuilding. While scholarship is generally lacking in this area, some scholars and 
practitioners have found a connection between religious freedom and peacebuilding.1009 
Peacebuilding activities instigated by nongovernmental organisations have the capacity to 
integrate religious freedom into their methods.1010 The Office of International Religious 
Freedom within the US State Department, for example, can see religious freedom become a 
part of the policymaking process.1011 The institutional integration of religious freedom 
highlights its potential value in translating to multiple areas within diplomacy, which  holds 
implications for the promotion of religious freedoms abroad. In the context of the United States, 
for example, promoting religious freedom is a process of multi-stakeholder collaboration, 
where civil society engages in assistance and development initiatives, nongovernmental 
organisations provide a network for activities, and governments, nonstate actors and the 
individual society enter into dialogue.1012 
 Typically, strategies and policies that protect and promote religious freedom take two 
forms. The first is advocacy programs that promote religious freedom which manifests through 
a public process that highlights situations where religious freedom is limited in some way.1013 
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This advocacy approach is used to generate awareness of violations, but can also “name, blame, 
and shame” governments, which may hinder the relationship between parties.1014 The second 
type of strategy is one that integrates religious freedom in a private process, engaging 
government officials and leaders in a country to address specific concerns.1015 This operational 
strategy can transform the political environment that is constricting religious freedoms, 
enhancing the value of faith traditions within the country. However, this strategy runs the risk 
of promoting harmful propaganda if the state chooses to only value one religion over another 
or marginalise a group.1016 While religious freedom may not be a key feature of transitional 
justice, it is not to be underestimated.1017 Religious freedom can play a crucial role in diplomacy 
beyond the traditional understanding of the state. For the United States, this ideally translates 
to religious freedom reinforcing “the virtues and values of diversity, pluralism, respect, and 
tolerance, even on foreign soil”.1018 If this was to be achieved in reality, the United States would 
reap the benefits in global image to maintain and influence relationships with other states.1019 
This type of influence can become a key feature of policy construction in the future and 
positions faith-based diplomacy to play a significant role.  
 
Foreign Policy  
Contemporary scholars are contending with the complex process of incorporating faith 
and faith-based diplomacy into foreign policy. This section will explore the limitations, 
opportunities, and methods available for integrating faith and faith-based diplomacy into the 
construction of foreign policy. The structures of foreign ministries suggest that there is no 
substantial understanding of religion and its role in policy.1020 Even though the United States 
supports giving religious considerations a higher priority in the construction of foreign policy, 
Johnston finds that the State Department’s organisational structure does not reflect that priority 
in any substantive way.1021 Addressing these structures must be a priority as faith-based 
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diplomacy can be a useful tool of foreign policy.1022 Developing a deeper capacity for religious 
engagement on various levels of foreign policy will assist in achieving this goal.1023  
 Policymakers would benefit from the realisation that they could “harness the unifying 
potential of faith, while containing its capacity to divide”.1024 In essence, foreign policy 
institutions must reorient to account for how religion influences societal behaviour.1025 There 
are evident overlaps between religion’s role in society and other international goals. When 
constructing foreign policy, policymakers will need to evaluate their decision to intervene in 
foreign conflict with a deeper consideration of the moral and ethical implications of that 
intervention; religion should be considered more closely as it can form the basis promoting 
ethical standards or as a source of positive conflict intervention.1026 Contemporary conflicts are 
often identity-based, and the clear delineation created by traditional borders is not sufficient in 
clarifying policy decisions that must contend with the nature of violence.1027 Essentially, 
religion cannot just be seen as a peripheral issue, especially when foreign policy is focusing on 
the negative force of religion, for example as a motivator for extremism.1028  
Religious peacemakers are important in contemporary foreign policy because they 
provide “a distinct ability to address the complex role of religion and a practical on-the-ground 
understanding of the nature of conflict among the people”.1029 The bottom-up approach is an 
opportunity that policymakers can utilise as a valuable resource to peacemaking. Within the 
American experience, Patterson argues that in order to take advantage of religious resurgence, 
the United States should entrust its domestic religious actors to deliver foreign policy 
objectives.1030 Marsden proposes that an example of effective American foreign policy about 
religion is the role of military chaplains (elaborated below in ‘The individual and Faith-based 
Diplomacy’) as an actor within the faith-based diplomacy paradigm.1031 Patterson notes that 
during the Cold War, US foreign policy sought to integrate multiple actors to assist in 
countering the idea of communism. In the same way, foreign policy can be targeted to 
academics to inform the policymakers about the nexus of security, religion and human rights; 
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to corporate leaders to discourage their financial support of violators of religious freedom; to 
enhance international coalitions and advocacy networks, and to inform the American national 
security policies.1032  
 The primary limitation of incorporating religion into public policy, as noted in Chapter 
7, is the belief that religion is inherently irrational, fueled by emotion, and thus incompatible 
with modernity. As a result, scholarly work has given insufficient attention to the links between 
religious freedom and societal well-being, as religion remains largely unrecognised as an 
integral policy matter.1033 A challenge for incorporating faith-based diplomacy into foreign 
policy is that it is not sufficient in and of itself to replace traditional diplomacy.1034 Often the 
policies for approaching religion are narrow, typically seeing religions as a problematic force 
which overemphasises terrorism-centric assessments of Islam and ultimately marginalises 
religion when it comes to cultural or humanitarian analysis.1035 Recognising that religion is an 
intractable force, observers have found that the normal instrumentalities of statecraft and 
foreign policy are unresponsive to the challenges posed by religion.1036 A critical goal of 
foreign policy experts is to be able to engage with religious actors within a community, to 
identify religious peacemakers, and to create a strategy that recognises the place of these 
actors.1037 
 Within the scope of public diplomacy, the soft power strategy to promote religious 
freedom is a valuable tool as policymakers can draw attention to restrictions to freedom and 
also encourage social conditions which are conducive to those freedoms.1038 The linkage 
between religious freedom and public diplomacy reflects on a wider implication: foreign 
policies that incorporate religious freedom into public diplomacy strategies are potentially a 
successful method of faith-based diplomacy. Understanding religious freedom in the American 
constructs of foreign policy can increase the chances of their foreign policy responses as 
contextually constructive rather than harmful or counterproductive.1039 Tan asserts that the 
United States in the 21st Century is well positioned to conduct a faith-informed foreign policy 
in that:  
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promoting religious freedom and eradicating religious persecution are crucial to 
the larger effort of promoting a broader suite of fundamental liberties in 
emerging democracies and sustaining those liberties in established 
democracies.1040 
In advancing and protecting these values as a part of foreign policy, the United States can 
remain in a position of influence in the international system.1041 The US must be cautious, 
however, not to use this influence as a way of interfering in domestic affairs as this can be 
viewed as antagonism, particularly by China or states in the Global South. This analysis of the 
linkage between religious freedom, public diplomacy and foreign policy demonstrates the 
potential benefits in this space for faith-based diplomacy and highlights that there is a need for 
the thoughtful construction of strategy in the future.  
 
Religious Leaders  
The role of religious leaders as part of the diplomatic process is expanding in theory 
and diplomatic practice. This role does require further examination; however, at the very least, 
there is increased involvement of religious figures in the process of peacemaking.1042 Religious 
leaders are beneficial to the diplomatic process for two primary reasons. The first is that 
“religious leaders can help to validate a peace process before, during, and after negotiations” 
by using dialogue and public statements to achieve and sustain peace.1043 In fact, “respected 
religious figures provide a level of reassurance that official diplomats are often hard-pressed to 
equal”.1044 The second primary reason is that religious leaders can persuade people of different 
religious perspectives to work together cooperatively which requires informed separation of 
what is debatable in scripture, and what is not.1045 Religious leaders can address the role of 
religion in the local environment and understand the nature of conflict within a given 
community, especially if they are from the community in question.1046  
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When incorporating religious leaders into negotiations, they can provide a mechanism 
for engagement, a method of communication, procedural assistance, and also they can act as 
an intermediary where opposing parties concede assets and make claims to the religious 
authority as opposed to their antagonists at the negotiating table.1047 Religious leaders can open 
a window “to a transcendent dimension at both the personal level (prayer, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation) and in political terms (peace, and political and social accords)”. 1048 As a result 
of this perspective, it can be easier for “individuals on both sides of the negotiation to speak 
with each other, and to see beyond their individual preoccupations to goals shared by the 
other”.1049 Religious leaders can also provide a level of expertise that has a genuine 
appreciation for the power of faith to move people to certain behaviours.1050 Johnston and Cox 
summarise the common attributes of religious leaders that can exert considerable influence on 
the peace process as:  
1. A well-established and pervasive influence in the community  
2. A reputation as an apolitical force for change based on a respected set of values  
3. Unique social leverage for reconciling conflicting parties, including an ability 
to rehumanize relationships  
4. The capability to mobilise community, national, and international support for a 
peace process.1051 
These characteristics are compelling and support Marsden’s claims that “the argument that 
religious actors are best equipped to deal with problems with a religious dimension, even (or 
especially) where this involves those of a different religious persuasion advanced by the faith-
based diplomacy school are in the ascendancy”.1052 As the understanding of the role of religious 
actors continues to rise, the policies and practices put in place to incorporate religious actors 
into the peace process are gaining acceptance. While some religious leaders will be discussed 
later in this chapter as individual actors, an example of a religious leader who has impacted the 
diplomatic process is Desmond Tutu. His commitment to overthrowing the apartheid regime 
was motivated by his theological background as an Archbishop, including his commitment to 
                                                          
1047 Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 17 
1048 Bruce  Nichols, "Religious Conciliation between the Sandinistas and the East Coast Indians of Nicaragua," 
ibid. 72 
1049 Ibid. 72 
1050 Johnston, Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement. 148 
1051 Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 14 
1052 Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 479 
167 
 
the principles of loving your enemy, truth and reconciliation.1053 Religious leaders are a 
valuable asset that faith-based diplomacy can incorporate to increase its effectiveness.  
 
Faith-based Diplomacy’s Third-party Mediation Capacity  
 Research suggests that there is an increasingly important role for faith-based diplomats 
as a third-party mediator in negotiations. Johnston found that, whether in an official capacity 
or a more nonofficial Track Two approach, third-party mediators are making their mark in the 
area of negotiation, conflict intervention, and conflict resolution.1054 They achieve success 
because faith-based mediators provide a negotiating mechanism, a method of communication 
and also procedural assistance.1055 However, the religious element of these mediators also 
creates a level or authority which can bridge the divide created by an antagonist-protagonist 
dichotomy.1056 In the traditional conception of a third-party mediator, the mediator is an 
“outsider-neutral” third party, which is the standard practice in diplomatic negotiations. 
However, when a faith-based individual or organisation is acting as a third-party, they are an 
“insider-partial” actor, which is valuable to the diplomatic process as they are influential “not 
in distance from the conflict… but rather in connectedness and trusted relationships with 
conflict parties”.1057 This trust is the consequence of a result of longstanding relationships 
which traverse traditional political boundaries and can assist diplomatic progress.1058 Through 
the lens of faith-based diplomacy, all humanity has a  divine connection and that bond forms 
relationships between parties.1059 As an example, the church as a representative body can play 
a role in peacemaking as it has: accumulated historical involvement in peacemaking within the 
community; demonstrated unusual persistence in the face of adversity; and, shown a special 
ability to influence the attitudes and actions of political leaders.1060 If integrated correctly, the 
church, or its representatives, is capable of playing an influential role in the resolution process. 
Religious agents are available at every level of peacemaking, be it international, domestic, 
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regional, ad hoc, or even individually.1061 The concept of third-party mediation firmly sits 
within the field of conflict resolution and negotiation, but the space for accommodating 
religious actors to play a more engaging role is developing. Within the constructs of faith-based 
diplomacy, the third-party mediating capacity is an advantageous opportunity.  
 
Faith-based Diplomacy and the Tracks of Diplomacy 
 The different tracks of diplomacy distinguish the methods and actors engaged in a 
diplomatic process.1062 The concept was developed by Joseph Montville, who made the 
distinction between Track One (being official, governmental action) and Track Two (being 
unofficial, nongovernmental action) as an approach to conflict resolution.1063  In Track One 
diplomacy “communication goes from one official party directly to the decisionmaking 
apparatus of another”.1064  Track Two looks toward an “unofficial, informal interaction 
between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, 
influencing public opinions and organizing resources in ways that might help resolve the 
conflict”.1065 As the concept took hold in scholarship, other academics began to expand the two 
tracks. McDonald, for instance, identified nine tracks of diplomacy and named this concept 
multi-track diplomacy.1066 This area of study has generated a framework which presents a 
“structure of mediator characteristics, resources and strategies”.1067 The quantitative literature 
on international mediation is comparatively extensive. When analysing the tracks of 
diplomacy, by comparison, very few generalised insights have been developed.1068 A task for 
the scholars of faith-based diplomacy is to identify which track is the most appropriate for 
faith-based strategies. As stated above, in the definitions of faith-based diplomacy, Track Two 
as the unofficial approach recommends itself.1069  
Johnston believes this is the case because Track Two agents can engage and intervene 
in situations where official government agents cannot.1070 Track Two approaches rely on a 
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progressive approach to diplomacy based on altered perspectives about international affairs 
and human behaviour.1071 Faith-based diplomacy is not typically well-suited for government 
practitioners as state institutions abide by the church-state divide.1072  As value-based conflicts 
about identity, survival and fears continue to intensify around the world, Track Two diplomacy 
is argued as the only effective approach because it “seeks to change the underlying 
relationships so as to promote a mutual understanding” between the parties involved.1073  In 
view of faith-based diplomacy pursuing reconciliation which impacts the personal level, then 
society, it does not fit naturally within the Track One approach.1074 The task of religious 
engagement in the diplomatic process then falls on individuals, nongovernmental organisations 
or civil society, but once that has taken place, governments can reinforce the processes or build 
upon them.1075  
A danger does lie, however, in suggesting that faith-based diplomacy only be applied 
to Track Two approaches, even if Track Two diplomacy deals specifically with religious 
issues.1076 Instead, faith-based diplomacy must integrate faith into the frameworks of 
diplomatic and political institutions. Thus, a broader approach is needed.1077 When writing on 
the theory of faith-based diplomacy, Johnston recognised that it fits well within the Track Two 
lens, but noted that there was the potential in the future for Track Two mediators to work 
constructively with Track One representatives.1078 He argues that the use of Track Two in 
seriatim with Track One diplomacy is the most effective in resolving conflict.1079 This is 
because the faith-based diplomat can provide a level of reassurance that official diplomats often 
cannot, helping to build relationships in the early stages of negotiations. But “by the same 
token, the parties to a settlement will inevitably look to the economic and military capabilities 
of the international community to provide the necessary political and security guarantees”.1080  
In the study of the tracks of diplomacy, the concept of Track One and a Half (or Track 
1.5) diplomacy supports this trend. It is “public or private interaction between official 
representatives of disputants that is mediated by a third party not representing a political 
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institution”.1081 This approach is advantageous because, unlike Track Two diplomacy, it can 
involve parties from every level of official and unofficial diplomacy.1082 In a simple form, this 
track of diplomacy attempts to combine the strengths of Track One and Two approaches. When 
considering the role of faith-based diplomacy, decision makers must carefully consider which 
approach is most appropriate. Faith-based diplomacy fits most naturally in the Track Two style 
of diplomacy, but as Johnston suggests, it may benefit from being reinforced by Track One 
agents. With the emergence of Track One and a Half frameworks, faith-based diplomacy may 
be able to integrate styles and methods from both tracks, but this requires testing. Track One 
“as the more powerful and enforcing mediator, is more likely to come to stable and effective 
outcomes”.1083 Importantly, however, “if this track is facilitated by unofficial mediators its 
effectiveness is even higher, owing to pooled resources, decreased uncertainty and the ensured 
support at the grassroots level”.1084 This type of approach may be beneficial to faith-based 
diplomacy and should be considered by scholars and practitioners alike for future faith-based 
strategies.  
 
The Actors of Faith-based Diplomacy  
 Throughout this thesis, consideration has been given not only to the theory of 
diplomacy but also to the actors that perform the diplomatic functions. This section will assess 
the way that different diplomatic actors can engage in faith-based diplomacy, beginning with 
the state and traditional diplomats, and subsequently continuing to nonstate actors. The section 
will then discuss intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, faith-based 
civil society organisations, namely the church, and also the role of the individual. In doing so, 
not only will the theory and characteristics of faith-based diplomacy have been presented in 
this chapter, but potential practitioners and actors as well.  
 
The State and Diplomats  
 As discussed previously in this thesis, the traditional constructs of diplomacy generally 
fall within the locus of the state. With the definition of states coming from Westphalian peace, 
religion has remained subordinate to the state and hence, Philpott suggests, observers have 
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“assumed the absence of religion among the factors that influence states”.1085 This absence was 
a result of the state restricting religion to the interior life of the individual within the state, 
where education and modernity were used to pacify the potential for religion to lead to conflict 
and control.1086 The process of confining religion in the domestic sphere was an incremental 
process post-Westphalia and varied depending on how each state took form.1087 The principle 
of cujus regio, ejus religio, or ‘whose region, his religion’ eventuated, meaning that variations 
in religious order became apparent between states.1088 The legal perspective accepts that the 
role of the state is a “neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths 
and beliefs”. 1089  Here, the state’s “duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any 
power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way those beliefs 
are expressed”.1090  
Frameworks that the state applies to concepts of religion are generally narrow in that 
they focus on the problematic element of religion, over-emphasise its extremist potentialities, 
and marginalise religion as a cultural issue.1091 While the value of culture in scholarship is 
increasing, the traditional focus on the state and institutions continues to limit culture’s 
penetration in policy.1092 Government departments have organised political structures in such 
a way as to diminish any priority given to religious considerations.1093 In the United States, for 
example, “the rigorous constitutional separation of church and state so relegates religion to the 
realm of the personal that most Americans are uncomfortable discussing their religious 
convictions in any sort of professional context”.1094 The nation-state model has entrenched this 
position and made religion of virtually no significance to government policymakers.1095 In 
contrast, Birdsall suggests that the US Department of State “as a whole is more institutionally 
attentive to religion than at any time in living memory” because actors within the Department 
and academics writing on the issue have brought religion firmly into the scope of analysis.1096 
Increasingly within the state, the construct of the nation and national identity is defined by 
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religion and ethnos.1097 The state-centric focus on power-politics has made it difficult to 
accommodate religion as a feature of decision-making.1098 Government practitioners, however, 
are constrained in their ability to conduct faith-based diplomacy.1099 Johnston cautions that “it 
is important not to overstate religion’s utility to government” as “in some situations, religion 
will be an unstable partner for statecraft as church and state go their separate ways over issues 
relating to justice or injustice”.1100 
 These concerns do not mean, however, that faith-based diplomacy has never interacted 
with the state. Lambert’s study found that Thomas Jefferson modelled his diplomatic approach 
on morality and religious freedom, which reflected in the peace treaties he proposed.1101 China, 
too, has had a long history of incorporating faith into their diplomatic engagement since the 
introduction of Buddhism into the country over 2000 years ago.1102 This includes sending 
religious envoys, such as Monk Zuanzang to India and Monk Jianzhen to Japan during the 
Tang dynasty.1103 In the contemporary international system, China has identified that various 
faiths play an important part in boosting its soft power initiatives for diplomatic purposes.1104 
The Chinese government has promoted certain goals in China’s faith diplomacy which include: 
“promoting international understanding and acceptance of China’s religious policy, advocating 
China’s actions regarding religions” and improving China’s image abroad.1105 These goals 
supported China’s “harmonious world” and “harmonious society” slogans, which underpinned 
China’s policy decisions under the Hu Jintao era, but the subsequent presidency of Xi Jinping 
has further emphasised loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) above all else, including 
religion. This has been especially evident in the restive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang where 
religious practices are circumscribed and those who refuse to be assimilated (or “harmonised”) 
are subjected to state security measures. These include detention in political “re-education 
camps” in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region where an estimated one million Muslims are 
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interned.1106  Even prior to Xi Jinping’s tighter policies, the Chinese Communist Party forbade 
divided loyalties by enforcing state power over religious leaders. This meant that the CCP had 
greater authority than the Dalai Lama for Tibetans and the Pope for Catholics. While the Dalai 
Lama is still deemed problematic for China, the same is no longer true for Catholics. In 2018, 
the Vatican recognised the CCP’s authority to appoint bishops. This compromise from the 
Vatican would count as a reassuring outcome for China as the heightened importance of faith 
in China’s domestic considerations finds that “religious adherents in China currently 
outnumber communist party members by more than four to one”.1107 However, the exact 
number of religious adherents cannot be known. There is no conversion ritual to become a 
Buddhist, for instance. In the case of Christianity: “Pew Research estimated that by 2030, 
China’s Christian population of 70 million would grow to between 250 million and 300 million. 
If the forecasts prove accurate, China will soon overtake the US as the most populous Christian 
country.”1108 This would mean that China would be in a strong position to engage in faith 
diplomacy, be it as a Buddhist, Christian or Muslim representative country – despite “re-
education” and “stabilisation” campaigns at home.  
Another example of contemporary faith-based diplomacy through the state is the 
activities of Indonesia following the Arab Spring. The Indonesian Institute for Peace and 
Democracy worked with academics, civil society leaders and government officials to look at 
the state’s structures vis-à-vis religion to revise their effectiveness in incorporating religion 
constructively into policy.1109 These examples do demonstrate that there are some attempts at 
addressing religion through state mechanisms, but more needs to be done. In Russia, for 
example, religion has returned to the everyday lives of people after the fall of Soviet 
Communism and its official atheism. As reported in 2017, Russia has the highest rate of belief 
among Europeans with more than 80 per cent of the Russian population identifying as 
religious.1110 Although there are definitive limitations to what states can do to engage with 
religion in diplomacy, attention to where faith-based diplomacy is possible constitutes a valid 
pursuit.  
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 The primary diplomatic agent of the state is the diplomat. The diplomat has faced 
unique challenges in engaging with religion as a part of their functions, as discussed in Chapter 
2.  Albright notes that practitioners of foreign policy “have sought to separate religion from 
world politics, to liberate logic from beliefs that transcend logic”; however, “religious 
motivations do not disappear simply because they are not mentioned” – indeed, they may burst 
forth in time of trouble after lying dormant.1111 Throughout history, states have initiated 
policies that entrenched secularisation, and now it is becoming apparent that diplomats should 
separate themselves from those policies as these strategies have often been counterproductive 
and have driven people to intolerance and conflict.1112 Diplomats are under pressure to 
reconceptualise their understanding of how religion operates in the world, and then apply the 
necessary skills, competency and framing to see how they can best engage with such a 
world.1113 As diplomats come to understand religion’s relevance, attempts are being made to 
adjust state structures. John Kerry noted in 2013 that “religious engagement would be a 
signature priority of his time as Secretary of State”.1114 Kerry’s pronouncement was promising, 
but the changing international agenda, state leadership, and diplomatic priority have seen these 
advancements slowed. Regardless, while it may be difficult to integrate faith-based strategies 
at the state level effectively, there is still scope for it to occur.   
 
Nonstate Actors  
 The research on faith-based diplomacy has suggested that nonstate actors are the most 
effective for successful diplomatic engagement with religion. Nonstate interactions at the 
subnational and individual levels are a challenge that faith-based diplomats are seeking to 
address.1115 New mechanisms of engagement are required to move beyond the traditional state-
centric focus on power to identify the positive contributions nonstate actors can make.1116 The 
nation-state has long ignored the role that nonstate actors can play in conducting diplomacy.1117 
Nonstate actors, particularly terrorist organisations, can be responsible for inflicting violence 
through networks of radical ideology, but research suggests that popular support for this 
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approach is waning.1118 Munthe notes that nongovernmental organisations, multinational 
corporations, churches, religious movements, transnational terrorists, revolutionaries, and 
private individuals are all actors that can play a part in delivering diplomatic services.1119 This 
section will focus, however, on the nonstate actors that can influence the diplomatic process 
positively. While intergovernmental organisations are impacting the diplomatic landscape, 
their capacity to engage in religious matters is beholden to the structures of the institution and 
the priorities of the member states. Research on their potential role is limited, but there is 
evidence of religion playing a role in the notion of pluralism and normative values.1120 Thus, 
the focus of analysis in this section will be on nongovernmental organisations, civil society 
organisations and the individual.  
States are increasingly outsourcing their responsibility to engage in religious issues to 
religious organisations that have demonstrated the ability of delivering required services.1121 
Religious organisations can more effectively achieve humanitarian assistance and community 
reconstruction as they have relationships with the community that allow them to do so.1122 
Religious channels of dialogue between communities and government representatives require 
dependable interlocutors who come from the cast of nonstate actors.1123 This development has 
promoted the idea of a multi-stakeholder collaboration taking place where several actors 
engage in the diplomatic process.1124 The composition of the actors involved is of vital 
importance to scholars and practitioners of faith-based diplomacy.  
 
Nongovernmental Organisations and Faith-based Diplomacy  
 Scholars note that nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are a complementary 
avenue for the practice of faith-based diplomacy. As the state is not often best suited to deal 
with religious issues, the NGO has emerged to fill the gaps left by the state.1125 It is necessary 
to consider, however, if the NGO itself is equipped to take on the task left behind by the 
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state.1126 The central benefit for using NGOs is that unlike government officials they are not 
bound by political constraints, and therefore may be more effective when engaging in conflict 
resolution efforts.1127 With the space in the international system for NGOs to engage with 
global issues, faith-based NGOs can best address religious concerns in the international sphere.  
 When observing the role of faith-based nongovernmental organisations several 
distinctive benefits become apparent. Johnston states that “to the extent that faith-based NGOs 
constructively exploit their religious identities, relationships of trust, and far-reaching 
networks, they offer a vital (and too-often-overlooked) tool for conflict avoidance and 
mitigation”.1128  In the face of intolerance and limitations to religious freedoms, sustained, 
substantive training and education initiated by diplomatic programs in collaboration with 
NGOs, can ensure long-term impact.1129 As nongovernmental organisations integrate religious 
freedoms into their practices and methodologies, they can become a powerful advocate and 
contribute to the broader goals of peacebuilding.1130 Lynch examined the role of Christian 
NGOs and found that they have been increasing in influence transnationally and locally in the 
way that they engage in governance.1131 She found that these Christian organisations exist as a 
network within a vast constellation of faith-based organisations that provide emergency relief 
and also support longer-term aid in education, health and other issues.1132 Faith-based NGOs 
can contribute in communal conflict resolution by going beyond the customary methods of 
diplomacy to “deal with the deeper sources of conflict, rebuild relationships, and make the 
necessary concessionary adjustments wherever possible”.1133 As nongovernmental 
organisations work closely with the grassroots level of society, these goals are more attainable 
by organisations that can penetrate the government structures and impact society and its 
identity.  
  Although nongovernmental organisations have been effective in achieving their goals 
concerning faith-based diplomacy, faith-based diplomacy is limited if religious NGOs are the 
only actors recognised.1134 When NGOs work in conjunction with other actors’ strategies, such 
as public diplomacy strategies of enhancing discourse, the outcomes can be more 
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promising.1135 State and secular NGOs can work alongside faith-based organisations to engage 
in humanitarian diplomacy, for example.1136 This can be seen in the case of faith-based 
organisations and their support of internally displaced persons. In both Kenya and Nigeria, 
cases have emerged of faith-based organisations providing assistance to various communities 
fleeing from conflict, demonstrating their viability as an actor in the diplomatic process.1137 
Thus, while NGOs can address certain religious issues in the international system, they may be 
more effective in impacting more substantial issues of conflict and diplomacy when working 
in conjunction with other international actors.  
 
Faith-based Civil Society Organisations, the Church and Faith-based Diplomacy  
 This section will assess the role of civil society organisations in engaging in faith-based 
diplomacy. The role of faith-based organisations will be considered, along with the distinctive 
position the place of worship – be it a Christian church, mosque, temple, synagogue or 
gathering place of religious believers – has in addressing religious concerns. Civil society is a 
“vital source of democratic participation, and a limit to the power of the state” as leaders of 
NGOs, academics, religious bodies and various other professions engage in political 
processes.1138 The principle of subsidiarity underpins the historical engagement of the state and 
civil society which “recognises the rights and responsibilities of civil society in relationship to 
the state”.1139 This relationship has been entrenched through history as organisations and the 
religious establishment have worked with the state to strengthen civil society.1140 As a result, 
civil society has worked closely with religious bodies to achieve nonviolent political change 
throughout history.1141 Complex issues like the compatibility of Islam and democracy in the 
state are only achievable in a civil state. Thus civil society has taken a more influential role in 
dialogue to achieve this aim.1142 
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The concept of civil society is popular among scholars, and some suggest that “global civil 
society is an antidote to war” and that “civil society groups help in the introduction of 
deliberative democracy as a way to deal with violent politics”.1143 In a study conducted on the 
involvement of civil society organisations in the peace process, Bell and O’Rourke found that 
out of 389 peace agreements between 1990 and 2007, 139 referenced the involvement of civil 
society including allocating resources and humanitarian aid, monitoring parties’ obligations 
under peace accords, providing participative forums, and building constitutions.1144 Brewer, 
Higgins and Teeney suggest four key strategic social spaces where civil society can engage in 
advocating for positive peace. These are: 
1. Intellectual spaces, in which alternative ideas are envisaged, and peace envisioned, and 
in which the private troubles of people are reflected upon intellectually as emerging 
policy questions that are relevant to them as civil society groups. 
2. Institutional spaces, in which these alternatives are enacted and practised by civil 
society groups themselves, on local and global stages, making the groups role models 
and drivers of the process of transformation.  
3. Market spaces, in which cultural, social and material resources are devoted by the civil 
society groups, drawn from local and global civic networks, to mobilise and articulate 
these alternatives, rendering them as policy issues in the public sphere, nationally or 
internationally.  
4. Political spaces, in which civil society groups engage with the political process as back 
channels of communication and assisting in the negotiation of the peace settlement, 
either directly by taking a seat at the negotiation table or indirectly by articulating the 
policy dilemmas that the peace negotiators have to try to settle or balance.1145 
Within this context, religious institutions are civil society groups that offer the opportunity for 
engagement globally and locally.1146 
Faith-based organisations that represent every major religion are in operation around 
the globe.1147 As such, “civil society is a strategic site for faith-based diplomacy”.1148 Faith-
based organisations cover a breadth of issues, and as Albright suggests, have the compatibility 
                                                          
1143 Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1023 
1144 Ibid. 1023 
1145 Ibid. 1024-5 
1146 Ibid. 1023 
1147 Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 8 
1148 Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 36-7 
179 
 
to work cooperatively with other agents to pool resources and specialise in delivering services 
and goods.1149 She continues:  
Some are most skilled at mediation others are best at helping former combatants 
readjust to civilian life. Still others emphasize prevention, addressing a problem 
before it can explode into violence. Many are experts in economic development 
or building democracy, both insurance policies against war. Together, these 
activists have more resources, more skilled personnel, a longer attention span, 
more experience, more dedication, and more success in fostering reconciliation 
than any government.1150  
In support for Albright’s claims, Brewer, Higgins and Teeney note that religious groups in civil 
society can work differently from each other, sometimes even in opposition. As such, the 
integration of different arms of civil society into a diplomatic approach requires strategic 
consideration.1151 The composition of civil society organisations demonstrates their potential 
versatility when engaging in conflict resolution, but they are also capable of not just influencing 
the grassroots of society, but also influencing and urging leaders above to pursue reconciliation 
and other goals of faith-based diplomacy.1152 A way to conceptualise the role of religion in the 
peace process is to identify its arena of influence within civil society “as special locations for 
religious peacemaking”.1153 This approach is beneficial as it can give religion a weight in civil 
society that extends beyond a religion’s number of adherents and highlights the mechanisms 
by which positive peace and communal transformation can take place.1154  When harnessed 
appropriately, civil society, propelled by faith, can be a powerful tool in the sphere of faith-
based diplomacy. 
An example of this is the role of faith-based organisations in humanitarian diplomacy, 
in delivering assistance in impoverished regions, where faith-based organisations have had 
greater prominence than secular development groups, which Munthe examined and found that 
the state had been ignoring.1155 Motivated by religious values, faith-based civil society groups 
seek to aid the needy and vulnerable, so the existing humanitarian values embedded in religion, 
                                                          
1149 Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 8 
1150 Ibid. 8 
1151 Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1024 
1152 Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 36-7 
1153 Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1024 
1154 Ibid. 1024 
1155 Munthe, "Religious Movements in Humanitarian Issue: The Emergence of Faith-Based Organizations 
(FBO) in Diplomacy Sphere." 172 
180 
 
and specific religious language, help to garner the support of sponsors and stakeholders to assist 
in humanitarian diplomacy.1156 Indeed, a notable strength of faith-based organisations is their 
capacity to translate “the religious value into humanitarian action” in the field.1157  
 With the changes to the theory and practice of diplomacy in the international sphere, 
individuals in civil society who are well-versed in the religious complexities of conflict, namely 
grassroots religious leaders, can become key Track Two actors and partners in diplomacy.1158 
As part of this process, religious values that are central to the identity of a community can be 
supported by civil society to influence key political figures.1159 The influence of faith-based 
civil society organisations is felt deeply in developing countries where they constitute a 
substantial part of civil society.1160 One challenge faced by religious civil society organisations 
is the fact that effectiveness can be dependent on garnering trust, legitimacy and relationships 
– sometimes in a secular environment.1161 However, this does not mean that religious groups 
need to deny their faith to be effective, but rather “they enter strategic social spaces in civil 
society as faith communities in partnership with secular groups, giving a specifically religious 
dimension to peacemaking but as a part of a general coalition of peacemakers”.1162 Indeed, the 
most effective engagement may be the multi-stakeholder collaboration that sees civil society 
engage with advocacy, overseas assistance and development initiatives to enhance the network 
of nongovernmental organisations and buttress the work of governmental agencies on the 
ground.1163 This network is achievable as civil society organisations, even faith-based 
organisations more specifically, are capable of developing relations and garnering support from 
diverse parties, be they governmental or nongovernmental.1164 These benefits are accessible 
when mobilising actors to engage in faith-based diplomacy.  
 Arguably the most valuable actor in civil society for the advancement of faith-based 
diplomacy is the community of faith. There are examples of churches influencing the conflict 
situation within a state, such as the Catholic Church’s involvement in the 1986 revolution in 
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the Philippines.1165 As Johnston found, “sometimes this opportunity relates to the temporal 
power of the church within the community. Sometimes it is simply that the church is the only 
institution having moral legitimate in the eyes of the populace. At times, it is both”.1166 The 
church is most effective as an advocate for social change when it utilises: institutional stability 
and moral authority; a capability for empowering individuals to act, and; a commitment to 
nonviolence.1167 In a study on the church’s ability to promote peace, Johnston identified five 
qualitative assets that the church could contribute. They are:  
1. An established record for humanitarian care and concern  
2. A respected set of values, including a reputation for trustworthiness  
3. Unique leverage for promoting reconciliation between conflicting parties  
4. A capability for mobilising community, national, and international support for a peace 
process  
5. An ability to follow through locally in the wake of a settlement.1168 
More conceptually from a Christian viewpoint, Lynch highlights that the church can promote 
universalism, truth and equality based on the fact that within the church there is a sense of 
common humanity where all people are equal in the eyes of God.1169 For peacemaking, this is 
a useful tool as “problems which otherwise seem unsolvable become susceptible of the solution 
if approached from the standpoint of the universal brotherhood of [humanity]”.1170 The leaders 
within the church, clergy and laity, are capable of helping re-establish communities after 
conflict, and the church itself “can play a vital role in the creation of democratic social 
structures, being vigilant in defence of social justice, and ready to challenge political and 
military leaders where necessary”.1171  
Historical cases demonstrate that the church can play an effective role in conflict resolution. 
In the case of the church's role in resolving conflict in the Philippines during the 1986 
revolution, Wooster found that the church was a social and political force, and knew how to 
operate as one successfully.1172 He noted that the strength of the church’s actions came from 
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the principles of the church as a Christian witness and a truth-teller.1173 In this “the church acted 
as the nation’s moral conscience: speaking out against the regime, denouncing repression, 
defending human rights, and pushing for transition to democracy.”1174 Throughout history, the 
Catholic church and the Papacy have held various degrees of political influence. The 
relationship can sometimes be complex, as a reflection of the history of conflict. However, 
there is a responsibility on the church to work with the state to develop civil society.1175 
The place of religion in social conflict is, as Johnston stated, “a double-edged sword” in 
that “it can cause conflict, or it can abate it”.1176 For the church, it often reflects the society 
within which it operates and, consequently, “if a church moves too strongly against forces for 
social change, it faces the possibility of losing some of its followers”, but at the same time it is 
expected to be an advocate for peace.1177 As a result, the church is often in a tenuous position 
of balancing these contradictory tendencies. The history of the church in many societies around 
the world can be difficult to navigate. However, the church does have a particular place within 
civil society to influence change in diplomacy and conflict resolution. The church, and civil 
society more broadly, should be seen as a positive asset in faith-based diplomacy’s toolkit.  
 
The Individual and Faith-based Diplomacy  
 The final actor that requires discussion in respect to engaging in faith-based diplomacy 
is the individual. Earlier in this chapter, the potential scope for religious leaders was examined. 
This section will build on that idea to demonstrate that the individual can contribute positively 
to faith-based diplomacy. As the nature of conflict has changed, the involvement of religious 
figures in peacemaking has increased.1178  By highlighting the identity-based dimension of 
conflict, religious figures can encourage “individuals on both sides of the negotiation to speak 
with each other, and to see beyond their individual preoccupations to goals shared by the 
other”.1179 In some cases, the individual can demonstrate the spiritual conviction that leads to 
reconciliation and can inspire parties to break the cycle of revenge and conflict.1180 It is 
important to contextualise how a community defines individual piety, so the peacemaker must 
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be able to recognise how rituals and symbols are used for a community to demonstrate their 
religious commitment.1181 If an individual is representing a party from a specific religious 
background, the diplomat should not disproportionately represent their religious perspective, 
or represent another religion negatively as a result.1182 When assessing at the role of an 
individual in political leadership that engages with religion, several scholars look to the 
negotiations between US President Carter, Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli President 
Begin in 1978 to resolve Arab-Israeli tensions as an effective demonstration of faith-based 
diplomacy. Berggren’s analysis of Carter’s role in this negotiation points to several areas where 
Carter was able to utilise faith to enhance his diplomatic effectiveness. Carter was able to 
understand the religious value of each party, to leverage the power of faith as a bond between 
leaders, to highlight the commonality between each leader under God, to use scripture and 
values to see potentialities of peace, and to see the cooperation that was possible between each 
party as they saw God’s purposes under the Abrahamic root of their traditions.1183 Beyond 
heads of state engaging in conflict resolution while being motivated by religious 
predispositions, there are other sites in which individuals have played a valuable role in 
supporting the aims of diplomacy. 
 An example of a religious individual being a significant part in peacebuilding is the role 
of chaplains.1184 Johnston and Cox state that chaplains, particularly military chaplains, can be 
a positive force for peacemaking and conflict prevention,  
through their personal interactions with local religious communities and 
selected [nongovernmental organisations] with which they come in contact, 
they would be able to develop a grass-roots understanding of the religious and 
cultural nuances at play in any given setting and, at times, possibly provide a 
reconciling influence in addressing misunderstandings or differences with these 
communities. Perhaps more importantly, they could advise their commanders 
on the religious and cultural implications of command decisions that are either 
being taken or that should be taken.1185  
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Here the individual military chaplain plays a critical role in several areas of conflict resolution 
and can be a useful tool in the broader strategy of faith-based diplomacy. Even in secular 
countries, military chaplains are an integral part of conflict resolution strategies that encourage 
a pluralistic approach.1186 A challenge to incorporating military chaplains, however, is that 
there can be a competing agenda between the chaplains where intolerance is a part of their 
religious worldview.1187 Evangelical chaplains, for example, need to provide pastoral needs to 
service personnel and their families, maintaining the fundamental principle of freedom of 
religion, without evangelising and converting people of other religious traditions to their 
perspective.1188 More effort is required to construct military and constitutional boundaries 
which still allow chaplains to assist in conflict resolution to mitigate this issue.1189 However, 
the principle remains that the military chaplain is an example of faith-based diplomacy 
perspectives in action, where an individual actor effectively addresses foreign policy objectives 
about religion.1190 
 The final area of analysis regarding the individual is the role of the Pope in conflict 
resolution. The Pope’s role is an area of study that has garnered much attention in scholarship 
and referred to by some as ‘Papal diplomacy’. Historical cases of Papal diplomacy are available 
in the literature, and thus this section will only highlight the contributions of recent Popes in 
engaging in diplomacy. This case does demonstrate, however, that there is a valuable place for 
individuals in this position to represent religious values, and also engage in the process of faith-
based diplomacy. As an individual religious actor, the Pope has received positive media 
attention, as “the Head of the Catholic Church seems to have returned as a player to be reckoned 
with in international politics”.1191  Two key factors have solidified the Pope’s position as a vital 
nonstate actor. The first is “a structural change in the rise of the inclusion of non-state actors 
as well as practices of paradiplomacy” and second, “a normative change in the overlap of the 
values of a solidarist international society and the core beliefs of the Catholic Church”.1192  
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There are several examples of the individual Popes engaging in diplomacy. Pope Leo 
XIII, in 1891, and Pope Pius XI both made concerted efforts to build a relationship between 
civil society, the state and the Catholic Church.1193 John Paul II assisted in limiting the advances 
of the Soviet empire and consequently helped in alleviating Cold War tensions.1194 In the case 
of Pope Benedict XVI, he pushed for the international community to address concerns of 
human dignity and of solidarity to safeguard the common interests of humanity.1195 He used 
diplomacy to advocate for and incorporate interfaith dialogue into global affairs, particularly 
in the case of Iraq.1196 Pope Francis, who began his papacy in 2013, has garnered popular 
support and a wave of enthusiasm for his contributions to issues on the international agenda, 
such as climate change.1197 While these examples have only examined the recent heads of the 
Catholic Church, they do demonstrate that the Pope has found a position of political influence 
that has allowed him to become an influential player in faith-based diplomacy. These 
diplomatic efforts are effective because the Pope can play a role in establishing a society of 
states “through diplomatic missions and the engagement in the United Nations and other 
international organizations, while at the same time addressing world society through means of 
public diplomacy and soft power”.1198   
There is some complexity, however, with the Pope as a diplomatic actor. The main 
issue is that the Vatican is a sovereign state with a position in the United Nations.1199 This may 
blur the lines between the Pope as a state actor. However, a simple delineation is that the Pope 
represents the Catholic Church, whereas the Vatican is represented by a separate Head of State. 
Furthermore, The Holy See establishes its diplomatic integration through discourse channels, 
non-governmental organisations, through observer positions in United Nations bodies, and 
through individual activities led by the Pope.1200  This deepening diplomatic engagement has 
entrenched the Pope as a valuable nonstate actor who suggests that individuals can be a key 
player in faith-based diplomacy efforts in the future.  
                                                          
1193 Chu, "Vatican Diplomacy in China and Vietnam." 59 
1194 Diez, "Diplomacy, Papacy, and the Transformation of International Society." 31 
1195 O'Connor, "A Diplomacy of Candor: Pope Benedict XVI on the Global Stage." 189 
1196 Ibid. 42 
1197 Diez, "Diplomacy, Papacy, and the Transformation of International Society." 31 
1198 Ibid. 37 
1199 For more on the role of the Pope within the United Nations see Robert John Araujo and John A. Lucal, 
Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace. The United Nations from Pius XII to Paul VI, Papal Diplomacy and 
the Quest for Peace (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Saint Joseph's University Press, 2010). 
1200 Kristiono Michael Joseph, "Understanding the Body of Christ: A Literature Review on Roman Catholic 




 The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that, outside of the theoretical constructions 
within Diplomacy Studies, several central characteristics could apply to the understanding of 
faith-based diplomacy. These have included concepts such as values, reconciliation, religious 
freedom, foreign policy approaches, the role of religious leaders, the space for third-party 
mediation, and the access to multiple tracks of diplomacy. The variety of actors on the 
international stage has also been considered to optimise future strategies of faith-based 
diplomacy. The research suggests that a multitrack, multi-stakeholder approach to faith-based 
diplomacy has much to recommend it in addressing the challenges of the 21st Century. A 
promising finding of this chapter is that theorists and practitioners of faith-based diplomacy 
have a myriad of opportunities available to them for the construction of faith-based diplomacy 



















Evaluating Faith-based Diplomacy: Strengths, Limitations, and 
Opportunities 
 
 The purpose of this thesis has been to examine faith-based diplomacy as a theory within 
Diplomacy Studies and present a theoretical framework for faith-based diplomacy’s 
application. Traditional diplomacy and traditional diplomatic actors were discussed to 
demonstrate the foundation of diplomatic theory in Chapter 2. Then in Chapters 3 and 4, an 
assessment of the schools of new and innovative diplomacy was conducted to see how nonstate 
actors engage in diplomacy. These chapters formed the foundation of this analysis scoped 
firmly in Diplomacy Studies. Expanding on the theoretical concepts forming the basis of 
Diplomacy Studies provided the contextual considerations that frame faith-based diplomacy in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 introduced the definitions and parameters of the theory of faith-based 
diplomacy. The literature that underpins faith-based diplomacy was critically evaluated to 
understand the prevailing scholarly frameworks and even those that could be effective for 
future application to faith-based diplomacy in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 highlighted the core 
concepts and characteristics that have emerged from the evaluation of faith-based diplomacy, 
and then provided a brief analysis of the actors in the international system, and how they may 
engage in faith-based diplomacy. To comprehensively examine faith-based diplomacy, this 
chapter must consider the strengths and limitations of faith-based diplomacy in light of the 
examination in previous chapters. After this analysis, opportunities and recommendations for 
the future study and application of faith-based diplomacy will come to light. These 
considerations have consolidated the development of faith-based diplomacy since its original 
introduction into scholarship in 1994 and, as such, the reconceptualization of faith-based 
diplomacy in the contemporary international system can be presented. To do this, a tenth 
chapter will be offered to discuss the scholarly contribution within Diplomacy Studies made 
throughout this thesis. 
 
Strengths for Faith-based Diplomacy  
 Several strengths are evident in faith-based diplomacy, as presented throughout the 
thesis.  By utilising faith-based diplomacy, diplomats will be able to place religion into the 
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centre of the analysis, which will ultimately assist in addressing the religious and identity-based 
motivators of violence present in many cases of 21st Century conflict, such as identity conflicts 
in developing states and continuing concerns regarding extremism in the Middle East. As 
Appleby notes, if religion is a determining or supporting factor in conflict, faith-based 
diplomacy can evaluate the contested and reinterpreted nature of religion as a way of life, as a 
form of intellectual heritage, and as a central social tradition.1201 Even in conflicts without a 
religious dimension, religious actors can still contribute through a mediating role; while on a 
larger societal scale the whole apparatus of a religious institution can be utilised to develop 
support for peacebuilding initiatives and negotiations.1202 This is one of the reasons that 
religion should not only be analysed to identify any negative effects it may have, but also in 
search of its inherent assets; indeed, religion possesses   “power in relation to war and security 
as a direct result of its control of resources, interpersonal relationships, communications and 
expertise”.1203 Cox and Philpott note four situations where faith-based diplomacy will be most 
favourable. They are:  
1. “Conflicts whose parties define themselves by their religion and perhaps even fight over 
religion.” Examples of this may be found in Sudan, Israel-Palestine and the former 
Yugoslavia. 
2. “Where, regardless of the identities of the parties, certain religious leaders enjoy a 
charisma that they may exercise for settlement and reconciliation.”  Cox and Philpott 
provide the example of Gandhi who exercised his own spiritual force to build 
reconciliation. 
3. “Civilizational dialogue. Here conflict, at least of the broad ideological sort, occurs 
even among the broadest religious collectivities – Islamic and Western civilisations, for 
example.” This notion of interaction between civilisations reflects perhaps an extension 
of Huntington’s thesis, however, research has engaged with the notion of civilisations 
to see how cooperation may be fostered between these groupings.1204 While care needs 
to be taken in using the civilisational label, civilisational dialogue has a positive history, 
including the United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations in 2001, or the 
Dialogue of Civilisations research institute founded in 2016. The main problems with 
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thinking in terms of ‘civilisations’ is that it could create, ‘imagined communities’ of 
enemies (to borrow from Benedict Anderson1205) on an unprecedented scale. 
4. “Faith-based diplomats are well positioned to become trusted envoys”. Here Cox and 
Philpott refer to examples from Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia and Lebanon.1206  
The strengths of faith-based diplomacy listed in this section reflect on those that have been 
explicated throughout the thesis. What is apparent, however, is that faith-based diplomacy can 
be a tool for practitioners to consider in their diplomatic strategies. This is the contribution of 
this thesis: that faith-based diplomacy presents itself as a worthy theoretical perspective to 
employ in the diplomat’s toolkit within Diplomacy Studies. 
 
Limitations of Faith-based Diplomacy  
 Having affirmed the benefits of faith-based diplomacy, it is important to note that faith-
based diplomacy is not a panacea for all religious conflict and resultant implications. As such, 
careful attention needs to be given to the potential limitations that exist in the theory of faith-
based diplomacy, and indeed what the consequences could be in practice. When considering 
the advancement of the study of faith-based diplomacy, the most significant limitation is that, 
since the Westphalian subordination of religion to the internal affairs of the state, analysts have 
essentially assumed that religion is absent among the factors that influence state behaviour.1207 
These assumptions have resulted in a “dangerous gap in knowledge about religion’s complex 
contemporary role”.1208 While some observers are recognising the value of studying religion, 
the secularisation of church and state will provide a level of limitation to those within 
international relations who want to contend intellectually with religion and its role in political 
affairs and diplomacy.1209 Maintaining the balance of this relationship between separateness 
and stability, where material power and secular mechanisms are in the service of a religious 
movement, is one that continues to challenge diplomats.1210 The core issues raised by religious 
violence is a challenge to the methods and structures of diplomacy, but this requires addressing 
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religious differences, and not superficially.1211 Data that is available on the intermediary 
peacemaking role, whether as a part of an institution or as a religious actor, is limited and the 
documentation that does exist to gather data is often fragmentary.1212 When considering that 
all major religions in the world present some element of peacemaking, “their development and 
articulation have been inadequate”, even though observers are noting the need to use this as an 
instrument of conflict prevention and resolution.1213 Whether studying religion, theology or 
faith-based diplomacy, the principles of peacemaking in religious beliefs have not been easily 
accessible for diplomats. Fundamentally, “faith-based diplomacy should know its own 
limitations in conflict situations as well as being aware of the need to address the basic needs 
of conflicting parties in the first instance and not in the balance of power”.1214 
 The available frameworks to approach religion are too narrow in current Western 
government processes, which generally only understand religion as a negative force.1215 As 
such, the role of religion in public policy is confused. Assumptions about religion’s irrationality 
mean that its relationship to democracy and modern society is underappreciated, let alone its 
relevance to addressing the issues in the contemporary international system. From the 
perspective of public diplomacy in the United States using the assets provided by religion, two 
limitations are apparent when noting how slow these advancements have been. The two are: 
“trepidation about any government linkage to religion, and the absence of any governmental 
public diplomacy mechanism that would foster effective use of the asset”.1216 Still, within the 
public diplomacy perspective, religion-related public diplomacy strategies are often limited by 
the need to vigilantly critique the religious sensitivities of the target audiences of public 
diplomacy programs.1217 As religion is an inherently identity-based issue, these sensitivities 
can quickly escalate which may lead to counterproductive results, or even motivating violent 
conflict.1218 This, for example, may happen if engagement with religion is superficial or 
tokenistic, such as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to India in early 2018.1219 
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When frameworks are applied, it is important to consider each conflict case as unique, as not 
every case highlights the same aspect of the conflict in question.1220 This is important to 
consider when a decisionmaker is analysing patterns across conflict, or for academics who are 
attempting to construct frameworks based on previous patterns in religious violence. While the 
international system is changing to allow the role of nonstate actors, even individuals, to play 
a part in diplomacy, the methods and mechanisms utilised by these new actors – their 
diplomatic ‘toolkit’ – needs to be revised to match contemporary needs. 
The rapid expansion of terrorist activity in the post-9/11 world has demanded a response 
from the international community. The rise of fundamentalism is a difficult issue to which to 
reply, and while faith-based diplomacy may be able to assist in some elements of the resolution 
of this distinctive conflict phenomenon, it remains an arduous task. From the perspective of the 
United States and its foreign policy which – in view of being the target of 9/11 and the chief 
protagonist in long ‘war on terror’ – provides a ready example, there are reasons for the urgency 
of addressing the issues of politically motivated violence. As Johnson has argued, the spectre 
of religious extremism and related threats requires a quick response.1221 Further, in light of the 
expenses of the American interventions in the post-Cold War era, and subsequently post-9/11 
(notabable Afghanistan and Iraq), interventions that seek to halt violent conflict which can 
impact American national interest have proven to be cost-prohibitive. They are also less 
politically palatable, as the Trump administration has shown. Also, terrorist organisations 
opposed to the foreign policies of the United States are finding environments which meet their 
needs for training, equipping and mobilising – as was evident with the rise of ISIS. The 
magnitude of the issues faced would suggest that they require a substantial response. It is a 
condition that requires methods perhaps more tested than faith-based diplomacy.  
Another limitation to the use of faith-based diplomacy to address these typically high 
agenda areas of international affairs is that religion is viewed as a soft, cultural notion, as 
opposed to the traditionally hard power conceptions of geopolitics.  Interestingly, the issues of 
religious violence and the implications of this type of conflict are increasingly found to impact 
developing countries. As Pokhariyal notes, the mechanisms and tools of diplomacy are 
predominantly used by rich, powerful, and industrialised nations as those diplomatic 
mechanisms have been professionally developed.1222 This divide between developing and 
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developed states in the institution and mechanisms of diplomacy will limit the potential 
application of faith-based diplomacy in the environments where it is most needed. 
Alternatively, developing nations with strong religious and cultural traditions and which are 
already using their religious culture diplomatically (as identified in this thesis, Chapter 8), may 
have tools of their own to contribute to the Western diplomat’s toolkit. This may be viewed as 
an opportunity for further development (discussed below). 
Returning to the risks of applying a poorly constructed faith-based approach to 
diplomacy, unless this problem is recognised it may even exacerbate conflict conditions. These 
limitations, however, are not a reason to ignore the study of faith-based diplomacy. As this 
thesis has suggested, there are significant opportunities in both the theory and practice of 
diplomacy for faith-based diplomacy to be considered as a viable tool for the diplomat, 
strategist and academic to use. Academics and practitioners have suggested areas of future 
improvement that should be considered to assist in enhancing faith-based diplomacy’s 
effectiveness as a theory and as a diplomatic strategy. These opportunities will, hopefully, 
address some of the limitations discussed in this section and see faith-based diplomacy 
strengthened as a result.  
 
Opportunities for the Future of Faith-based Diplomacy  
 Throughout the literature on faith-based diplomacy, scholars and practitioners have 
offered suggestions as to improving faith-based diplomacy in the future. This section will draw 
together these recommendations to present the opportunities for enhancing faith-based 
diplomacy in its theoretical construction and its practical application. These recommendations 
will provide the framework for reconceptualising faith-based diplomacy as it is understood and 
practised in the 21st Century. Fundamentally, the knowledge that there are tools for 
peacemaking in all major religions needs to be developed and articulated; these represent vital 
instruments for conflict prevention and resolution. The aim of the founding thinkers on faith-
based diplomacy comes back to the core of finding ways to use religion as a positive force for 
peace within diplomacy. This was borne out of the findings in the early scholarly investigations 
of faith-based diplomacy which concluded that: “religious contributions to peacemaking have 
been under-appreciated, if not totally ignored, by foreign policy practitioners”, and “there are 
substantial under-utilized assets within religious communities which, with proper training, 
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could be applied to peacemaking”.1223 While progress is evident in this area, there is still much 
work to be done, whether that be in the exploration of more religious traditions, or the 
construction of diplomatic instruments which harness these religious norms for peacemaking. 
Cox and Philpott offer four recommendations for those who may see a future in faith-based 
diplomacy. They are:  
1. For policymakers and diplomats: build relationships with faith leaders 
2. For young activists in faith-based diplomacy: work with an experienced practitioner as 
a mentor 
3. Explore programs in peace studies that have a strong religious component 
4. Become committed to specific international conflict situations – long-term 
involvement, relationship-building, trust, and on-site knowledge are the keys to making 
a difference.1224 
These recommendations suggest the importance of improving the academic nature of faith-
based diplomacy, and also the way in which faith-based diplomats engage in the diplomatic 
mechanism. A way to enhance the theory and practice of faith-based diplomacy may be to fill 
the gap in research where a “systematic and comprehensive assessment of the conditions under 
which faith-based and religious actors are more effective in resolving conflicts has not yet been 
undertaken”.1225 Appleby also suggests that trained religious actors who are available to local 
communities impacted by conflict are accessible to engage in peacemaking efforts.1226 Thus, 
this space of engaging with religious actors is one that warrants critical attention. Sharp notes 
that this is an attainable opportunity as “the rise of the idea [of] religion in international affairs 
has occurred hand-in-hand with the rise of the idea of people being international actors in their 
own right”.1227 The construction of platforms which effectively integrate individuals into the 
diplomatic process should be considered by scholars in Diplomacy Studies to reap further 
results from this area. The growing variety of actors in the international system can be of benefit 
to faith-based approaches to diplomacy; official channels of diplomacy when partnered with 
peacemaking from a religious perspective can contribute to improved outcomes in overcoming 
communal conflict. 
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 To enhance the application of faith-based diplomacy, Albright reflected on her own 
experiences within the State Department. She found that: 
In the future, no American ambassador should be assigned to a country where 
religious feelings are strong unless he or she has a deep understanding of the 
faiths commonly practiced there. Ambassadors and their representatives, 
wherever they are assigned, should establish relationships with local religious 
leaders. The State Department should hire or train a core of specialists in 
religion to be deployed both in Washington and in key embassies overseas.1228 
These recommendations are not beyond the scope of possibility. What they require is a 
reordering of priorities within government departments that see the importance of religion as 
part of their policymaking. This is why Farr suggests that policymakers should see religion as 
a normative motivator of human and government behaviour, that can be a multiplier of either 
destructive or constructive outcomes.1229 Luttwak echoes this point and notes that 
policymakers, diplomats, journalists and scholars can all recognise the role of religious 
institutions and religious motivations in the way that they explain politics and conflict.1230 This 
does not mean, however, that faith-based diplomats isolate themselves from the broader 
diplomacy community. Indeed, “faith-based diplomats, in turn, have much to learn from the 
secular ‘veterans’ of conflict management”.1231 The opportunity for understanding religion as 
a contributor to soft power and also traditional hard power needs recognition, as the conceptual 
lens applied to the analysis of religion will determine how people act, and also how 
governments respond. Through history, governments have made a concerted effort to secularise 
society. In this current climate, Sharp notes that diplomats should try to remain separate from 
secular projects “designed to counter faith, ignorance and tradition, with reason, science and 
market democracies” because, as hindsight now shows, these projects have been 
counterproductive, often entrenching intolerance and misunderstanding.1232   
In the contemporary international system, the issues presented by religion need to be 
addressed by constructive responses, especially in the American context where the ‘war on 
terror’ became emblematic of the era. Johnson’s recommendations begin with the idea of 
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integrating religious attachés into the diplomatic corps.1233  They fit within a bottom-up 
approach to peacebuilding, where they can plan programs appropriate to their budgets, and 
operate as experts with specialised training in dealing with the complexities of religious issues. 
Moreover, they understand religious motives, the language of local religious expression, and 
also how faith inspires action.1234 Johnston also calls for adjusting the structures of government 
departments to allow for spiritual engagement.1235 This structural change would be supported 
by what he calls “the congressional dimension”, which sees foreign policy and leadership 
involved in the processes of resolving religious issues.1236 Finally, Johnston also calls for 
educational reform.1237  In support of educational reform, Patterson states that the US “national 
security community needs to bring more comparative politics, religious studies, and cultural 
studies into traditional ‘international relations theory’ approaches to security education”.1238 
This is just one of the ways that education can be enhanced to increase the effectiveness of 
government institutions in addressing religious challenges. These are broad recommendations 
which fit within the context of the United States but do offer a target for reform.  
Still, within the American context, Birdsall recommends several steps for how the 
United States can enhance religious freedom and religious engagement. In response to 9/11, 
the Bush administration in its difficulties conceptualising a coherent approach to Muslim 
outreach was unable to foster a positive religious engagement.1239 The Obama administration, 
however, pledged to restore the American relationship with the Muslim world, but even then, 
religious freedom received little attention, and the International Religious Freedom Office 
within the State Department battled observer scepticism.1240 President Trump’s ability to 
enhance religious engagement is, at the time of writing, not yet known. However the signals of 
the so-called “Muslim Ban” were not promising.1241 For an administration to effectively 
integrate religious engagement, they must first appoint an International Religious Freedom 
ambassador as a priority.1242 Furthermore, the bureaucratic apparatus surrounding religion and 
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foreign policy needs to be reviewed to ensure that government institutions are addressing 
effectively the religious challenges that states are facing.  
Seib has suggested that within the context of the United States, religious values and 
religious freedom are assets that can enhance America’s public diplomacy strategies.1243 The 
national interests of the United States can advance if public diplomacy strategies can provide 
venues for defining the role of religious freedom in society, where diplomats are trained to 
engage with the dynamics of religious freedom critically, and where religious freedom becomes 
an integral part of American civil society.1244 This is an example of how one intersection 
between religion and politics, in this case religious freedom, can be effectively managed by 
diplomatic strategies when constructed properly. Loskota and Flory note that American public 
diplomats’ interest in religion has been growing, however, the “necessary skills, competency, 
or even framing to understand better the variety of religious forms and the ways they shape the 
world” are underdeveloped.1245 They call for a reconceptualisation of diplomat’s notions of 
how religion operates, how it influences social and political action, and how the religion 
impacts the personal and communal levels of society.1246 Once this fundamental shift occurs, 
the potential for achieving public diplomacy goals will enhance. Faith groups can be partners, 
or at least consultants, in public diplomacy strategies.1247 Spurred by globalisation, however, 
the need for a pluralistic understanding of religious differences is vital, and thus public actors 
and faith groups must articulate their understanding of how the world works and seek mutual 
roles for each group to play.1248 Scholars recognise that religion-related public diplomacy can 
be a valuable counterweight to religious politics, but the way in which it is an effective 
counterweight, and also as an independent influence on the conduct of international relations, 
much work remains to be done.1249 
 Whether in the scholarship of faith-based diplomacy or its application by diplomats in 
the field, these recommendations show that many opportunities can be taken to see faith-based 
diplomacy improve in the future. An issue present in these recommendations is that they are 
heavily US-centric, but this in itself can be viewed as an opportunity for future study. Other 
world religions in other regions within different state perspectives can be the focus of future 
                                                          
1243 Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 19  
1244 Ibid. 20 
1245 Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 10  
1246 Ibid. 10  
1247 Ibid. 23 
1248 Ibid. 23  
1249 Seib, "Conclusion: The Future of Religion and Public Diplomacy." 219 
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analysis, thus expanding the resources available for those engaged in the field of faith-based 
diplomacy. Some movement is evident in this area, but as the field begins to grow, the 
consideration of other religious perspectives and cultural positions will only help to strengthen 
the body of work. The review of literature conducted throughout this thesis has noted several 
recommendations that require attention. However, the intention of this thesis is not to merely 
advocate for the potential of faith-based diplomacy, but rather present a comprehensive and 
consolidated frame for academics and practitioners to utilise when devising future research or 
diplomatic strategy. This thesis has noted several distinct gaps in the literature, but to this point 






















Conclusion: Reconceptualising the Theoretical Framework of Faith-based 
Diplomacy 
 
 This thesis has examined faith-based diplomacy in an endeavour to identify and 
explicate the tools available for diplomats in addressing the challenges of the 21st Century. 
Clarifying the constructs of faith-based diplomacy in theory and consolidating the various 
perspectives applied to the theory since its introduction into scholarship in the 1990s has been 
a priority of this study. This has been undertaken so that theory can inform practice; more 
precisely, so that the critically examined theories of faith-based diplomacy can inform the 
diplomatic strategies of the future. As a result, the understanding of faith-based diplomacy will 
have been reconceptualised in light of the gains made in the area. Each chapter of this thesis 
has been written to analyse and extend the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies by presenting 
advancements when considering the integration of faith and religion into diplomacy. In Chapter 
2 the school of traditional diplomacy was examined to determine what the foundational theories 
of Diplomacy Studies are. The primary actors of traditional diplomacy, the state and state 
diplomats, were discussed. So too was the role of religion in diplomacy as evident in this 
traditional conception of the theory. This set the foundation for a literature analysis in 
Diplomacy Studies, but also suggests that there has been a strong interlinkage between religion, 
politics and diplomatic mechanisms throughout history. Chapter 3 highlighted the evolution of 
theory in Diplomacy Studies and noted the challenge to the traditional school of diplomacy by 
the new and innovative understandings of diplomacy theory. The movement away from the 
traditional school of thought in diplomacy recognised actors beyond the state and opened up 
the possibilities for different actors to fulfil the functions of diplomacy customarily conducted 
by the state. The new actors of diplomacy, nonstate actors who gained prominence through the 
new and innovative schools of thought, were then examined in Chapter 4. Like the examples 
given in the analysis of traditional diplomacy, new and innovative diplomacy also reveals the 
engagement of religious actors at various levels. The methods for integrating religious 
considerations into diplomacy have expanded with the advancements in Diplomacy Studies, a 
development to which this thesis has made a contribution. These early chapters formed the 
basis of analysis within the scope of Diplomacy Studies and suggested the areas of change in 
the theories that have made way for faith-based diplomacy to emerge. Chapter 5 looked to 
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resolve the contextual and framing issues of faith-based diplomacy, including its interaction 
with conflict, conflict resolution, secularisation, the definitions of religion and faith, and also 
how religion has re-emerged as an important factor of analysis in the 21st Century. Chapter 6 
then examined specifically faith-based diplomacy as it has been discussed in theory thus far. 
This chapter highlighted some of the central definitions of faith-based diplomacy, with a 
revised definition (under ‘Defining Faith-based Diplomacy’ in Chapter 6) also offered by this 
thesis. This was undertaken to emphasise the expanding space of faith-based diplomacy in light 
of the prevailing trends impacting Diplomacy Studies.  
This definition proposed by this thesis, and which supports the reconceptualization of 
the theoretical framework of faith-based diplomacy, is worth repeating in this concluding 
chapter: 
Faith-based diplomacy is a form of diplomacy usually conducted by, but not limited to, Track 
Two agents. Faith-based diplomacy integrates the dynamics of religious faith with the conduct 
and processes of international peacemaking. As such, reconciliation is the primary goal of 
faith-based diplomacy in conflict resolution as faith-based diplomacy seeks not only the 
absence of conflict, but the restoration of relationships between parties to establish positive 
peace. 
This definition is taken from Johnston and Cox’s definition, but key features of the definition 
have been adjusted to account for the changes in the international system since the definition 
was first produced. Those changes are worth justifying here to highlight how faith-based 
diplomacy has been reconceptualised. The first essential point is that faith-based diplomacy 
was originally labelled as functioning only in the second track of diplomacy. While this is 
arguably the most effective and convenient place for faith-based diplomacy to operate, it can 
be a limitation. As scholars have suggested, faith-based diplomacy can work well in tandem 
with official agents. Further, faith-based diplomacy does not seek to overthrow traditional 
mechanisms of diplomacy, but rather be integrated into practice as a viable option in diplomatic 
strategy. The strength of faith-based diplomacy as a Track Two practice is not being ignored; 
however, opening faith-based diplomacy to a broader cast of actors allows for the growth in 
the innovative school of diplomacy and Track 1.5 diplomacy. The second sentence of the 
definition remains the same as Johnston and Cox’s as the central aim of faith-based diplomacy 
remains the same. In the original definition, reconciliation was highlighted as the goal of faith-
based diplomacy, and this definition affirms reconciliation as the primary pursuit. The value of 
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reconciliation in faith-based diplomacy and as a part of conflict resolution is an important 
association that will be elaborated on further below. However, the final part of this revised 
definition importantly places weight on the attainment of positive peace. Reconciliation and 
positive peace are inherently linked but positive peace as a theory provides more scope for the 
potential impact of faith-based diplomacy. Positive peace is an important addition to this 
revised definition because, even though it includes reconciliation, there are other activities 
within positive peace that faith-based diplomacy can benefit. Positive peace seeks to alleviate 
structural causes for conflict. This may include laws against religious freedom, or access for 
religious groups to participate in democratic institutions. Sources of cultural violence are also 
a focus of positive peace with issues stemming from the basis of ethnology or identity resolved 
in this process. Incorporating faith-based diplomacy into the broader spectrum of positive peace 
activities enables the theory to become a more readily available tool to diplomats and 
policymakers.  
This thesis has also linked the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies to the concept of faith-
based diplomacy to understand better how faith-based diplomacy fits as a theory within the 
scope of Diplomacy Studies. This was performed within Chapter 7, which noted theories of 
complementarity and provided new lenses of analysis to understand faith-based diplomacy 
from a variety of perspectives within International Relations. In Chapter 8, the core concepts 
of faith-based diplomacy, as suggested through the literature, were presented to strengthen the 
constructs and defining features of the theory. Through this section, the thesis gave special 
attention to the different actors in the international system and how they can potentially engage 
in faith-based diplomacy. In so doing, practitioners of diplomacy will have a clearer picture of 
what is available within the theory of faith-based diplomacy, and who best to engage with when 
employing faith-based diplomacy in practice. As the aim of this thesis is to reconceptualise 
faith-based diplomacy to best fit the current international system, Chapter 8 is essential in 
providing the key frameworks, targets, actors and concepts which form the basis of this 
reconceptualiation. In Chapter 9, recommendations for advancements in the study of faith-
based diplomacy, predominantly in the American context, were identified, and this was in 
accordance with a central aim of this thesis:  to identify the recommendations that scholars and 
practitioners have called for, in an attempt to present areas of future improvement. The 
discussions of the strengths, limitations and recommendations for faith-based diplomacy were 
given in Chapter 9 and presented to form a reconceptualised framework. In this current 
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concluding chapter, recommendations will be offered to assert how this deeper understanding 
of faith-based diplomacy can be applied to diplomatic theory, practice and to future research.  
This framework, supported through the analysis of this thesis, comprises the following 
recommendations: 
• To continue the investigation of religion to identify the assets for peace inherent in 
religions. As societies around the world are seeing a rise of religious populations, and 
scholarly attention continues to draw religious issues into light, this recommendation 
suggests that observers optimise the opportunities of this trend. This will require 
scholars to examine religious traditions, values, and key texts to identify potential 
contributions of these religions to peacemaking. Importantly, academics must clearly 
articulate what these assets are so that they can feature in diplomatic strategy. For future 
study in this area specifically, academics should direct attention not only to Western 
religious traditions such as Christianity, but the growing body of literature into other 
world religions.  
• The recommendation of drawing from a variety of religious traditions leads to the 
second recommendation of expanding the basis of faith-based diplomacy from a 
multiplicity of perspectives through a strengthened knowledge base and understanding. 
Since 9/11, the body of literature focusing on the Islamic faith tradition has grown 
dramatically. Buddhist and Confucian traditions from Asia are also gaining more 
attention. In addition, indigenous religious traditions around the world will be valuable 
to investigate. The more research that is conducted to develop accurate understanding 
in this area, the greater the opportunities for those working within faith-based 
diplomacy.  
• The interdisciplinary nature of religion is another way that perspectives and 
understandings of faith-based diplomacy can be expanded. As religion forms such a 
central part of many societies around the world, multiple scholarly fields are interested 
in its impact. Work in comparative theology and biblical studies, for example, has 
developed practical frameworks for conducting interfaith dialogue. Those in faith-
based diplomacy can observe the advancements made through these approaches and 
find appropriate ways to translate those findings into diplomacy. Research in areas such 
as education, psychology, sociology, anthropology, theology, conflict resolution, peace 
studies, and security studies hold considerable potential in contributing to the 
development of strategies within the diplomat’s toolkit.    
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• Religion needs to be afforded greater analytical relevance within the field of peace 
studies. In this, education would benefit from reform to highlight the importance of 
religion as a variable in the study of behaviour in society. Within this scope, religion 
would be a more important factor in multiple channels of conflict resolution and peace 
studies, including reconciliation, post-conflict rebuilding, confidence-building 
measures, mediation, and aid delivery. This re-evaluating of education within peace 
studies can be beneficial to multiple areas, including in general academic studies, in the 
education and training of diplomatic practitioners, and at the grassroots of society so 
that people better understand religion and its role in their community. Importantly, this 
requires a fundamental shift of perspective, where religion can be appreciated as a 
source of peace, not only as a driver of conflict.  
• Religion should be considered as a critical part of the policymaker’s calculus. This 
requires that decisionmakers see how religion influences behaviour, and where religion 
supports processes toward peace. Once religion has been given a higher priority on the 
agendas of policymakers, it will reflect in practice. This does not imply the dissolution 
of the separation of church and state, but it does mean that those involved in 
policymaking should give religious considerations the appropriate weight when 
constructing policy.   
• The place of new actors in the diplomatic process is one that requires significant 
scholarly attention. The effectiveness of religious actors in conflict resolution needs to 
be studied, and upon realising their potential benefits, then religious actors can be 
integrated more effectively. Importantly, individuals within the community are a 
diplomatic asset, and training should be conducted to raise religious peacemakers from 
the grassroots. Throughout this thesis a myriad of actors has been hypothesised, 
including religious leaders, places of worship, faith-based civil society organisations 
and broader religious communities. As research continues to understand the different 
platforms from which actors can participate in diplomacy, scholars should consider the 
viability of faith-based actors in these processes.  
• With respect to diplomatic theory, the area of public diplomacy seems the most 
effective for collaboration with faith-based approaches. Here, public diplomacy 
practitioners and academics should continue their investigations into how religion and 
religious values can enhance their diplomatic strategy. Not only that, but public 
diplomacy has enabled issues such as religious freedom to be seriously considered by 
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the state. This scholarly work is a fertile ground to expand faith-based diplomacy in the 
future.  
• The final recommendation within the reconceptualised framework pertains to the state 
and the diplomat. Essentially, government structures need to be adjusted to ensure that 
there is a place for religion to be investigated, understood, and appropriately applied in 
policy. This should see religion given a more serious position in the formulation of 
diplomatic strategies. Diplomats should be trained on religious issues, especially when 
considering the location of their deployment. Furthermore, diplomats should be trained 
to engage with religious leaders and build relationships with the religious community 
when seeking to engage in conflict resolution. These goals are achievable by 
incorporating religious attachés, or technical experts in the area of religion, into 
diplomatic missions. Again, this does not suggest that the state remove the separation 
of church and state powers, but rather recognises that the diplomatic corps must be 
better equipped at dealing with religious issues. This thesis has proposed a 
reconceptualised understanding of faith-based diplomacy for the purposes of expanding 
the diplomat’s toolkit. This recognises that faith-based strategies for diplomacy are 
tools that are available to state diplomats in the conduct of their profession.  
The above recommendations are not only an extension on the areas of concern 
identified in the literature, but taken together form a higher order concept in which faith-based 
diplomacy gains coherence and recognition as a diplomatic tool. Moreover, in view of prior 
scholarship having been undertaken within a predominantly American context, this thesis – in 
examining the theoretical substance of faith-based diplomacy – recommends a globalised 
toolkit. Here the term ‘globalised’ is used in both senses of generalised and internationalised. 
An Australian, a European or a Chinese diplomat, for example, would benefit from utilising 
the unique space for public diplomacy and faith-based diplomacy to cooperate. Furthermore, 
with this thesis providing a comprehensive and consolidated framework of faith-based 
diplomacy, the central tenets of faith-based diplomacy and its application through various 
actors can be readily accessed by scholars and practitioners to incorporate into diplomatic 
processes to address global issues.     
 When examining the way that religion has impacted security studies, it is well to 
remember that behaviour is often determined by perception and its associated mental models. 
As Saunders aptly expressed it, how we act largely depends on “the conceptual lenses we use 
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to bring into focus the world around us and to give meaning to events”.1250 This is the goal of 
faith-based diplomacy as a theory, to enhance understanding of (a) the role and impact of 
religion and how religion has influenced conflict, as well as (b) how religion may be used as a 
positive asset to influence diplomacy and conflict resolution. Such a goal has been the central 
purpose of this thesis. In reconceptualising the frame of faith-based diplomacy in light of the 
changing international system and advancements to diplomacy scholarship, this reconfigured 
consideration of faith-based diplomacy can bring into focus the challenges facing the 
international community in the contemporary era.  
The impact of new challenges to diplomacy globally has heightened the need for more 
sophisticated approaches to these issues. Faith-based diplomacy is one such conceptual lens 
that, if applied correctly, could offer greater analytical insights and assistance in resolving the 
conflict issues that have come to the attention of international observers. A number of these 
areas of concern have been identified throughout this thesis, and the inherent benefit of 
incorporating faith-based approaches to diplomatic practice has been made. As noted in this 
thesis, practitioners have recognised the efficacy of faith-based diplomacy as a tool of foreign 
policy. In line with the findings throughout this thesis (Chapter 8), faith-based diplomacy needs 
to be viewed not as a replacement of traditional diplomacy, but as a strategy that can work with 
the traditional mechanisms of diplomacy while also engaging with the new, contemporary 
diplomatic landscape. Acquiring a deeper appreciation of religion’s influence in society and 
having frameworks for enhanced engagement with religion in diplomacy, represents a potent 
tool for the state, diplomats, nonstate actors, nongovernmental organisations, civil society 
organisations, religious communities, religious leaders and individuals who seek to participate 
in diplomatic institutions. In this way, it is envisaged that a reconceptualised theory will assist 
in informing practice.  
 Since faith-based diplomacy’s emergence as a scholarly construct in Diplomacy Studies 
in the 1990s, several academics and practitioners have engaged with it to varying degrees. 
While some considered that further theoretical development was not necessary, this thesis has 
argued to the contrary: theoretical advancements in faith-based diplomacy are necessary to 
address the changing nature of conflict and diplomacy in the prevailing international system. 
As such, this thesis has reinvigorated the definition of faith-based diplomacy, presented faith-
based diplomacy’s revised central tenets, and constructed frames by which different global 
                                                          
1250 Saunders, "Relational Realism: Toward a New Political Paradigm for Security." 165 
205 
 
actors can engage in the area of faith-based diplomacy. This has addressed the gap that existed 
in the literature, that being a lack of a sophisticated theoretical conceptualisation of faith-based 
diplomacy. With this now provided, scholars and practitioners have a frame which they can 
utilise to expand the diplomat’s toolkit by better incorporating faith into the thinking and 
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